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Abstract 
Over the next fifty years, the size and age structure of Europe’s population will 
experience major changes due to low fertility rates, continuous increases in life 
expectancy due to medical advances and the retirement of the baby boom generation. 
The main output of this work package is a model which allows the construction of 
scenarios for health and long-term care expenditure based on the premise that health 
spending is driven by a number of demographic, economic, social and institutional 
variables. The projections computed in this study are not forecasts but are instead 
intended to provide an indication on the potential timing and scale of budgetary 
challenges that could result from Europe’s ageing population.  
  
                                                 
∗ This is the final report of work package 8 of the Ageing, Health Status and Determinants of Health 
Expenditure (AHEAD) Project, undertaken by the National Institute of Economic and Social Research, 
under the EC 6
th Research Framework Programme. This version was prepared before the receipt of 
results for Denmark and Germany.   1
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1. Introduction 
One main characteristic of the European Union (EU) member states is the growing 
share of health and long-term care expenditure in GDP. In consequence, to control, 
and as much as possible to limit, the increase of those expenditure has become a 
major issue of European governments. In order to do so, we need to know what the 
main determinants of health and long-term care expenditure are and what their impact 
is. In effect, health and long-term care expenditure is usually explained by either a 
demand or a supply approach. In the former, health and long-term care expenditure 
depends on the level of GDP per capita and the relative price of health and long-term 
care, whilst, in the latter, health and long-term care spending depends on technical 
progress and the general behaviour of medical practitioners through induced demand.  
Throughout this report the term health care expenditure includes expenditure on long-
term care unless explicitly stated that it does not.  
 
Public expenditure on health care comprises a large part of government budgets. 
Overall health spending, including long-term care for the elderly, already accounts for 
around 9% of GDP in the EU countries (European Commission, 2006). There is also a 
question mark over how much funding will be available in the future, given an 
expected slowdown in GDP growth as the progressive decline in fertility rates since 
the late 1960s has caused labour supply to expand more slowly. How much health 
care expenditure might increase is difficult to say as there are numerous factors at 
play whose impact is quite uncertain. Past studies provide only limited guidance. Key 
factors that might explain rising expenditure appear to have been rapid introduction of 
new technologies, and higher demand for health care, itself a reflection of rising 
incomes and a more educated public. Calculating exactly how much spending will be 
needed, who will provide it, and the best way to spend it, is as complex a task as it is 
urgent. 
 
Many EU member states are concerned about the financial sustainability and the 
efficiency of their national health care systems. They share the collective challenge of 
discovering ways to deal with issues like the increase of the ageing population, the 
emergence of new and costly medical innovations, and the public’s growing outlook   3
regarding the quality and availability of health care. The affordability of health care is 
indeed at great risk. 
 
The main output of this work package is a model built from  the results of the earlier 
work packages in combination, and used to construct scenarios for health care 
expenditure in the EU. The underlying modelling framework is embedded in a series 
of EXCEL spreadsheets for subsequent use by policymakers. This makes it possible to 
explore the implications of changes either to parameters of the model or to underlying 
drivers such as demographic projections. 
2.  Data and Methodology 
The model is macroeconomic in form and represents the demand and supply side 
jointly, incorporating factors such demographic variables and the importance of the 
public sector.  The baseline of our calculations is provided by Christiansen et. al 
(2006) who investigate the relationship between ageing and aggregate health care 
expenditure in the EU countries. We have essentially taken their model and re-
estimated it in a form which is convenient for incorporation into a spreadsheet model. 
Our analysis relates to thirteen “old” EU countries (the EU-15 excluding Greece and 
Luxemburg) because data for the newer members were not available for long enough 
for satisfactory estimation to be possible.  
2.1 Data  
Following from Christiansen et. al (2006) the data used in this paper are a balanced 
panel dataset that covers 13 of the old EU member states (excluding Greece and 
Luxemburg). We refer to the results as relating to the EU15. The panel spans over a 
time period of 24 years (1980-2003).
1 
 
The dependent variable used in this paper is the natural logarithm of total health care 
expenditure per capita (THEPC) measured in US dollars in nominal prices and 
adjusted for both purchasing power parities (PPP) and inflation. Christiansen et. al 
(2006) make use of data collected from the OECD Health Data 2004 for OECD 
countries and data from the WHO (European health for all databases, WHO Regional  
 
                                                 
1 At an early state an attempt was made to estimate a similar model for new and prospective member 
states but the data were not of suitable quality.   4
Office for Europe, Copenhagen, Denmark) for non-OECD countries
2. The OECD’s 
measure of health care expenditure includes important parts of long-term care.  
Table 1  Data and Data Sources 
Variable Description  Data 
Source 
THEPC  Total health care expenditure per capita, US$ in nominal prices and 
adjusted for PPP (in logs).  OECD/WHO 
GDPPC  Gross domestic product per capita, US$ in nominal prices and 
adjusted for PPP (in logs).  OECD 
AGE65-74  Population aged 65-74 as a share of the total population.  Eurostat 
AGE75+  Population aged 75+ as a share of the total population.  Eurostat 
ALE  Average of Life expectancy at aged 65 for males and females.  WHO 
FLFPR  Female labour force participation rate (% ratio to active population 
aged 15-65).  OECD 
UNEMP  Unemployed individuals as a share of the total labour force.  OECD 
ALCCON  Alcohol consumption, litres per capita (15+) (in logs).  OECD/WHO 
MORTALITY  Number of registered deaths/mid-year population (per 100) (in logs).  WHO 
PUHES  Public health expenditure in US$ PPP per capita as a share of the 
total health expenditure in US$ PPP per capita.  OECD/WHO 
SALARYGP  Dummy variable for countries with salaried GPs.  Christiansen 
et. al (2006) 
CAPGP  Dummy variable for countries with capitation payment GPs.  Christiansen 
et. al (2006) 
CASEHO  Dummy variable for countries with case-based reimbursement of 
hospitals. 
Christiansen 
et. al (2006) 
COPAYGP  Dummy variable for countries with significant co-payment for GPs.  Christiansen 
et. al (2006) 
COPAYHO  Dummy variable for countries with significant co-payment for 
inpatient hospital treatment. 
Christiansen 
et. al (2006) 
FREEGP  Dummy variable for countries with free choice of GP or primary 
care physician. 
Christiansen 
et. al (2006) 
FREEHO  Dummy variable for countries with overall ceiling of hospitals.  Christiansen 
et. al (2006) 
BEDS  Acute care beds per 1,000 inhabitants (in logs).  OECD/WHO 
 
The explanatory variables can be grouped into 3 broad categories. The first group 
includes the economic variable, the natural logarithm of GDP per capita (GDPPC), a 
behavioural variable (alcohol consumption
3) and two social variables (female labour 
force participation and unemployment rate). The age structure variables, life 
expectancy and mortality rates are included as demographic variables. The mortality 
rate was included to account for the recent arguments made in the literature that health 
care spending is more related to the nearness of death than to age (Zweifel et. al, 
1999; Seshamani and Gray, 2004a; Seshamani and Gray, 2004b). Studies overseas 
using unit record data have shown than one-quarter or more of lifetime health care 
                                                 
2 More extensive descriptive statistics are reported in work package 6, Part A, see (Schulz, 2005). 
3 We had hoped to include tobacco consumption as well but the data did not seem to be reliable.   5
expenditure may be consumed, on average, in the last year of life (Miller, 2001; Yang 
et. al, 2003). 
 
The second group includes characteristics of each country’s health care system in the 
period for which data has been collected. This list includes variables that describe 
institutional factors assumed to affect utilisation. This second group of institutional 
variables is included to catch incentives and regulatory factors on the supply side.  
 
Finally, the number of hospital beds reflects a variable which is generally believed to 
be an important determinant of costs.  
 
2.2 The problem in making cross-country projections 
The projections are in general made on the basis of ‘no policy change’, in that they 
reflect only existing legislation and not possible future policy changes. While these 
projections can point to key drivers of health care spending, it needs to be noted that 
they cannot completely model the specific institutional arrangements and policies 
which exist at the national level. A certain level of caution must be exercised when 
interpreting the long-run projections and the degree of uncertainty increases the 
further into the future the projections go. 
 
3. The Model 
Since the seminal paper by Newhouse (1977), it has been widely debated whether 
health care expenditures are a luxury good. Although over time the original empirical 
model by Newhouse has been improved in several directions in order to obtain a more 
realistic model, after three decades, the main result that emerges from these studies is 
that aggregate income appears to be the most important factor explaining health 
expenditure. Where disagreement occurs, is on the question of whether health care 
expenditure is either a luxury or a necessary good, i.e. on whether the income 
elasticity of demand is above or below one. 
3.1 Panel unit root tests 
Firstly, we check so see if there are unit roots for health care expenditure and the other 
explanatory variables in our model. Along with the standard augmented Dickey-Fuller 
(ADF) test (1979) and the Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) test, Error! Reference source   6
not found. presents four other panel data unit root tests that have been performed for 
all the variables in question for the EU15. The optimal lag length is selected using the 
Bartlett kernel and the automatic bandwidth parameter suggested by Newey and West 
(1994).  
 
The results show that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of the presence of a unit 
root for health care expenditure and GDP per capita. This hypothesis is only rejected 
for the female labour force participation rate (FLFPR) for the EU15 countries. 
Table 2   Panel Unit Root Tests for the EU15 
Variable  Lag 
Order 
Levin, 
Lin and 
Chu
a 
(2002) 
Breitung
b 
(2000, 
2002) 
Im, 
Pesaran 
and 
Shin
c 
(2003) 
Augmented 
Dickey-
Fuller
d 
(1979) 
Phillips 
and 
Perron
e 
(1988) 
Hadri
f 
(2000) 
THEPC 6.8393  -2.1523  -0.7470  24.1278  251.1278  2.8618 
p-value 
6 
(1.0000) (0.0157) (0.2275)  (0.2275) (0.0000)  (0.0021) 
GDPPC 5.8171  -4.1700  -2.1002  38.2773  154.504  0.5577 
p-value  6  (1.0000) (0.0000) (0.0179)  (0.1428) (0.0000)  (0.2885) 
AGE65_74 4.3733  -2.4932  -0.3544  25.3944  32.6828  2.0804 
p-value  6  (1.0000) (0.0063) (0.3615)  (0.7056) (0.3365)  (0.0187) 
AGE75_ 3.8639  -1.7226  -0.8477  24.1797  48.4834  -0.0752 
p-value  6  (0.9999) (0.0425) (0.1983)  (0.7638) (0.0177)  (0.5300) 
ALE 3.0061  -1.7951  -1.3904  34.1273  934.556  4.4105 
p-value  6  (0.9987) (0.0363) (0.0822)  (0.2758) (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
FLFPR 2.3024  -2.2114  -1.7238  29.7737  573.939  3.0968 
p-value  6  (0.9893) (0.0135) (0.0424)  (0.2771) (0.0000)  (0.0010) 
UNEMP 3.3033  -4.0794  -3.6606  55.1869  350.331  1.0309 
p-value  6  (0.9995) (0.0000) (0.0001)  (0.0034) (0.0000)  (0.1513) 
ALCCON 3.7001  -3.4188  -0.9583  29.0145  264.818  7.1720 
p-value  6  (0.9999) (0.0003) (0.1690)  (0.5168) (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
PUHES 5.8974  -1.7204  -0.2598  20.9425  304.899  3.1054 
p-value  6  (1.0000) (0.0427) (0.3975)  (0.8897) (0.0000)  (0.0010) 
BEDS 11.2182  -1.0813  -0.3283  2.7560  26.8064  -1.4385 
p-value  6  (1.0000) (0.1398) (0.3713)  (0.5995) (0.0000)  (0.9249) 
MORTALITY 7.2338  -3.5880  -0.5334  27.3345  982.770  4.2770 
p-value  6  (1.0000) (0.0002) (0.2969)  (0.6057) (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
Note: Panel unit root tests a, b, c, d and e all assume a null hypothesis of a common unit root process. 
Test f is the only test that assumes a null hypothesis of no unit root.  
 
 3.1 The Co-integration Rank 
The presence of unit root variables inevitably mean that we have to consider how 
many co-integrating vectors may be present in the model. We do this in the context 
set out by Breitung (2005). He suggests that the co-integrating vectors can be 
estimated first of all applying the first stage of Johansen’s (1988) approach to each 
member of the panel separately. This allows the data to be purged of dynamic effects 
and the co-integrating vectors can be estimated by means of a pooled regression based   7
on exactly the same derived variables as is used in Johansen’s approach. He then sets 
out a test which, given an initial assumption about the number of co-integrating 
vectors, tests for the significance of at least one extra co-integrating vector. The test is 
based on orthogonal complements as suggested by Saikonnen (1999). It relies on the 
fact that, if the rank of the co-integration matrix is sufficient, then linear combinations 
of the co-integration variables calculated using the orthogonal complement of the 
assumed co-integrating vector should have no explanatory power in the pooled 
regression. 
 
With twelve variables apart from the dummies and a  short annual  series there is a 
pragmatic question about how to explore the rank of the co-intergrating space. 
Breitung presents test statistics for co-integrating spaces of up to rank 6 against 
alternatives of lower rank. The test statistics present mixed messages.  GDP per capita 
is generally believed to be I(1) and it would therefore be surprising if health spending 
were not. Morality rates by age are also often thought to follow I(1) processes (Lee 
and Miller, 2001), and one would therefore expect average life expectancy to be so.  
For the same reasons we include the population shares aged 65-74 and aged 75+ in 
the group of variables amongst which we explore co-integration. Finally, we consider 
also the share of public health expenditure relative to total health care expenditure. 
This gives us six variables with a maximum of five co-integrating relationships, 
allowing Breitung’s test to establish whether we can accept the hypothesis that there is 
no more than one co-integrating relationship between the two. If there is no more than 
one such relationship we can use standard methods for estimating dynamic equations 
in panels, with the statistically significant present of lagged variables in levels 
indicating co-integration.  This gives a test statistic of λ= 86.35 where, with N the 
number of panel elements and T the sample size,  the distribution of 
76 94
01
119 7
Lt
.
N~ N ( , ) T
.
N
λ −
→∞
→∞
 
tests the hypothesis that there are k-5 co-integrating vectors against the null of k-1. It 
is plain that the hypothesis is easily accepted, and we proceed on the assumption that 
there is at most one co-integrating vector linking the variables in levels. 
 
   8
 
3.2 Estimation 
It has been known for many years that estimation of panel models with lagged 
dependent variables is subject to biases (Nickell, 1982). One popular means of dealing 
with this problem is to use the estimation methods described by Arellano and Bond 
(1991) and Arellano and Bover (1995) using dynamic generalised method of moments 
(GMM). However, as Nickell shows, the biases fall off rapidly as the sample size 
increases. For our sample size of over twenty observations it is by no means clear that 
Arellano and Bond’s method is better than more  conventional generalised least 
squares. We did experiment with both methods and found it difficult to identify 
satisfactory instruments for use with Arellano and Bons’ method. Accordingly we 
have instead relied on generalised least squares estimation with country fixed effects.  
 
We consider the simple autoregressive model 
,1 1,..., ; 1,..., it i t it it THEPC THEPC x u i N t T δ β − ′ =+ + = =        (1) 
where  it x  is a KN ×  matrix of covariates, β  a 1 K ×  vector of regression slopes and 
it i it u µ υ =+with ()
2 ~0 , i µ µ σ and  ( )
2 ~0 , it υ υ σ , independent and identically distributed 
(i.i.d) over the panels. With the hypothesis of a single co-integrating vector accepted 
we have, provided that the covariates include both current and lagged values of the 
I(1) variables, a satisfactory means of estimating the dynamic relationship. 
3.3 Least-squares restriction 
From the unrestricted equation we can use least-squares methods to explore various 
restrictions (Theil, 1971). This can be done following on from the estimation 
procedure, making it possible to explore the effects of different restrictions in the 
EXCEL spreadsheet produced as part of this work and allowing users to impose their 
own structures.  
 
It is assumed that there is a parameter vector x defined as the unrestricted set of 
variables, which should satisfy the accounting constraint,  = Ax r, where r is a vector 
of accounting residuals. It is also assumed that the observed parameters are distributed 
without bias around the true parameter values 
* x  with known variance matrix, V . 
   9
The least-squares problem presented here is then one of finding a vector 
* x , i.e. the 
set of restricted variables, which satisfies the accounting constraints, 
* = Ax r , and is 
close as possible to the observed parameter vector, x. The problem is that of 
minimising 
() ()
*1 * − ′ −− xx Vxx             ( 3 )  
subject to the constraint 
* = Ax r              ( 4 )  
The Lagrangian function takes the form 
() () ( )
*1 * * L λ
− ′ =− − − − Min x x V x x Ax r          ( 5 )  
The first-order conditions are then 
()
1*
* 2VxxA =  0
x
L
λ
− ∂ ′ =− −
∂
           ( 6 )  
* Ax r = 0
L
λ
∂
=−
∂
                             (7) 
Rearranging equation (6) gives 
()
* 2 λ ′ =− VA x x                              (8) 
Now by premultiplying both sides by A and rearranging yields 
( ) ()
1
* 2 λ
−
′ =− AVA A x x                            (9) 
and given that 
* = Ax r , we have 
() ()
1 2 λ
− ′ =− − AVA Ax r                          (10) 
Substituting this into equation [8] yields the constrained least-squares solution 
() ()
1 * − ′′ =− − x x VA AVA Ax r                        (11) 
The estimator is just a linear combination of the unrestricted parameters. That is, we 
need only run the unrestricted regression and then by performing a few computations 
we get the restricted estimates. We conclude this least-squares adjustment process by 
noting that the difference between the constrained and the unconstrained least-squares 
coefficient vectors is a linear function of the vector 
* Ax r − , which measures the 
degree to which the unconstrained coefficient vector fails to satisfy the constraints. 
 
The mean of this estimator can be shown to be   10
() () ()
1 * x x VA AVA Ax r E
− ′′ =− −                        (12) 
So the restricted least squares estimator is unbiased only when the linear restrictions 
are identically correct. The restricted least-squares estimator (Equation (11)) does not 
appear to be affected by premultiplication of the variance matrix V  by any scalar 
constant. This implies that the balancing process depends on relative but not on 
absolute data reliability. Restricting the parameters also leads to a reduction in the 
data variance, which can be seen by considering the restricted variance matrix 
()
1 * V V VA AVA AV
− ′′ =−                          (13) 
Given that equation (13) is a positive semi-definite matrix, it follows that the process 
of least-squares balancing has the effect of not making the data less accurate. The 
restricted variance matrix has a smaller variance than its unrestricted counterpart since 
()
1 − ′′ VA AVA AV  is positive definite and by restricting the parameters we enhance 
their reliability. 
 
4.  The Health Care Expenditure Model 
The model is built around a macro programme in EXCEL which uses the parameters 
estimated by GLS for the EU-15 excluding Luxemburg and Greece; we nevertheless 
refer to the model as a model of the EU-15. It is set up in such a way that users can 
impose restrictions on the parameters and also restrict the long-run elasticity of health 
care expenditure with respect to GDP. A set of restrictions has been programmed into 
the model but users can change any of these by adjusting the number of restrictions in 
the model. The long-run elasticity can be changed in the same way. An empty box 
implies that no restriction has been put in place on that parameter. Once the user is 
satisfied with the restrictions the 
2 χ  output will present a test for the validity of the 
restrictions.  
 
Once the restrictions have been imposed the user can select the member states whose 
health expenditure they wish to project. The spreadsheet for each country contains the 
data output from Christiansen et. al (2006) which is used to estimate the restricted 
model. For each of the variables, users can select the start and end period of the data 
in question. Alternatively, a trend growth can be applied to any of the variables. It is   11
important to mention here that the growth rates of the parameters projected may not 
be entirely logical and users are recommended to change the growth rates for the 
variables in question accordingly. For example, with the age variables, the proportion 
of the elderly may be very large the further the projections go and so therefore it is 
advisable for users to insert their own growth rates. 
 
Finally, users can enter an intercept correction by entering an initial and final years 
over which the correction is to be calculated. The default of this for the forecasting 
model is that the results are aligned to the last five years of the data. This avoids sharp 
jumps between data and forecast periods and is in keeping with common practice 
among economic forecasters. When users are content with the restrictions in place 
along with the relevant data selected for the countries in question then the model will 
compute projections for health care spending between 2004 and 2050 (or up to any 
other year the user specifies). Each time the model is run, the new projected figures 
are pasted over the existing ones. In order to show more clearly how to apply the 
model, appendix A provides a step-by-step guide on how to use the programme to 
project health care spending. 
 
5. Estimation Results 
By using the unrestricted and restricted parameters following from the least-squares 
estimation method outlined in section 3 we have estimated health care projections for 
the EU15 excluding Luxemburg and Greece. For an analysis of the descriptive 
statistics along with the correlation matrix of the variables the reader is referred to 
Christiansen et. al (2006). 
5.1 Parameter Estimates for EU15 countries 
    Table 3 gives the long-run elasticities of the variables in our initial regression 
analysis.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   12
Table 3 Long-Run Elasticities 
Variable Unrestricted  Models 
GDPPC 0.9363 
AGE65_74 -0.0230 
AGE75_ -0.0381 
AVELE65 0.0920 
FLFPR 0.0253 
UNEMP -0.0082 
ALCCON -0.0006 
PUHES 0.0125 
SALARYGP 0.1212 
CAPGP 0.2013 
CASEHO 0.0079 
COPAYGP 0.0812 
COPAYHO -0.1409 
FREEGP 0.2458 
FREEHO 0.0690 
BEDS 0.0369 
MORTALITY 0.2152 
 
As we can see from Table 3, the age effects have negative long-run semi-elasticities 
while the effects of mortality and average life expectancy are positive. Since the 
variables are not independent of each other such a structure need not be inconsistent 
with the idea that the partial effect of each demographic term should be positive. 
However we are able to accept a set of restrictions which set the long-run age effects 
to zero and which also limit the effect of mortality to zero, so that the only age effect 
is associated with rising life expectancy. We impose these restrictions jointly with 
others on insignificant variables giving the base restrictions for model 0 shown in 
Table 4. If we restrict only the population structure terms to zero the mortality effect 
becomes negative and for this reason it too is restricted to zero.    13
 
Table 4  Unrestricted and Restricted Regression Results 
from EU15 
  Unrestricted    Restricted Model 0 
 Coeff  z-stat  Coeff  z-stat 
LOGTHEPC(-1) 0.712597  14.75834  0.7001  22.4300 
LOGGDP 0.286783  2.266419  0.3021  10.8121 
LOGGDP(-1) -0.01768  -0.14216  0.0000  Rest* 
AGE65_74 0.023154  1.99257  0.0338  5.0139 
AGE65_74(-1) -0.029777  -2.729757  -0.0338  -5.0139 
AGE75_ 0.038199  1.904183  0.0311  3.3023 
AGE75_(-1) -0.049141  -2.26814  -0.0311  -3.3023 
AVELE65 -0.008697  -0.582769  -0.0163  -1.8821 
AVELE65(-1) 0.035151  2.510683  0.0288  2.5109 
FLFPR 0.005525  1.982653  0.0084  7.3622 
FLFPR(-1) 0.001753  0.720535  0.0000  Rest* 
UNEMP -0.002544  -0.917307  -0.0019  -3.2634 
UNEMP(-1) 0.000201  0.083806  0.0000  Rest* 
ALCCON -0.012096  -1.768828  -0.0058  -1.1924 
ALCCON(-1) 0.011911  1.846001  0.0032  0.6695 
PUHES 0.004087  1.831964  0.0028  4.9738 
PUHES(-1) -0.000487  -0.198353  0.0000  Rest* 
SALARYGP 0.024331  1.369935  0.0000  Rest* 
SALARYGP(-1) 0.010513  0.729624  0.0000  Rest* 
CAPGP 0.036716  3.136739  0.0220  4.5991 
CAPGP(-1) 0.021145  1.849732  0.0201  5.6771 
CASEHO -0.038563  -3.436662  -0.0496  -6.9427 
CASEHO(-1) 0.040823  3.760246  0.0447  5.6206 
COPAYGP 0.038339  1.553251  0.0472  4.7847 
COPAYGP(-1) -0.014997  -1.140861  0.0086  1.5641 
COPAYHO -0.024313  -2.015252  -0.0199  -3.2467 
COPAYHO(-1) -0.01619  -0.972756  0.0000  Rest* 
FREEGP 0.007112  0.441763  0.0000  Rest* 
FREEGP(-1) 0.06352  3.966351  0.0429  3.8931 
FREEHO 0.052506  4.974856  0.0541  8.1592 
FREEHO(-1) -0.032686  -2.76244  -0.0329  -4.1439 
BEDS 0.011626  0.890551  0.0187  5.8882 
BEDS(-1) -0.001009  -0.096272  0.0000  Rest* 
MORTM -0.107016  -0.668941  -0.2128  -2.0307 
MORTM(-1) 0.168854  1.190521  0.2128  2.0307 
Test of Restriction      χ
2
13=12.90 
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The long-run coefficients of the restricted model are compared with the earlier 
unrestricted model  in Table 5.  
Table 5  The Impact of 
Restrictions on the Long-Run 
Coefficients 
 Unrestricted  Model  0 
GDPPC 0.9363  1.0071 
AGE65_74 -0.0230  0.0000 
AGE75_ -0.0381  0.0000 
AVLE65 0.0920  0.0419 
FLFPR 0.0253  0.0281 
UNEMP -0.0082  -0.0065 
ALCCON -0.0006  -0.0087 
PUHES 0.0125  0.0094 
SALARYGP 0.1212  0.0000 
CAPGP 0.2013  0.1405 
CASEHO 0.0079  -0.0162 
COPAYGP 0.0812  0.1862 
COPAYHO -0.1409  -0.0662 
FREEGP 0.2458  0.1429 
FREEHO 0.0690  0.0707 
BEDS 0.0369  0.0622 
MORTM 0.2152  0.0000 
 
 
While income is the main driving force in most studies of health care expenditure, 
there is little consensus regarding the elasticity with respect to per capita health care 
spending (McGuire et. al, 1993). Herwartz and Theilen, 2003 argue that estimated 
elasticity seems to have decreased since the beginning of the 1980s, possibly 
reflecting cost-containment policies. Earlier studies using cross-sectional data found 
elasticities greater than one (Gerdtham et.  al, 1998), suggesting that health care 
expenditure is a luxury good. More recent studies using pooled time-series data and a 
wider range of explanatory variables suggest elasticities near or less than one (Hitiris 
and Posnett, 1992). Though, for time-series data, it is difficult to separate demand 
from supply related factors, since supply side factors are often not available, and those 
that are show little variance or are correlated with the income variable. With the 
restrictions in place which are easily accepted model 0 delivers an elasticity very close 
to 1.  
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Among the social and demographic variables, alcohol consumption might be thought 
to have an incorrect sign. However, there is little consensus about how far alcohol 
consumption is harmful and we have therefore not tried to restrict this variable. There 
is an expected positive sign on public health care expenditure (PUHES); high public 
provision raises total expenditure. The positive term in acute beds is not a surprise.  
 
The dummy variables merit particular discussion. They arise from an attempt to 
identify the characteristics of the health care systems of the different countries at 
different times. There is an obvious question how well they do this, since, for 
example, one might expect a country with small co-payments to be more like one 
without copayments than like one with large copayments. The supply-side dummy 
variables tend to have positive signs apart for case-based remuneration of hospitals 
(CASEHO) and co-payments to hospitals (COPAYHO). The demand-side dummy 
variables show a mixture of positive signs for co-payment for visiting a GP 
(COPAYGP), free choice of GP (FREEGP) and free choice of hospitals (FREEHO) 
but a negative sign for  co-payment for using hospitals (COPAYHO).  
 
Of these variables one in particular, the positive sign on copayments to GPs is of 
some concern. One might expect that copayments to GPs would reduce rather than 
increase health spending for any given share of public spending in the total. Since our 
model includes country fixed effects, the dummies affect our projections only if they 
change in the projection period. This happens only to Austria where the change is the 
removal of co-payments for visiting GPs. This has a powerful effect in depressing 
expenditure. Since there are obvious questions whether the dummy might actually 
represent a combination of characteristics rather than just the characteristic attributed 
to it, there are grounds for doubting that the impact of that single change would 
actually be what our model shows. In the report on Austria we therefore also present a 
projection on the assumption of no change. 
 
The large impact of the dummy variables suggests that institutional arrangements are 
an important influence on costs. However it is hard to be precise about exactly what 
characteristics of institutional arrangements do in fact have this influence.  
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6. Hypotheses about Determinants of Health Care 
Spending 
The model allows us to explore the implications of basic scenarios about the 
determinants of health spending in the context of the richer framework provided by 
regression analysis. We can explore hypotheses about the long-run elasticity of health 
spending with respect to GDP, that spending is closely related to the age structure of 
the population and that it is substantially driven by death-related costs. 
 
With the equation given as 
, 1 11 12 1 ln ln ... 1,..., ; 1,..., it i t it it it THEPC THEPC GDP GDP u i N t T δ ββ −− =+ + + + = =   (14) 
The long-run elasticity with respect to GDP is 
11 12
1
GDP
β β
ε
δ
+
=
−
                           (15) 
For a given value of  GDP ε  this defines a linear restriction linking  11 12 and  , β βδ . 
Equation (15) shows the long-run elasticities which result from imposing various 
restrictions on long run income elasticity. We can see in table 5 that, while an 
elasticity of 1.1 is accepted by the data, one of 1.2 is firmly rejected. Raising the 
elasticity affects the other coefficients. Most notably it reduces the coefficient on life 
expectancy. This explains why we find, in our country studies, that when the elasticity 
is raised, projected expenditure may fall. The impact of the reduced weight put on life 
expectancy more than compensates for the effect of a greater than unit elasticity on 
GDP with a rising GDP. 
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Table 6   Long-Run Coefficients with Different 
GDP Elasticities 
GDPPC  1.0071 1.0000 1.1000  1.2000 
AGE65_74  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 
AGE75_  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 
AVELE65  0.0419 0.0431 0.0244  0.0029 
FLFPR  0.0281 0.0282 0.0273  0.0264 
UNEMP  -0.0065 -0.0066 -0.0059  -0.0059 
ALCCON  -0.0087 -0.0089 -0.0068  -0.0055 
PUHES  0.0094 0.0094 0.0101  0.0104 
SALARYGP 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 
CAPGP  0.1405 0.1405 0.1460  0.1628 
CASEHO  -0.0162 -0.0161 -0.0149  -0.0107 
COPAYGP  0.1862 0.1856 0.1929  0.1982 
COPAYHO  -0.0662 -0.0647 -0.0845  -0.1017 
FREEGP  0.1429 0.1459 0.1088  0.0805 
FREEHO  0.0707 0.0702 0.0788  0.0895 
BEDS  0.0622 0.0628 0.0547  0.0465 
MORTM  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 
  χ12
2=12.90  χ13
2=12.93  χ13
2=16.42  χ13
2=24.6 
 
 
The model also allows us to explore the hypothesis that spending is age-related, or 
death-related. The first of these hypotheses implies that it changes as the age structure 
of the population changes while the second implies that it responds to movements in 
the mortality rate. As the population ages through increased longevity the proportion 
of old people in the population is likely to rise, while at the same time the mortality 
rate will decline. Thus the two hypotheses may have rather different implications for 
the evolution of health spending. 
 
We consider the long-run model in schematic form as 
12 3 4 65 74 75 THEPC GDPPC AGE AGE MORTALITY etc α αα α =+ − + + +           (15) 
It is important to recall here that the dependent variable, THEPC, used is defined in 
natural logarithms. The coefficients α2 to  α4 show the semi-elasticities of the 
population share age 65-74, the population share aged 75 and over and the mortality 
rate on health spending. If health spending is driven only by population structure and 
the amount spent per person under 65 is β1, per person aged 65-74 is β2, and per 
person aged 75+ is β3 with π1, π2, π3 being the number of people in each of the three 
categories, then total spending per capita is   18
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The effect on the proportion of 65-74 year olds of a change in π2 is 
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and the effect of the same change given the model of health spending is 
2
21 1 2 2 3 3 1 2 3
1 THEPC β
π βπ βπ βπ π π π
∂
=−
∂+ + + +
                   (18) 
Thus the semi-elasticity with respect to the proportion is given as 
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Here the numerator is the ratio of what health spending would be if it were β2  per 
capita for the whole population to actual spending less 1, divided by 1 minus the 
proportion of people aged 65-74 in the actual population. Thus by restricting α2 to this 
value we can impose the hypothesis that health spending is driven in this precise way 
by population structure. Obviously the effect of the population aged 75+ can be 
derived in the same way. Note that the coefficient actually changes as the population 
numbers change. We impose it using the most recent information available.  Since the 
equation is estimated for the EU15 as a whole, with country-specific effects dealt with 
by means of country dummy variables, we base the restrictions on the EU15 average 
and impose the same restrictions for all countries. 
 
We have used age profiles for health and long-term care supplied by the European 
Commission. While health profiles are available for all countries, the long-term care 
profiles are not available for Austria, Eire, France, Greece and Spain, Eire. We have 
used the per capita expenditure average for the other countries to substitute for these   19
missing data.  Table 7 shows the derivation of the restrictions to be imposed on the 
long-run coefficients if health spending is taken to be age-related. 
 
Table 7  Derivation of the Restrictions of the Long-Run  
Values of the Age Terms when Health Expenditure is Age-Related 
Proportion of Health 
and Long-term Care  
Expenditure by Age 
Group 
Health and Long-term Care 
Expenditure by Age  Group  Country 
Health 
spending 
as  of 
GDP 
GDP 
(2003) 
Health 
and 
Long-
term 
Care 
Spending  0-64  65-
74  75+ 0-64  spend 65-75 
spend 
75+ 
spend 
Austria  8.65%  226243 19570  0.468  0.124  0.408  9162 2422 7986 
Belgium  9.28%  274658 25495  0.396 0.134  0.470  10089  3412  11994 
Denmark  8.68%  188500 16363  0.430  0.108  0.462  7031 1774 7558 
Finland  6.48%  145938 9463  0.385 0.096  0.518  3646  911  4906 
France  9.58%  1594814 152734  0.450  0.125  0.425  68708 19049 64977 
Germany  11.37%  2161500 245799  0.461  0.154  0.385  113310 37861 94628 
Greece  10.22%  155543 15892  0.447  0.130  0.423  7100 2064 6728 
Eire  7.47%  138941 10378  0.464  0.127  0.408  4820 1320 4239 
Italy  8.50%  1335354 113504  0.464  0.167  0.369  52699 18964 41841 
Luxemburg  5.94%  25607 1522  0.411  0.129  0.460  626 197 699 
Netherlands  8.71%  476945 41539  0.432 0.105  0.462  17951  4381  19207 
Portugal  9.60%  137523 13198  0.468  0.124  0.408  6179 1633 5385 
Spain  6.91%  782531 54073  0.442 0.164  0.393  23922  8876  21274 
Sweden  9.01%  269548 24292  0.339 0.069  0.592  8234  1679  14380 
U.K  7.76%  1604497 124549  0.407  0.119  0.474  50685 14822 59041 
Total  9.10%  9518142 868369           384162  119365  364844 
Number of people           318998600 35344285 45546619 
Share of spending by age           0.442 0.137 
Spend per person            1204 3377 8010 
Population shares      0.798  0.088  0.114     
Coefficients            0.006 0.030 
Data Source. Ageing Working Group. European Commission 
 
We can similarly impose the restriction that a proportion of health spending is 
determined by the number of deaths. If 
12 log THEPC MORTALITY γ γ =+                        (20) 
then  
2 exp( )
THEPC
THEPC
MORTALITY THEPC
γ ∂
==
∂
                     (21) 
Thus if spending per death (or spending in the last year of life) is known the 
associated semi-elasticity can be imposed.  
 
Here there are two data problems. First of all data on death-related costs are not 
available for all countries. This means that we have to work out the relevant   20
restriction for those countries for which we have data. Secondly, while we can 
identify expenditure on health care in the year prior to death, at least for some 
countries, it is much less clear how to handle long-term care costs. These undoubtedly 
increase with age, but at the same time mortality rates of people receiving long-term 
care are probably higher than those not receiving it. Unfortunately, mortality rates for 
people in receipt of long-term care are not available and it is therefore impossible to 
establish this. Faut de mieux we simply use the information on death related health 
costs and assume that the same proportion applied to long-term care.   The calculation 
of the EU15 share of mortality-related costs in the total is shown in Table 8. 
 
Table 8  Mortality-Related Costs as a Proportion of Total Health Expenditure 
Country  Mortality-related costs 
(% of total)  Health spending  Mortality-related 
spending 
Austria 24.0%  19570  4697 
Belgium 28.0%  25495  7139 
Denmark 23.0%  16363  3770 
France 43.0%  152734  65675 
Germany 25.3%  245799  62070 
Italy 28.0%  113504  31781 
Netherlands 27.0%  41539  11216 
Portugal 36.8%  13198  4853 
Spain 45.4%  54073  24529 
Sweden 23.0%  24292  5587 
EU as  a whole: based on countries reporting 
results  706575 221318 
Mortality-related share Coefficient restriction   
  0.313 
Data Source. Ageing Working Group. European Commission 
 
Given these calculations we are able to explore a range of scenarios summarised in 
Table 9. Model 0 is our starting point. We next look at the effect of restricting the 
mortality coefficient both without and then with the coefficient on life expectancy 
restricted to zero. We repeat the process with the ageing coefficients taking their 
restricted values but with the mortality coefficient set at zero. Thus models 2 and 4 
have demographic influences restricted to mortality and populations structure 
respectively, while models 1 and 4 are closer to the original model. The GDP 
elasticity moves as a consequence of the effects of the restrictions on unrestricted 
coefficients of the model 
 
We repeat the exercise with the GDP elasticity set to 1. 
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Table 9  Scenarios of Different Restrictions 
On the Demographic Parameters 
Model  GDP 
Elasticity 
AGE65-
74  AGE75+ AVELE65 MORT 
0 1.0071  0 0  0.0419  0 
1 1.0151  0 0  0.0538  0.313 
2 1.1738  0 0  0  0.313 
3 0.9653  0.006 0.030  0.0227  0 
4 1.0403  0.006 0.030  0  0 
5  1 0  0  0.0431  0 
6  1  0 0  0.0564  0.313 
7  1 0 0  0  0.313 
8  1 0.006  0.030  0.0163  0 
9  1 0.006  0.030  0  0 
 
The impact of these restrictions on the long-run coefficients is shown in Table 10 and 
Table 11. 
Table 10  Long-run Coefficients with Demographic Restrictions. GDP 
Elasticity Unrestricted 
  Unrestricted  Model 0  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
GDPPC  0.9363  1.0071 1.0151  1.1738 0.9653 1.0403 
AGE65_74 -0.0230  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0060  0.0060 
AGE75_ -0.0381  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0300  0.0300 
AVELE65 0.0920  0.0419  0.0538  0.0000  0.0227  0.0000 
FLFPR  0.0253  0.0281 0.0321  0.0323 0.0322 0.0308 
UNEMP  -0.0082  -0.0065 -0.0034  -0.0054 -0.0055 -0.0061 
ALCCON  -0.0006  -0.0087 -0.0144  -0.0142 -0.0156 -0.0148 
PUHES  0.0125  0.0094 0.0138  0.0136 0.0103 0.0102 
SALARYGP  0.1212  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
CAPGP  0.2013  0.1405 0.1539  0.1937 0.1615 0.1728 
CASEHO  0.0079  -0.0162 -0.0144  -0.0132 -0.0196 -0.0080 
COPAYGP  0.0812  0.1862 0.2572  0.3042 0.2610 0.2965 
COPAYHO  -0.1409  -0.0662 -0.0663  -0.0736 -0.0677 -0.0821 
FREEGP  0.2458  0.1429 0.0858  0.0599 0.0928 0.0951 
FREEHO  0.0690  0.0707 0.0872  0.1130 0.0766 0.0869 
BEDS  0.0369  0.0622 0.0775  0.0554 0.0807 0.0715 
MORTM 0.2152  0.0000 0.3130  0.3130 0.0000 0.0000 
   χ12
2=12.9  χ12
2=21.2
∗  χ14
2=34.4
∗∗  χ12
2=23.5
∗  χ14
2=27.5
∗ 
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Table 11  Long-run Coefficients with Demographic Restrictions. GDP 
Elasticity Restricted to One 
  Unrestricted  Model 5  Model 6  Model 7  Model 8  Model 9 
GDPPC 0.9363  1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
AGE65_74 -0.0230  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0060 0.0060 
AGE75_ -0.0381  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0300 0.0300 
AVELE65  0.0920 0.0431 0.0564 0.0000  0.0163  0.0000 
FLFPR  0.0253 0.0282 0.0322 0.0349 0.0319 0.0314 
UNEMP  -0.0082 -0.0066 -0.0035 -0.0094 -0.0052 -0.0070 
ALCCON  -0.0006 -0.0089 -0.0148 -0.0233 -0.0148 -0.0164 
PUHES  0.0125 0.0094 0.0137 0.0099 0.0105 0.0095 
SALARYGP  0.1212 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
CAPGP  0.2013 0.1405 0.1539 0.2401 0.1630 0.1774 
CASEHO  0.0079 -0.0161 -0.0144 -0.0027 -0.0193 -0.0065 
COPAYGP  0.0812 0.1856 0.2560 0.3380 0.2636 0.3108 
COPAYHO  -0.1409 -0.0647 -0.0631 -0.0125 -0.0747 -0.0688 
FREEGP  0.2458 0.1459 0.0921 0.1921 0.0795 0.1241 
FREEHO  0.0690 0.0702 0.0861 0.1159 0.0795 0.0870 
BEDS  0.0369 0.0628 0.0787 0.0588 0.0780 0.0717 
MORTM 0.2152  0.0000 0.3130 0.3130 0.0000 0.0000 
   χ13
2=12.9  χ13
2=21.4  χ15
2=48.6
∗∗  χ13
2=24.0
∗  χ15
2=28.7
∗ 
 
* Significant at 5%  
** Significant at 1% 
Restricted demographic coefficients are shown in bold type.  
 
A conclusion from tables 9 and 10 is that simple demographic hypotheses- that 
spending is driven by the age structure of the population, or by death-related costs, in 
a manner connected with observed spending on different age categories or in the year 
before death- are rejected by the data at a 5% level. The rejection is relatively 
marginal, with only the hypothesis that mortality is the sole demographic influence 
being rejected at the 1% level; on the other hand the increase in the χ
2 statistic 
between model 0 and the models with the demographic restrictions in place points to 
these restrictions being strongly rejected.  While we noted earlier the difficulty in 
determining the appropriate restriction, it is unlikely that the error is so large as to 
affect this conclusion.   23
 
We present scenarios for the countries to which our model is fitted with the various 
restrictions imposed above in place. This allows us to explore what would happen if 
such models were true despite the statistical evidence against them.  
 
7.  Simulation Results 
The results for each country are presented in the appendix (to be completed). We 
show a summary of these in Table 12. The results are generated using the unrestricted 
model, model 0. Some general points emerge from these figures for model 0. 
Increases in the share of health spending in GDP are expected everywhere except in 
Denmark and  Sweden where a reduction in the share of health spending which is 
publicly funded is expected to offset demographic effects. Austria manages to keep its 
rise in spending modest on account of a change in the structure of co-payments to 
GPs.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The individual country reports show, in addition the effects on the outcome of 
individual variables remaining constant instead of changing as specified in our 
projections. 
Table 12  Summary Results of Health Care Projections for the EU15 
Health Care Expenditure as % of GDP 
    2050 Projected Value 
Country  2003 
Value  Model 0 
Model 2 
Mortality 
Restricti
ons 
Model 5  
εGDP=1 
 
Model 7 
εGDP=1 
Mortality 
Restricti
ons  
Model 4 
AGE65-
74 and 
AGE75+ 
restricted 
Model 9 
εGDP=1 
AGE65-
74 and 
AGE75+ 
restricted 
Austria  8.7% 9.0% 9.1% 9.0% 7.8% 9.9% 9.5% 
Belgium 9.3% 11.6% 11.6% 11.6% 10.5% 13.0% 12.7% 
Denmark  8.7% 8.6% 9.0% 8.6% 8.3% 9.8% 9.6% 
Finland  7.4% 9.2% 9.5% 9.2% 8.7%  10.1% 9.8% 
France  9.6% 11.3% 11.3% 11.3% 10.1% 13.4% 13.0% 
Germany  11.4% 12.9% 14.2% 12.9% 13.1% 16.0% 15.7% 
Eire  7.5% 12.1% 15.1% 12.1% 13.6% 14.5% 14.0% 
Italy  8.5% 10.0% 10.2% 10.0%  9.7% 11.6% 11.5% 
Netherlands  8.7%  9.9% 12.5%  9.9% 10.4% 12.2% 11.8% 
Portugal 9.6% 13.8% 13.0% 13.8% 11.9% 15.9% 15.5% 
Spain  7.7% 11.1% 12.9% 11.1% 12.6% 14.8% 14.5% 
Sweden  9.0% 8.7% 9.0% 8.7% 8.3% 9.3% 9.1% 
United 
Kingdom  7.8% 9.9% 9.3% 9.9% 8.6%  10.8%  10.5%   24
 
8. Comparison with Ageing Working Group Results 
 
These results naturally invite comparison with the findings of the Ageing Working 
Group (European Commission, 2006). However, such a comparison is fraught with 
difficulties. An initial difficulty is that the data provided by the OECD plainly differ 
from those used by the Ageing Working Group. There are two factors behind this. 
First of all, the OECD figures include all spending while the AWG figures include 
only spending by the public sector. In principle it ought to be possible to correct for 
this because the OECD also provides data on the share of total health and long-term 
care expenditure paid for by the public sector. We therefore show in  Table 13 the 
AWG figures for the pure ageing scenario plus the long-term care figures. This 
represents core projection in the AWG Report, scaled up to expand from the public 
sector to the whole economy and the OECD figures side by side.  Ageing Working 
Group figures are available for 2004 but not for 2003. We do not regard this as an 
important influence on the comparison. 
 
 
 
Table 13 The Ageing Working Group and the OECD Data 
  Ageing Working Group 2004  Ahead 
 
  Health 
Long-term 
Care 
Total 
Public 
Public 
Share  Total 
OECD 
2003 
Austria 5.3%  0.6% 5.9% 70.3% 8.4%  8.65% 
Belgium 6.2%  0.9% 7.1% 71.6% 9.9%  9.28% 
Denmark 6.9%  1.0% 7.9% 82.9% 9.5%  8.68% 
Finland 5.6%  1.7% 7.3% 73.8% 9.9%  7.39% 
France 7.7%  0.0% 7.7% 76.1% 10.1%  9.58% 
Germany 6.0%  1.0% 7.0% 79.4% 8.8%  11.37% 
Eire 5.3%  0.6% 5.9% 77.5% 7.6%  7.47% 
Italy 5.8%  1.5% 7.3% 75.3% 9.7%  8.50% 
Netherlands 6.1%  0.5% 6.6% 63.0% 10.5%  8.71% 
Portugal 6.7%  0.0% 6.7% 69.7% 9.6%  9.60% 
Spain 6.1%  0.5% 6.6% 71.2% 9.3%  7.68% 
Sweden 6.7%  3.8% 10.5% 84.3% 12.5%  9.01% 
United Kingdom  7.0%  1.0% 8.0% 82.2% 9.7%  7.76% 
Source:  European  Commission(2006). Table 4-8 p. 128 (Health Expenditure). Table 5-13. p.157 (Long-term Care) 
 
The correlation between the two sets of data in the last two columns is 0.11 
suggesting that, at least in some countries, there are serious differences of definition   25
between them. On its own this might be thought to render comparison of the 
projections pointless. 
A second substantial point affects our projections. As we have discussed, the share of 
public spending in the total can be an important influence on total spending. Countries 
with a high public share tend to have a high total level of spending. In our core 
projections country authors have generally assumed that trends in the share of public 
spending are likely to continue while the AWG figures can be presumed to be 
calculated on the assumption that the share is constant since, as far as we are aware 
the projection methods used do not consider the issue.  
A declining public sector share has two impacts. First of all as noted, it depresses the 
projected value generated by our model for 2050. Secondly, if we gross up the AWG 
projections for 2050 using the projected public sector share figures for 2050, public 
spending lower in 2050 than in 2004 raises the grossing up factor applied to the AWG 
figure. Thus a decline the public sector share reduces the estimate of total spending 
generated by our model and raises the grossed up figure computed from the AWG 
figures. For this reason we present two sets of comparisons. The first is with our 
projections  from model 0 using the values assumed there for the public sector share 
in 2050.  The second is an alternative projection with the results generated on the 
assumption that the share of public sector spending in the total remains constant. We 
show in Table 14 the implications of these two assumptions for the interpretation of 
the AWG figures for 2050.  
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Table 14 Ageing Working Group Projections for 2050 and the Public 
Sector Share 
  Ageing Working Group 2050   
 Health 
Long-term
 Care 
Total 
Public 
Base 
Public 
Share  Total 
Constant 
Public 
Share  Total 
         
Austria 6.9%  1.5% 8.4% 59.9% 14.0% 70.3%  11.9% 
Belgium 7.7%  2.1% 9.8% 70.6% 13.9% 71.6%  13.7% 
Denmark 8.0%  2.3% 10.3% 82.9% 12.4% 82.9%  12.4% 
Finland 7.0%  4.0% 11.0% 73.8% 14.9% 73.8%  14.9% 
France 9.5%  0.0% 9.5% 76.1% 12.5% 76.1%  12.5% 
Germany 7.3%  2.3% 9.6% 79.4% 12.1% 79.4%  12.1% 
Eire 7.3%  1.3% 8.6% 69.9% 12.3% 77.5%  11.1% 
Italy 7.2%  2.4% 9.6% 70.0% 13.7% 75.3%  12.7% 
Netherlands 7.4%  1.2% 8.6% 75.0% 11.5% 63.0%  13.7% 
Portugal 7.3%  0.0% 7.3% 61.4% 11.9% 69.7%  10.5% 
Spain 8.3%  0.8% 9.1% 63.9% 14.2% 71.2%  12.8% 
Sweden 7.8%  6.3% 14.1% 70.3% 20.1% 84.3%  16.7% 
United Kingdom  9.3%  2.0% 11.3% 69.4% 16.3% 82.2%  13.7% 
  
 
In Table 15 we compare the figures produced on the two assumptions. Moving to the 
assumption that the public sector share is held constant reduces the gap between the 
AHEAD projections and those from the AWG. The sum of squared deviations falls 
from 128.9 to 69.0 showing the importance of the issue.  
 
Table 15: Comparison of AWG and Ahead Project Projections 
  Ahead Ahead AWG 
 Model  0 
Increase 2003 to 2050  
Percentage Points 
 Increase 2004 to 2050 
Percentage Points 
 
Base Public 
Share 
Constant 
Public Share 
Base 
Public 
Share 
Constant 
Public 
Share 
Base 
Public 
Share 
Constant 
Public Share 
Austria 9.0%  8.7%  0.3  0.1  5.6  3.5 
Belgium 11.6%  11.7%  2.3  2.5  4.0  3.8 
Denmark 8.6%  9.3%  -0.1  0.7  2.9  2.9 
Finland 9.2%  9.2%  1.8  1.8  5.0  5.0 
France 11.3%  11.4%  1.7  1.8  2.4  2.4 
Germany 12.9%  12.7%  1.6  1.4  3.3 3.3 
Eire 12.1%  12.9%  4.6  5.5  4.7  3.5 
Italy 10.0%  10.5%  1.5  2.0  4.0  3.0 
Netherlands 9.9%  8.9%  1.2  0.2  1.0  3.2 
Portugal 13.8%  13.8%  4.2  4.2  2.3  0.9 
Spain 11.1%  11.9%  3.4  4.2  4.9  3.5 
Sweden 8.7%  10.0%  -0.3  0.9  7.6  4.2 
United 
Kingdom  9.9% 11.1%  2.1  3.4 6.6  4.0 
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This comparison is still open to the objection that we have used our core model, with 
public sector shares adjusted while the AWG uses an ageing scenario. We address this 
final issue in  Table 16. Here we draw on our simulations of model 9, where the 
demographic effects are limited to those arising from the changing age structure of the 
population and the income elasticity of health spending is held at one. We also hold 
the share of public spending in the total at the level identified in 2003, so as to remove 
the influence of this.  
 
Table 16  Comparison with Ageing Working Group 
Projections with Constant Public Sector Share and 
Similar Demographic Effects 
  AWG Ahead 
Percentage Point 
Increase 2003/4 to 2050 
     AWG  Ahead 
  
Austria 11.9% 9.6% 3.5 1.0 
Belgium 13.7% 13.2% 3.8 3.9 
Denmark 12.4% 10.7% 2.9 2.0 
Finland 14.9% 10.1% 5.0 2.7 
France 12.5% 13.5% 2.4 4.0 
Germany 12.1% 15.7% 3.3 4.3 
Eire 11.1% 15.6% 3.5 8.1 
Italy 12.7% 12.3% 3.0 3.8 
Netherlands 13.7% 10.8% 3.2 2.1 
Portugal 10.5% 15.9% 0.9 6.3 
Spain 12.8% 15.9% 3.5 8.2 
Sweden 16.7% 10.7% 4.2 1.7 
United 
Kingdom 13.7% 12.1% 4.0 4.4 
Source:  European  Commission(2006). Table 4-8 p. 128 (Health Expenditure). Table 5-13. p.157 (Long-term Care) 
 
 
In fact this change serves to widen the gap between the two sets of estimates further. 
The sum of squared deviations rises to 96.6. It can be seen that there are very 
substantial differences in Eire, Spain and Portugal. One further point is of importance. 
We have already noted that for Austria our projections are depressed by the change in 
copayments to GPs in 2050; with this change we would find a figure of 12.6% for 
2050 in this simulation, giving an increase of 3.9 percentage points which is close to 
the AWG figure of 3.5 percentage points.  
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9. Discussion and Conclusions 
The aim of this work package is to present projections of health care expenditure in 
order to assess the impact of ageing populations on future spending levels. Projections 
of public expenditure on health are required to inform the debate on the future impact 
of ageing populations for the overall sustainability of future EU public finances. The 
expenditure projections modelled in this work package for the EU member states have 
attempted to measure the impact of health care expenditure in the first half of the 
current century.  
 
Health care spending is to a large extent determined by the policy decisions of 
national governments, for example, whether specific treatment are provided by public 
health systems, the coverage of individuals eligible for public health services, the 
‘quality’ of public health care (policy choices/ preferences for waiting lists, size of 
hospital wards, etc.). The different institutional arrangements of health care systems 
across member states imply that these factors cannot be taken into account in 
projections made at a multilateral level, although they can be included in national 
projections when clear policy targets exist (Wanless, 2004). 
 
In general, the health of the public in EU countries has improved significantly in 
recent years. Though, all member states face problems with the affordability and 
efficiency of the provision of health care, as well as with the realisation of good 
quality health care for all individuals. There are many lessons to be learned about 
good and bad practices where effective and ineffective health care policy is 
concerned. Finally, there tends to be a general consensus within the EU member states 
that there is no ideal system to project health care expenditure. There are indeed trade-
offs between various government objectives. Every member state attempts to 
reconcile social and economic goals and makes its own balance of trade-offs, 
reflecting different national values, traditions and institutions. There is therefore no 
‘one size fits all’ approach to projecting health care expenditure. 
 
Nevertheless, perhaps the most important message which emerges from this work is 
that a variety of variables seems to influence health spending- and the influence of 
factors such as the share of the public sector in the total could easily be omitted from   29
more mechanical calculations. Thus the results from this study provide a valuable 
insight into influences on health spending and also shed some light on the policy 
structures which governments can adopt to keep health spending in check.  
 
Our results suggest that the share of GDP spent on health is likely to increase by more 
than four percentage points in Eire and Portugal, with a slightly smaller increase in 
Spain. Other countries should expect increases of the order of 1 to 2 ½ percentage 
points with the exception of Austria where only a small increase is anticipated and 
Denmark and Sweden where slight declines are expected. These figures are generally 
below those found by the Ageing Working Group, but the comparison is affected by 
the assumption made about the size of the public sector. If we compare our 
projections on the assumption that spending is driven by demographic effects with 
those of the Ageing Working Group we find substantial differences for Eire, Portugal 
and Spain, for which we project increases substantially larger than those of the 
Ageing Working Group. 
 
The study suggests that institutional variables are of great importance. Finland is an 
acknowledged success story in having limited its health spending over the last ten 
years or so by means of institutional change and this may provide an example to other 
countries. However, the use of dummy variables to represent institutional differences 
is not completely satisfactory since a number of countries reported that they did not 
see institutional structures being as clear cut as the dummy variables themselves 
suggested. Thus, if institutional change is to be used as a means of limiting spending, 
careful case studies will be needed to identify more precisely the effects of different 
arrangements. 
 
Nevertheless, one institutional issue does stand out unambiguously. Total spending on 
health is significantly and positively related to the share of health spending paid for by 
the public sector. This result is extremely intuitive and is likely to be of considerable 
importance in any future discussion of budgetary pressures associated with population 
ageing.   30
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Appendix A: The Model in EXCEL 
The health care projections were constructed using a model embedded in a macro 
programme and set of spreadsheets in the workbook healthn.xls in EXCEL using a 
fixed effects panel regression estimated by Generalised Least Squares. Access to the 
model is given by running the macro “Health Model” . The structure of the 
spreadsheets is the same in both cases. The sole difference between them is that in 
healths.xls changes to one model parameter do not affect other parameters making this 
more useful for simulation work. 
 
The first figure displays the window laying out the regression parameters that users 
can access by running the macro ‘Health Model’ from the tools menu. Restrictions 
can be imposed on the parameters. 
 
 
•  Step 1: Enter long-run elasticity with respect to GDP. Leave blank if this is not 
restricted. 
•  Step 2: Impose restrictions on specific parameters by entering desired values in 
boxes. Note that we have pre-specified a set of restrictions. This is shown in the   A2
boxes but can be changed. If a box is left blank then no linear restriction is 
imposed. 
•  Step 3: Clicking the box marked ‘impose restrictions’ presents the restricted 
coefficients and the impact of these restrictions on unrestricted coefficients.  
•  Step 4: Once the restrictions are imposed a test for the validity of the restrictions is 
performed and shown by the 
2 χ  statistic with its p value.  
•  Step 5: Users should now select the first country whose health expenditure they 
wish to project. Failure to select a country will result in an error, and the 
programme has to be restarted. Users should note that if the model strongly rejects 
the restrictions that they have imposed, there is a substantial risk that the 
projections they generate will be meaningless. 
•  Step 6: By clicking here users will be moved to the next window for the projection 
stage of the model. 
 
 
•  Step 7: In order to project the exogenous variables, users must select the growth 
rates and the initial and final years over which the trends should be calculated. The 
exogenous values are entered up to 2003 and the remaining cells up to 2050 are 
left blank. However, users can insert their own values here and then move onto the 
projections.   A3
•  Step 8: This button will compute the growth rates from the trend start and end 
dates selected. As noted above, it is important to mention here that the growth 
rates of the parameters may be illogical and users are recommended to change the 
growth rates for the variables in question accordingly. Alternatively,  may enter 
their own projected values in the spreadsheet for the country concerned. Step 9: 
Enter in the initial and final data years. 
•  Step 8: This button will compute the growth rates from the trend start and end 
dates selected. As noted above, it is important to mention here that the growth 
rates of the parameters may be illogical and users are recommended to change the 
growth rates for the variables in question accordingly. Alternatively,  may enter 
their own projected values in the spreadsheet for the country concerned. Step 9: 
Enter in the initial and final data years. 
•  Step 9: To make an intercept correction, enter the initial and final years over 
which the intercept should be calculated. 
•  Step 10: Users should enter here the final year up to which the projections will go. 
•  Step 11: Finally, by clicking here users will find projections of health care 
expenditure for the country selected in the previous window. Expectations of 
health care expenditure are projected in row 16 (and in row 21 in percentages of 
GDP per capita) for the sheet of the country in question. Rows 14 and 16 (and in 
rows 20 and 22 in percentages) provide ±1 standard deviation on either side of the 
projected health care spending profile. It is important to mention here that the 
growth rates of the parameters projected may not be entirely logical. For example, 
with the age variables, the proportion of the elderly may be very large the further 
the projections go and so therefore it is advisable for users to insert their own 
growth rates. 
 
•  Note: In order to run the programme for another country, either (i) repeat steps 4-
11 if you wish to keep the long-run elasticity and the linear restrictions the same 
(ii) or start from the beginning at step 1 to change the long-run elasticity and the 
restrictions to be imposed. 
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 Appendix B: Country Reports 
B1    Austria 
Markus Kraus, Sandra Müllbacher and Alexander Schnabl, IHS 
Health care expenditure, 1980-2003 
Health care expenditure in Austria grew by an estimated 1.24 percentage points from 
7.41 per cent to 8.65 per cent of GDP between 1980 and 2003. According to the 
OECD Health Data 2006 this compares with a growth of 2.5 percentage points for the 
EU 15 member states over the same period with average health care expenditure 
reaching 9.0 per cent of the GDP in 2003. 
 
Austrian health care expenditure can be broadly divided into public spending, which 
is defined as expenditures by the social health insurance as well as by the federal 
government, federal states and municipals, and private spending, which is defined as 
expenditures by the households. Public health expenditure as a share of the total 
increased between 1980 and 2003 by an estimated 1.49 percentage points to 70.32 %. 
Health care expenditure, 2004-2050  
The projected data for Austria supposes that the female labour force participation 
(FLFPR) will continue to grow until 2050 (from 44.89 to 46.20). The unemployment 
rate (UNEMP) is expected to fall from 4.16% to 3.43%.  
 
The dependent variable in this paper is total health care expenditure per capita 
(THEPC), measured in US dollars in nominal prices, adjusted for purchasing power 
parities (PPP) and for inflation. However, in the presented results THEPC is 
converted to a percentage of GDP. The variables used are listed in Table B1-1.   
Demographic, economic and institutional variables included in our model have been 
collected from both the OECD Health Data 2006 and the AWG. The variables alcohol 
consumption (ALCCON), public health care expenditures (PUHES) and acute care 
beds (BEDS) have been evaluated by extrapolating the trend over the period 1980-
2003. Dummy variables are assumed unchanged. The source or method of derivation 
is indicated in the table. 
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Table B1-1 Demographic, economic and institutional variables included in model.   
Variable  Definitions and Sources 
Projected 
Value in 
2004 
Projected 
Value in 
2050 
Average 
Annual 
Growth 
Rate, 2004-
2050 
AGE65-
74 
Population aged 65-74 as a share of the total 
population. Source: Eurostat.  7.98 11.92 0.88 
AGE75+ 
Population aged 75+ as a share of the total population. 
Source: Eurostat.  7.56 18.22 1.93 
AVELE65
+ 
The average life expectancy at aged 65 for males and 
females. Source: WHO  18.02 22.46  0.48 
MORTAL
ITY 
Mortality from any cause of death. Calculated as the 
simple ratio of number of registered deaths/mid-year 
population (per 100,000). Source: WHO.
0.98 1.46 0.91 
FLFPR 
Female labour force participation rate (% ratio to active 
population aged 15-65). Source: OECD and AWG.  44.89 46.20  0.06 
UNEMP 
Unemployed individuals as a share of the total labour 
force. Source: OECD and AWG.  4.16 3.43 -0.42 
ALCCON 
Alcohol consumption, litres per capita (15+) (in logs). 
Source: OECD and Annual Growth Trend.  10.49 9.61  -0.19 
PUHES 
Public health expenditure in US$ PPP per capita as a 
share of the total health expenditure in US$ PPP per 
capita. Source: OECD and Annual Growth Trend.
70.38 73.35  0.09 
SALARY
GP 
Dummy variable taking the value of one for countries 
with salaried GPs; zero otherwise.  0 0 Na 
CAPGP 
Dummy variable taking the value of one for countries 
with capitation payment GPs; zero otherwise.  0 0 Na 
GLOBAL
HO 
Dummy variable taking the value of one for countries 
with global budget reimbursement of hospitals; zero 
otherwise.
0 0 Na 
CASEHO 
Dummy variable taking the value of one for countries 
with case-based reimbursement of hospitals; zero 
otherwise.
1 1 Na 
COPAYG
P 
Dummy variable taking the value of one for countries 
with significant co-payment for GPs; zero otherwise.  1 0 Na 
COPAYH
O 
Dummy variable taking the value of one for countries 
with significant co-payment for inpatient hospital 
treatment; zero otherwise.
1 1 Na 
FREEGP 
Dummy variable taking the value of one for countries 
with free choice of GP or primary care physician; zero 
otherwise.
1 1 Na 
FREEHO 
Dummy variable taking the value of one for countries 
with overall ceiling of hospitals; zero otherwise.  1 1 Na 
BEDS 
Acute care beds per 1,000 inhabitants. Source: OECD 
and Annual Growth Trend.  6.01 3.35 -1.26 B3
  Simulation models of health care expenditure in Austria, 2004-2050: 
Influences of Driving Variables 
Economic and demographic variables 
Table B1-2 shows the projections for expenditures on health as a proportion of GDP. 
The base-line expenditures on health care, as shown in the first line of the table, are 
expected to rise from 8.65% of GDP in 2003 to 8.98% in 2050.  
 
Table B1-2 The influence of socio-economic variables on projected health 
spending 
  Value in 2003  Value in 2050 in 
Base Run 
Projected Share of 
Health Spending 
in 2050 (% GDP) 
Difference from 
Base 
Base    8.98%  0.00% 
GDP 28118 57180 9.25%  0.27% 
GDP (1.5% p.a. 
growth)  28118 57180 8.97%  -0.01% 
AGE 65-74  8.01  11.92  9.01%  0.03% 
AGE 75+  7.45  18.22  8.84%  -0.14% 
AVELE65 18.17  22.46  7.59%  -1.39% 
MORT 0.95  1.49  9.12%  0.14% 
FLFPR 44.24  46.20  8.48%  -0.50% 
UNEMP 4.30  3.43  8.93% -0.05% 
ALCCON 10.51  9.61  8.97%  -0.01% 
PUHES 70.32  73.35  8.73% -0.25% 
  
Additionally to the base value, Table B1-2 shows the results of simulations in which 
each socio-economic variable is set to the value that it held in 2003. A comparison of 
the results of these simulations with the base therefore indicates the importance of the 
projected path of each variable, and shows how they influence the base projection. 
 
Most of the variables have only little influence on the share of health spending in 
GDP. Although the elasticity of health spending with respect to GDP is slightly bigger 
than one (1.0071), rising GDP in itself decreases the share of health spending in GDP. 
With GDP constant the projected value is 0.27 percentage points higher than the base 
(9.25% vs. 8.98%). Restricting the GDP growth to 1.5% p.a. leads to almost no 
difference in the expenditure share value. The reason for that is that the coefficient on 
life expectancy falls as the income elasticity is raised. 
 
The age structure is likewise not very important. The growing share of people aged 
75+ leads to higher spending. Keeping their share as in 2003 reduces the health 
expenditure by 0.14 percentage points. The development of the share of people aged 
65-74 has almost no influence. Mortality is as influential the aged 75+, but with a 
reverse sign. (Keeping mortality as in 2003 leads to lower costs by 0.14 percentage 
points.) A more influential demographic variable is the average life expectancy of 
people aged 65 since the long-term effects of the other demographic variables are 
restricted to zero. If this stayed at its 2003 value spending would be reduced by 1.39 
percentage points. A net demographic effect can be calculated by adding together the 
deviations of all demographic terms. If all these variables stayed at their 2003 values, 
spending would be reduced by –1.36 percentage points, but one has to reconsider that 
almost the whole effect is based on the effect of the life expectancy. B4
   
The share of the public sector in health spending is also of little importance. Leaving 
it constant reduces projected spending by 0.25 percentage points. A more influential 
variable is the female participation rate on the labour market. If the rate stayed at its 
2003 value, spending would be reduced by 0.50 percentage points. 
Health policy variables 
We use a similar approach to look at the effects of the variables, which can be 
regarded as health policy variables. The only continuous variable of this type is the 
number of beds; we treat this as in the earlier simulations, showing what would have 
happened if it had been held at its 2003 value. The other variables are dummy 
variables and we explore these differently. We carry out a set of simulations in which 
the value of each variable in turn is switched between the base run and the 
alternatives. Thus if a dummy took the value of 1 in the base it is switched to 0 in the 
alternative and vice versa. The results are provided in Table B1-3. 
 
Table B1-3: The influence of policy variables on projected health spending. 
 Value  in  2003  Value in 2050 in 
Base Run 
Projected Share of 
Health Spending in 
2050 (% GDP) 
Difference from 
Base 
Beds 6.09 3.35  9.29%  0.31% 
  Value in Base Run Value in Alternative    
Salary GP  0  1  8.98%  0.00% 
CapGP 0  1 10.33%  1.35% 
CaseHo 1  0  9.12%  0.14% 
CoPayGP 1  0  8.98%  0.00% 
CoPayHo 1  0  9.59%  0.61% 
FreeGP 1  0  7.78%  -1.20% 
FreeHo 1  0  8.36%  -0.62% 
 
Note: The entry for beds has the same interpretation as in Table B2. The other entries 
show the impact of each dummy in turn changing from 0 to 1 or vice versa. 
Source: IHS HealthEcon 2007. 
 
Reducing the number of beds between 2003 and 2050 depresses costs, but only by 
0.31 percentage points. The most influential variable is the one for Capitation-paid 
GPs, that add to costs by 1.35 percentage points. However, salaried GPs have no 
influence on health spending. Not charging the public for visiting a hospital would 
increase costs by 0.61 percentage points, whereas co-payments for visiting a GP have 
no influence. Abolishing the free choice of hospitals and GPs would both reduce costs 
(0.62 and 1.20 percentage points respectively). 
Influences of Expenditure Elasticities 
Table B1-4 provides further information on the effects of the income elasticity if it was 
restricted to 1, 1.1 and 1.2. The unrestricted elasticity amounts to 1.01. It can be seen 
that the impact of the elasticity is particular weak for values just above 1. Thus, 
restricting it to 1.1 or 1.2 should increase projected health care expenditures in 2050, B5
  whereas in this case projected  spending decreases (8.93% and 8.82%). The reason 
for that is that the coefficient on life expectancy falls as the income elasticity is 
raised. 
 
Table B1-4: Scenario of Different Restrictions on Long-run Income Elasticity 
on Health Care Expenditure in Austria 
Restriction on long 
run income elasticity 
+1% s.d. of Health 
Care Expenditure in 
2050 
Health Care 
Expenditure in 2050 
(% GDP) 
-1% s.d. of Health 
Care Expenditure in 
2050 
Unrestricted 9.48%  8.98%  8.49% 
1 9.48%  8.98%  8.50% 
1.2 9.39%  8.82%  8.29% 
Source: IHS HealthEcon 2007. 
Influences of Restrictions on Demographic Parameters 
Finally in Table B1-5 we explore the effects of restrictions on the demographic 
parameters, both with the long run elasticity with respect to income left unrestricted 
and being restricted to 1. In the table the boldface entries indicate that a demographic 
restriction has been imposed. For the age variables it is that the coefficient on them is 
what would be observed if health expenditure were driven by the age structure of the 
population. For the mortality it is the coefficient that would be expected if the only 
demographic influence were death-related costs. In each case where demographic-
related restrictions are imposed on parameters we are interested in two sub-cases. In 
the first the other parameters on the other demographic variables related to old people 
are left unrestricted and in the second they are restricted to zero. Thus the second sub-
case of each cell tells us what would happen if expenditure were age or mortality 
related and if that were the only demographic influence. 
 
Table B1-5 The Impact of Restrictions on the Demographic Parameters on the 
Projected Share of Health Expenditure in 2050 
Model  GDP 
Elasticity  AGE65-74 AGE75+ AVELE65  MORT  +1  S.D
Health 
Expenditure in 
2050 (% GDP) 
-1 S.D
0 1.0071  0 0  0.0419  0  9.48% 8.98% 8.49%
1 1.0151  0 0  0.0538  0.313  11.05% 10.43% 9.84%
2 1.1738  0 0 0  0.313  9.73% 9.11% 8.52%
3 0.9653 0.006 0.03 0.0227  0  11.25% 10.61% 10.01%
4 1.0403 0.006 0.03  0  0  10.51% 9.92% 9.36%
5  1 0  0  0.0431  0  9.58% 9.06% 8.57%
6  1 0  0  0.0564  0.313  11.05% 10.44% 9.85%
7  1 0  0 0  0.313  8.42% 7.84% 7.29%
8  1 0.006  0.03  0.0163  0  11.22% 10.59% 9.99%
9  1 0.006  0.03 0  0  10.01% 9.53% 8.99%
Note: Boldface entries indicate numerical values of restrictions. Other entries are the 
long-run coefficients implied by the restrictions. 
Source: IHS HealthEcon 2007. 
 B6
  The importance of the interactions between the coefficients can be deduced from this 
table. When the income elasticity is restricted to 1, the restriction on mortality has a 
decreasing effect on spending (Model 7, 7.84%), whereas with unrestricted income 
elasticity the restriction on mortality increases projected spending to 9.11% of GDP 
(Model 2). We also note that when the parameters on the age variables are restricted, 
there are in both cases (Model 3 and Model 8) pronounced increases, with no effect of 
a restriction on the income elasticity. If the life expectancy term is set to zero this 
effect is reduced slightly. 
 
Conclusion 
Summing up, in the group of the socio-economic variables “average life expectancy 
of people aged 65” and “female participation rate on the labour market” are the most 
influential ones. If average life expectancy of people aged 65 stayed on its 2003 value 
spending would be reduced by 1.4 percentage points. Keeping female participation 
rate on the labour market at its 2003 level, health care expenditure would be reduced 
by a half percentage point. B7
 B2    Belgium 
Peter Willemé. Federal Planning Bureau 
Health care expenditure, 1980-2003 
Health care expenditure in the Belgium grew by an estimated 2.9 percentage points 
from 6.4 per cent to 9.3 per cent of GDP between 1980 and 2003. According to the 
OECD Health Data 2006 (OECD, 2006) this compares with a growth of 2.5 
percentage points for the EU15 member states over the same period with health care 
expenditure in 2003 reaching 9.0 per cent of GDP. 
  
Belgian health care expenditure can be broadly divided into public spending, which is 
mainly spent by RIZIV through sickness funds, and private spending, which is 
defined as expenditure by the household and corporate sector on health care. Public 
health expenditure as a share of the total has fluctuated around 71 per cent between 
1980 and 2003. 
Health care expenditure projections, 2004-2050 
The projected data for Belgium assume that female labour force participation 
(FLFPR) will continue to grow slowly until 2050, whilst the unemployment rate 
(UNEMP) is expected to decrease from 8.2 percent in 2003 to 6.5 percent in 2013 and 
thereafter. Both the amount of alcohol consumption per capita (ALCCON) and the 
number of acute care beds (BEDS) are expected to decline until 2050. Finally, private 
health care expenditure is expected to remain constant at around 71 per cent 
throughout the projections. 
 
The dependent variable used in this paper is total health care expenditure per capita 
(THEPC) measured in US dollars in nominal prices, adjusted for purchasing power 
parities (PPP) and for inflation, although this is converted to a percentage of GDP in 
presenting the results. The variables listed in Table B2-1 have been collected from 
both the OECD Health Data 2006 and the AWG. The projected data are either derived 
from the OECD, AWG or evaluated by extrapolating the trend over the period 1980-
2003.  Dummy variables are assumed unchanged. The source or method of derivation 
is indicated in the table. 
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  Table B2-1  Demographic, economic and institutional variables included in our 
model 
Variable  Definitions and Sources 
Projected 
Value in 
2004 
Projected 
Value in 
2050 
Av 
Annual 
Growth 
Rate, 
2004-2050 
AGE65-74  Population aged 65-74 as a share of the total 
population. Source: Eurostat.  9.29 11.19 0.40 
AGE75+  Population aged 75+ as a share of the total 
population. Source: Eurostat.  7.83 15.99 1.53 
AVELE65  Average life expectancy at age 65 for males and 
females. Source: WHO.  18.13 22.54  0.49 
MORTALIT
Y 
Mortality from any cause of death. Calculated as 
the simple ratio of number of registered 
deaths/mid-year population (per 100,000) (in 
logs). Source: WHO. 
0.98 1.18 -0.40 
GDP  Gross domestic product in US $ PPP. Source: 
OECD.  27120 57284  1.6 
FLFPR 
Female labour force participation rate (% ratio 
to active population aged 15-65). Source: OECD 
and AWG. 
44.79 46.62  0.09 
UNEMP  Unemployed individuals as a share of the total 
labour force. Source: OECD and AWG.  8.40 6.50 -0.54 
ALCCON  Alcohol consumption, litres per capita (15+) (in 
logs). Source: OECD and Annual Growth Trend.  8.19 6.34 -0.54 
PUHES 
Public health expenditure in US$ PPP per capita 
as a share of the total health expenditure in US$ 
PPP per capita. Source: OECD and AWG. 
70.58 70.58  0.00 
SALARYG
P 
Dummy variable taking the value of one for 
countries with salaried GPs; zero otherwise. 
Source: Christiansen et. al (2006) 
0.00 0.00  na 
CAPGP 
Dummy variable taking the value of one for 
countries with capitation payment GPs; zero 
otherwise. Source: Christiansen et. al (2006) . 
0.00 0.00  na 
CASEHO 
Dummy variable taking the value of one for 
countries with case-based reimbursement of 
hospitals; zero otherwise. Source: Christiansen 
et. al (2006) . 
0.00 0.00  na 
COPAYGP 
Dummy variable taking the value of one for 
countries with significant co-payment for GPs; 
zero otherwise. Source: Christiansen et. al 
(2006) . 
1.00 1.00  na 
COPAYHO 
Dummy variable taking the value of one for 
countries with significant co-payment for 
inpatient hospital treatment; zero otherwise. 
Source: Christiansen et. al (2006) . 
1.00 1.00  na 
FREEGP 
Dummy variable taking the value of one for 
countries with free choice of GP or primary care 
physician; zero otherwise. Source: Christiansen 
et. al (2006) . 
1.00 1.00  na 
FREEHO 
Dummy variable taking the value of one for 
countries with overall ceiling of hospitals; zero 
otherwise. Source: Christiansen et. al (2006) . 
1.00 1.00  na 
BEDS  Acute care beds per 1,000 inhabitants (in logs). 
Source: Christiansen et. al (2006)  4.41 3.35 -0.58 
 
It is important to note that many of the variables, such as those representing the public 
share in health spending may seem arbitrary, and we subsequently explore the 
importance of our assumptions. In addition, the differences between institutional B9
  arrangements of different countries are not usually as simple and clear-cut as implied 
by the use of dummy variables which take on values of zero or one. 
Simulation models of health care expenditure in Belgium, 2004-2050: 
Influences of Driving Variables 
Table B2-2 shows the base-line expenditure on health as a proportion of GDP, with 
expenditure on health care expected to rise to 11.63% of GDP in 2050 from 9.3% in 
2003. This compares with the most recent national estimates by the Study Committee 
on Ageing (SCA) 1 of 14.8% obtained by grossing up the original figure, which 
includes only public expenditure. As Table B2-2 shows, public expenditure in 
Belgium is expected to remain constant at around 71% of total health care 
expenditure, so the SCA figure for 2050 (10.5%) was divided by 0.71. Even when the 
uncertainty surrounding both models is taken into account, projected total health 
expenditures as a share of GDP with the current model appear to be significantly 
lower. 
 
In Table B2-2 we show, along with the base value, the results of simulations in which 
each socio-economic variable is set to the value that it held in 2003. Comparison of 
the results of these simulations with the base therefore indicates the importance of the 
projected path of the variable as an influence on the base projection. These results are 
calculated using model 0 of Table B5. 
 
Table B2-2  The Influence of Socio-Economic Variables on Projected Health 
Spending (Model 0) 
 Value  in  2003  Value in 2050 in 
Base Run 
Projected Share of 
Health Spending 
in 2050 (% GDP) 
Difference from 
Base 
Base     11.63% --- 
GDP 26539 57284  12.03%  0.40% 
GDP (1.5% p.a. 
growth)  26539 57284  11.67%  0.04% 
AGE65-74 9.33  11.19  11.67%  0.04% 
AGE75+ 7.69  15.99  11.60%  -0.03% 
AVELE65 15.95  20.50  9.71%  -1.92% 
MORTALITY 1.03  1.18  11.66%  0.03% 
FLFPR 44.77  46.62  11.03%  -0.60% 
UNEMP 8.2  6.50  11.51%  -0.12% 
ALCCON 7.88  6.34  11.61%  -0.02% 
PUHES 71.61  70.58  11.75%  0.12% 
Note: Except in the case above where the GDP growth rate is set to 1.5% p.a., the table shows the 
share of health spending in GDP resulting if each variable in turn is held to its 2003 value instead of 
moving to the 2050 value during the simulation. The GDP elasticity is unrestricted.  
 
 
This table shows that some of our projections have a powerful influence on the share 
of spending. Although the steady state elasticity with respect to GDP is very close to 
1, a reduction in the growth rate affects the dynamics of the process and thus the 
                                                 
1  Study Committee on Ageing, Annual Report, June 2007. B10
  projected value for 2050. The share of the population in each age group is not very 
important, which is not very surprising since the variables are specified to have no 
long-run effect. Mortality likewise has little influence. However rising average life 
expectancy of men and of women adds 1.75 percentage points to the expenditure 
share. 
 
The projected continuation of the historical trend in female labour force participation 
by nearly 2 percentage points also has some impact on projected health care spending, 
accounting for a 0.60% percentage point difference of the 2050 expenditure figure. 
 
We use a similar approach to look at the effects of the variables which can be 
regarded as health policy variables. The only continuous variable of this type is the 
number of beds; we treat this as in the earlier simulations, showing what would have 
happened if it had been held at its 2003 value. The other variables are dummy 
variables and we explore these differently. We carry out a set of simulations in which 
the value of each in turn is switched between the base run and the alternatives. Thus if 
a dummy took the value of 1 in the base it is switched to 0 in the alternative and vice 
versa. These results are shown in Table B2-3. 
 
Table B2-3  The Influence of Policy Variables on Projected Health Spending 
(Model 0) 
 Value  in  2003  Value in 2050 in 
Base Run 
Projected Share of 
Health Spending 
in 2050 (% GDP) 
Difference from 
Base 
Beds 4.41  3.35  11.90%  0.27% 
  Value in Base 
Run 
Value in 
Alternative    
SalaryGP 0  1  11.63%  0.00% 
CapGP 0  1 13.39%  1.49% 
CaseHO 0  1  11.44%  -0.46% 
CoPAyGP 1  0  9.66%  -1.97% 
CoPayHO 1  0  12.43%  0.80% 
FreeGP 1  0  10.08%  -1.55% 
FreeHO 1  0  10.84%  -0.79% 
Note: The entry for beds has the same interpretation as in Table B1. The other entries show the 
impact of each dummy in turn changing from 0 to 1 or vice versa. 
 
 
The table shows that it is the management of GPs rather than the management of 
hospitals which has an important effect on health spending. Introducing capitation-
payment and abolishing co-payment of GPs  both add to costs. A word of caution is in 
order to qualify these counter-intuitive results. It should be noted that the estimated 
effects of the health system dummies were obtained from a limited number of 
institutional changes in just some of the countries (the dummies are constant over 
time in approximately half of the countries). Consequently, they capture country-
specific effects of these transitions. It is not clear whether these effects can be 
meaningfully attributed to countries like Belgium, where no such institutional changes 
have taken place in the past. Limiting the free choice of GP appears to be a promising 
way to keep health expenditures under control, leading to a rather substantial decrease 
of around 1.5 percentage points in health spending (although, once again, this result is 
based on average effects in a limited number of other countries). B11
  Influences of Expenditure Elasticities 
Table B2-4 shows the effect of increases in the elasticity of health spending with 
respect to GDP on total expenditure as a proportion of GDP. Since in model 0 the 
GDP elasticity is very close to one, it is no surprise that the result is scarcely changed 
by imposing an elasticity of 1. Higher elasticities result in lower expenditure shares. 
This is because of the interaction between the elasticity and the coefficient on life 
expectancy as discussed in the main body of the paper.  
 
 
Table B2-4   Scenarios of different restrictions on long run income elasticity on 
health care expenditure in Belgium 
Restriction on 
long run income 
elasticity 
+1% s.d. of 
Health Care 
Expenditure in 
2050 
Health Care 
Expenditure in 
2050 
(% GDP) 
-1% s.d. of Health Care Expenditure 
in 2050 
Unrestricted 12.10%  11.63%  11.18% 
1 12.10%  11.64%  11.19% 
1.1 11.94%  11.47%  11.01% 
1.2 11.70%  11.20%  10.72% 
Influences of Restrictions on Demographic Parameters 
Finally, in Table B2-5 we explore the effects of restrictions on the demographic 
parameters, both with the long run elasticity with respect to GDP left unrestricted and 
with it set equal to 1. In the table the boldface entries indicate that a restriction has 
been imposed. For the age variables it is that the coefficient on them is what would be 
observed if health expenditure were driven by the age structure of the population. For 
mortality it is the coefficient which would be expected if the only demographic 
influence were death-related costs. In each case where demographic-related 
restrictions are imposed on parameters we are interested in two sub-cases. In the first 
the other parameters on the other demographic variables related to old people are left 
unrestricted and in the second they are restricted to zero. Thus the second sub case of 
each type tells us what would happen if expenditure were age or mortality related and 
if that were the only demographic influence. 
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  Table B2-5  The Impact of Restrictions on the Demographic Parameters on 
the Projected Share of Health Expenditure in 2050 
Model  GDP 
Elasticity 
AGE65-
74  AGE75+ AVELE65 MORT +1  S.D 
Health 
Expenditure 
in 2050 (% 
GDP) 
-1 S.D 
0 1.0071  0 0  0.0419  0  12.10% 11.63% 11.18% 
1 1.0151  0 0  0.0538  0.313  13.56% 13.04% 12.54% 
2 1.1738  0 0  0  0.313  12.08% 11.58% 11.11% 
3 0.9653  0.009 0.020 0.0227  0  13.62% 13.08% 12.57% 
4 1.0403  0.009 0.020  0  0 12.86% 12.36% 11.87% 
5  1 0  0  0.0431  0  12.10% 11.64% 11.19% 
6  1 0 0  0.0564  0.313  13.58% 13.06% 12.57% 
7  1 0 0  0  0.313  11.01% 10.54% 10.09% 
8  1 0.009  0.020  0.0163  0  13.60% 13.07% 12.56% 
9  1 0.009  0.020  0  0  12.30% 11.82% 11.37% 
Note: Boldface entries indicate numerical values of restrictions. Other entries are the long-run 
coefficients implied by the restrictions. 
 
The importance of the interactions between the coefficients can be deduced from this 
table. The restriction that spending is driven by death-related costs in the manner set 
out in section 3.2 has the effect of raising projected expenditure by 1.41 percentage 
points. However, if the life expectancy effects are restricted to zero so that death-
related costs are the only demographic influence, then projected expenditure is 
reduced by 0.05 percentage points. By contrast when expenditure is assumed to be 
age related, it is raised by nearly 1.45 percentage points, falling to 0.74 percentage 
points when life expectancy effects are also suppressed. If the GDP elasticity is also 
restricted to one these effects are altered. In particular, when demographic effects are 
assumed to come only through mortality, a unit elasticity has the effect of reducing 
age projected expenditure fairly sharply.  
Conclusions 
The exercise has indicated a number of key influences on health spending in Belgium. 
Estimates of the influence of demographic effects are crucially dependent on the 
interaction between these and the estimated GDP elasticity of health spending. With 
the figures for the Belgian projections, raising the GDP elasticity from its unrestricted 
value of 1.0071 to 1.2 has the effect of reducing projected expenditure because of 
offsetting movements in the effects of the demographic variables. The effect of rising 
life expectancy is enhanced because the restriction results in the coefficient on this 
being raised. 
 
Of the other variables the female labour force participation rate is important; a 
projected increase in this variable adds 0.6 percentage points to total expenditure by 
2050.  The structure of GP remuneration and the basis on which GDP services are 
provided are also important influences, although some of the estimated effects of 
these institutional variables contradict a priori expectation. B13
 B3    Denmark 
Erika Schulz, DIW 
Health care expenditure, 1980-2003 
Total health care expenditures (public and private) in Denmark decreased by an 
estimated 0.4 percentage points from 9.1 per cent to 8.7 per cent of GDP between 
1980 and 2003. According to OECD Health Data 2006 (OECD, 2006) this compares 
with a growth of 2.5 percentage points for the EU15 member states over the same 
period with health care expenditures in 2003 reaching 9.0 per cent of GDP.  
  
Health care expenditure in Denmark can be broadly divided into public spending, 
which is mainly spent on National Health Service, and private spending, which is 
defined as expenditure of households and corporate sector on health care. The public 
health expenditure as a share of the total decreased by an estimated 4.9 percentage 
points to 82.9 percent between 1980 and 2003. Public health care expenditure as a 
percentage of GDP declined from 7.9 percent in 1980 to 7.7 per cent in 2003.  
 
Health care expenditure projections, 2004-2050 
The projected data for Denmark assume that the unemployment rate (UNEMP) is 
expected to fall slightly. In the past the alcohol consumption (ALCCON) increased by 
0.07 percent per year and it is assumed that this trend will continue. The number of 
beds decreased markedly by 1.91 per cent per year (BEDS). It is assumed that the 
further decline is restricted to 0.5 per cent per year. While the share of the elderly will 
increase until 2050, the number of inhabitants shows a different development: Until 
2035 an increase in population is expected, and afterwards a decrease. In 2050 the 
population is projected to reach 5.5 million which means a slight increase in 
comparison to the base year. As a result the crude mortality rate will decline until 
2012 and will then rise to 1.34 in 2050. 
 
The dependent variable used in this paper is total health care expenditure per capita 
(THEPC) measured in US dollars in nominal prices, adjusted for purchasing power 
parities (PPP) and inflation. In the presentation of the results it is additionally 
converted to a percentage of GDP. The variables which are included in our model are 
listed in Table B3-1. They were collected from both the OECD Health Data 2006 and 
the AWG. The projected data are either derived from the OECD, AWG or evaluated 
by extrapolating the trend over the period 1980-2003.  Dummy variables are assumed 
to remain unchanged. The source or method of derivation is indicated in the table.  
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Table B3-1  Demographic, economic and institutional variables included in our 
model 
Variable  Definitions and Sources 
Projected 
Value in 
2004 
Projecte
d Value 
in 2050 
Average 
Annual 
Growth 
Rate, 
2004-2050 
FLFPR  Proportion of females in total labour force 
Source: OECD, AWG  47.00 46.4  -0.03 
AGE65-
74 
Population aged 65-74 as a share of the total 
population. Source: EUROSTAT, AWG.  7.89 10.32  0.61 
AGE75+  Population aged 75+ as a share of the total 
population. Source: EUROSTAT, AWG.  7.02 14.63  1.62 
AVELE65  Life expectancy at aged 65 for females and males. 
Source: WHO, AWG.  16.60 19.54  0.36 
MORTAL
ITY 
Mortality from any cause of death. Calculated as 
the simple ratio of number of registered 
deaths/mid-year population (per 100) (in logs). 
Source: WHO, AWG. 
1.13 1.34  0.39 
GDP  Gross domestic product per capita in US$ PPP 
Source: OECD and AWG.  29196 62122  1.66 
UNEMP  Unemployed individuals as a share of the total 
labour force. Source: OECD and AWG.  5.26 4.26 -0.45 
ALCCON  Alcohol consumption, litres per capita (15+) (in 
logs). Source: OECD and Annual Growth Trend.  9.56 9.89  0.07 
PUHES 
Public health expenditure in US$ PPP per capita 
as a share of the total health expenditure in US$ 
PPP per capita. Source: OECD and AWG. 
82.73 73.90  -0.25 
SALARY
GP 
Dummy variable taking the value of one for 
countries with salaried GPs; zero otherwise. 
Source: Christiansen et. al (2006) 
0.00 0.00  na 
CAPGP 
Dummy variable taking the value of one for 
countries with capitation payment GPs; zero 
otherwise. Source: Christiansen et. al (2006) . 
0.00 0.00  na 
CASEHO 
Dummy variable taking the value of one for 
countries with case-based reimbursement of 
hospitals; zero otherwise. Source: Christiansen et. 
al (2006) . 
0.00 0.00  na 
COPAYG
P 
Dummy variable taking the value of one for 
countries with significant co-payment for GPs; 
zero otherwise. Source: Christiansen et. al (2006) 
. 
0.00 0.00  na 
COPAYH
O 
Dummy variable taking the value of one for 
countries with significant co-payment for 
inpatient hospital treatment; zero otherwise. 
Source: Christiansen et. al (2006) . 
0.00 0.00  na 
FREEGP 
Dummy variable taking the value of one for 
countries with free choice of GP or primary care 
physician; zero otherwise. Source: Christiansen 
et. al (2006) . 
1.00 1.00  na 
FREEHO 
Dummy variable taking the value of one for 
countries with overall ceiling of hospitals; zero 
otherwise. Source: Christiansen et. al (2006) . 
1.00 1.00  na 
BEDS  Acute care beds per 1,000 inhabitants (in logs). 
Source: Christiansen et. al (2006)  3.37 2.67  -0.5 B15
   
 
It is important to note that many of the variables, such as those representing the 
public share in health spending may seem arbitrary, and we subsequently explore the 
importance of our assumptions. In addition, the differences between institutional 
arrangements of different countries are not usually as simple and clear-cut as implied 
by the use of dummy variables which take on values of zero or one.  
Simulation models of health care expenditure in Denmark, 2004-2050: 
Influences of driving variables 
Table B3-2 The Influence of Socio-Economic Variables on Projected Health 
Spending (Model 0) 
 Value  in  2003  Value in 2050 in 
Base Run 
Projected Share of 
Health Spending 
in 2050 (% GDP) 
Difference from 
Base (% pts) 
Base    8.61%   
GDP 28745 62122 8.98%  0.37 
GDP (1.5% p.a. 
growth)  28745 62122 8.71%  0.10 
AGE65-74 7.80  10.32  8.83%  0.22 
AGE75+ 7.03  14.63  8.50% -0.11 
AVELE65 16.70  19.54  7.70%  -0.91 
FLFRP 47.00  46.40  8.76% 0.15 
MORTALITY 1.07  1.34  8.62%  0.01 
UNEMP 5.40  4.26  8.55% -0.06 
ALCCON 9.55  9.89  8.61%  0.00 
PUHES 82.94  73.90  9.34%  0.73 
Note: Except in the case above where the GDP growth rate is set to 1.5% p.a., the table shows the 
share of health spending in GDP resulting if each variable in turn is held to its 2003 value instead of 
moving to the 2050 value during the simulation. The GDP elasticity is unrestricted. 
 
In Table B3-2 we show, along with the base value, the results of simulations in which 
each socio-economic variable is set to the value that it held in 2003. A comparison of 
the results of these simulations with the base therefore indicates the importance of the 
projected path of the variable as an influence on the base projection. They are 
calculated by using model 0 of Table 3. 
 
This table shows that some of our projections have a powerful influence on the share 
of spending. Because the health spending elasticity with respect to GDP is 1.0071, 
rising GDP in itself (1.5 per cent annual growth rate) increases the share of health 
spending in GDP by 0.1 percentage points. With constant GDP the projected value is 
0.37 percentage points higher than the base. The ageing of the population with an 
increase in the share of the elderly leads to different effects in the two included age-
groups. If the share of people aged 65 to 74 was held constant, the health care 
spending would rise by 0.22 percentage points. On the other hand, if the share of 
people aged 75 and over was held constant, a decline in health care spending by 0.11 
percentage points would be the result. While the effects of increasing shares of the 
older age-groups show a relative small effect since the variables have no long run 
effect in our equation, increase in life expectancy has a significant impact on health 
care spending. Constant life expectancy reduces the spending by 0.91 percentage 
points. Changes in the crude death (MORTALITY) have nearly no effect in the case B16
  of Denmark because, once again, they have no long-run influence on the model. A 
net demographic effect can be calculated by adding together the deviations of all the 
demographic terms. If all of these stayed at their 2003 values spending would be 
reduced by 0.79 percentage points. The share of the public sector in health spending is 
also important, since the projected decline in the share reduces the total expenditure 
by 0.73 percentage points. 
  
In order to look at the effects of the variables which can be regarded as health policy 
variables, we use a similar approach. The only continuous variable of this type is the 
number of beds; we treat this as in the earlier simulations, showing what would have 
happened if it had been held at its 2003 value. The other variables are dummy 
variables and we explore these differently. We carry out a set of simulations in which 
the value of each in turn is switched between the base run and the alternatives. Thus, 
if a dummy takes the value of 1 in the base, it is switched to 0 in the alternative and 
vice versa. These results are shown in Table B3-3 using our model 0.  
 
Table B3-3  The Influence of Policy Variables on Projected Health Spending  
(Model 0) 
 Value  in  2003  Value in 2050 in 
Base Run 
Projected Share of 
Health Spending 
in 2050 (% GDP) 
Difference from 
Base (% pts) 
Base    8.61%   
Beds 3.38 11.01  8.73%  0.12 
  Value in Base 
Run 
Value in 
Alternative    
SalaryGP 0  1  8.61%  0.00 
CapGP 0  1  9.91%  1.30 
CaseHO 0  1  8.47%  -0.14 
CoPAyGP 0  1  10.37%  1.76 
CoPayHO 0  1  8.06%  -0.55 
FreeGP 1  0  7.47%  -1.14 
FreeHO 1  0  8.02%  -0.59 
Note: The entry for beds has the same interpretation as in Table B1. The other entries show the 
impact of each dummy in turn changing from 0 to 1 or vice versa. 
 
The table shows that it is the management of GPs rather than the management of 
hospitals which has an important effect on health spending. If GP’s were reimbursed 
by capitation the health care spending would rise by 1.3 percentage points. 
Copayments for visiting a GP increases the total health care expenditures by 1.76 
percentage points due to a rise in private spending. However, there is a question 
whether this dummy in fact represents this term. Limiting the access to GP’s would 
lead to a decline in health spending by 1.14 percentage points. 
Influences of Expenditure Elasticities 
Table B3-4 shows that a reduction in the elasticity of health spending with respect to 
GDP to 1 results in a very small fall and an increase of GDP elasticity up to 1.1 and 
1.2 results in an increase in total expenditure as a proportion of GDP.  
 
Table B3-4 provides further information on the effect of income elasticity. As we 
have already observed when reducing it from the unrestricted value to 1, there is little 
overall change because of offsetting changes in the other parameters of the model. It B17
  can be seen that the impact of the elasticity is particularly weak for values just above 
1. 
 
Table B3-4   Scenarios of different restrictions on long run income elasticity 
on health care expenditure in Denmark 
Restriction on long run 
income elasticity 
+1% s.d. of Health 
Care Expenditure in 
2050 
Health Care 
Expenditure in 2050 
(% GDP) 
-1% s.d. of Health Care 
Expenditure in 2050 
Unrestricted 8.89%  8.61%  8.35% 
1 8.87%  8.60%  8.34% 
1.1 9.05%  8.77%  8.49% 
1.2 9.24%  8.92%  8.62% 
Influences of Restrictions on Demographic Parameters 
Finally, in Table B3-5 we explore the effects of restrictions on the demographic 
parameters, both with the long run elasticity with respect to GDP left unrestricted and 
with it set equal to 1. In the table boldface entries indicate that a demographic 
restriction has been imposed. For the age variables the coefficient shows what would 
be observed if health expenditure were driven by the age structure of the population. 
The coefficient for mortality indicates what would be expected if the only 
demographic influence were death-related costs. In each case where demographic-
related restrictions are imposed on parameters we are interested in two sub-cases. In 
the first the other parameters on the other demographic variables related to old people 
are left unrestricted, while in the second they are restricted to zero. Thus the second 
sub case of each type tells us what would happen if expenditure were age or mortality 
related and if that were the only demographic influences.  
 
 
Table B3-5  The Impact of Restrictions on the Demographic Parameters on 
the Projected Share of Health Expenditure in 2050 
Model  GDP 
Elasticity 
AGE65-
74  AGE75+ AVELE65 MORT +1  S.D 
Health 
Expenditure 
in 2050 (% 
GDP) 
-1 
S.D 
0 1.0071  0 0  0.0419  0  8.89% 8.61%  8.35% 
1 1.0151  0 0  0.0538  0.313  9.48% 9.19%  8.90% 
2 1.1738  0 0  0  0.313  9.36% 9.03%  8.70% 
3 0.9653  0.006 0.03  0.0227  0  10.14% 9.82% 9.50% 
4 1.0403  0.006 0.03  0  0  10.15% 9.81% 9.48% 
5  1 0 0  0.0431  0  8.87% 8.60%  8.34% 
6  1 0 0  0.0564  0.313  9.45% 9.16%  8.88% 
7  1 0 0  0  0.313  8.59% 8.27%  7.96% 
8  1 0.006  0.03  0.0163  0  10.21% 9.88% 9.56% 
9  1 0.006  0.03  0  0  9.91% 9.59%  9.27% 
Note: Boldface entries indicate numerical values of restrictions. Other entries are the long-run 
coefficients implied by the restrictions. 
 
The importance of the interactions between the coefficients can be deduced from this 
table. When the GDP elasticity is not limited, the restriction of the elasticity for the 
both age-groups to zero has the effect of raising projected expenditure (model 1 
compared to model 0). However, if the life expectancy effects are restricted to zero so B18
  that death-related costs are the only demographic influence, then projected 
expenditure is reduced by 0.16 percentage points (model 2 compared to model 1). In 
contrast when expenditure is assumed to be age related (model 3) the health care 
spending will rise by 1.2 percentage points compared to the base model. an additional 
restriction if life expectancy (model 4) lead not to a significant change in the result.  
If GDP elasticity is restricted to 1 the results are not quite different from the results of 
the unrestricted GDP elasticity. However, if also the life expectancy was restricted to 
zero the increase the health care expenditure would be 0.34 percentage points below 
the base model (model 7 compared to model 0) respectively 0.76 percentage points 
compared to model 2.  
Conclusions 
The exercise has indicated a number of key influences on health spending in 
Denmark. Estimates of the influence of demographic effects are crucially dependent 
on the interaction between these effects and the estimated GDP elasticity of health 
spending.  
 
According to the Danish projections, raising the GDP elasticity from its unrestricted 
value of 1.0071 1.2 results in rising projected expenditures due to offsetting 
movements in the effects of the demographic variables. Out of the other variables the 
life expectancy of people aged 65 is important; a projected rise in this increases the 
total expenditure by 0.91 percentage points in 2050. The structure of GP remuneration 
and the basis on which GDP services are provided are also important influences B19
 
B4    Finland 
Hannu Piekola, ETLA 
Health care expenditure, 1980-2003 
Health care expenditure in Finland grew by an estimated 2.1 percentage points from 
5.7 per cent to 7.8 per cent of GDP between 1980 and 2003. According to the OECD 
Health Data 2006 (OECD, 2006) this compares with a growth of 2.5 percentage 
points for the EU15 member states over the same period with health care expenditure  
in 2003 reaching 9.0 per cent of GDP. 
  
Finnish health care expenditure can be broadly divided into public spending, which is 
mainly spent on the National Health Service, and private spending, which is defined 
as expenditure by the household and corporate sector on health care. Estimated public 
health expenditure as a share of the total fell by an estimated 7.2 percentage points to 
82.2 per cent between 1980 and 2003. 
Health care expenditure projections, 2004-2050 
The projected data for Finland assume that female labour force participation (FLFPR) 
will continue to grow until 2050, whilst the unemployment rate (UNEMP) is expected 
by 2 %-points to 6%. Both, the amount of alcohol consumption per capita (ALCCON) 
and the number of acute care beds (BEDS) will rise until 2050. Finally, private health 
care expenditure is expected to rise considerably, with the level of public health care 
expenditure (PUHES) falling to under seventy per cent by the end year of the 
projections. 
 
(i) Mortality rates are adjusted for population structure.  The original data suggested a 
decrease from 1 to 0.66 and the latter figure is now 0.93. I also used the calculated 
figures until 2050, pointing to an increase up to 1.41 by 2050.  
 
(ii) Unemployment rate follows Etla’s calculation, where it is projected to decrease to 
6% in the long run, which is not very far from structural unemployment rate.   
 
(iii) Gdp growth follows now AWG estimates (growth decreasing gradually to 1.6%) 
but steady 1.5% is also explored.   
 
Following elasticity restrictions were used. 
 
(i) LR Income Elasticity: we have applied the unit elasticity in some of the models. 
This moderates expenditures up a little. 
 
(ii) LR Age 65-74 Semi-Elasticity: The health care expenditure allocated for this age 
group in the projection year, 2003, is 1449 million and share is 13.57%. The 
percentage of the population in this age group in the same initial projected period 
year, 2003, is 8.53%. Hence we have, 0.1357/8.53 = 0.01591. We, however, use the 
same restriction 0.009 in Table B6.7 as imposed in other countries. Without the 
restriction we rely on manually inserted projection of the demographic variables.  B20
 
(iii) LR Age 75+ Semi-Elasticity: The health care expenditure allocated for this age 
group in the projection year, 2003, is 3464 million and share is 32.43% and 
population share is 7.03%. Hence we have, 0.3243/7.03 = 0.0461. We, however, use 
the same restriction 0.020 in Table B6.7 as imposed in other countries. 
 
(iv) LR Mortality Semi-Elasticity: Miller (2001) and Yang et. al (2003) suggested that 
one-quarter or more of life-time health care expenditure may be consumed, on 
average, in the last year of life. The figure in Finland in 2004 would be 0.246/0.9287 
or around 0.27 (in UK 0.25/0.8896 = 0.28). We hare experimented with commonly 
decided semi-elasticity restriction 0.31 on LR Mortality, which is close to the figure 
obtained for health care expenditure for last four years before death. 
  
Stakes (2006) evaluated this from a 40% sample of 65+ population (285,000 obs) 
allowing health expenditures to differ depending how long time it takes for a person 
to die. They obtained following results 
 
Table B4-1  Health and long-term care expenditures depending on death year 
for 1998 sample for population 65+ 
1998  1999 2000 2001 2002 Alive at the 
end of 2003  All 
14.2%  17.1% 12.3% 9.3%  7.8%  39.3% 100% 
 
The 65+ share of health care expenditures of total population is 46% so that 
expenditures from last four years before death is 0.46*53.5% = 24.6%. 
 
(v) We experimented with projecting number of beds to follow roughly Hospital Days 
per Age Cohort, All as shown below.  
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Here, the average decrease in last years 1996-2001 was -1.7%. A more rapid decrease 
over such long period is not viable assumptions as ageing will offset part of the 
increase in efficiency. The assumptions regarding this variable have significant 
effects. 
 
The source or method of derivation is indicated in Table B4-2.  B22
 
Table B4-2  Demographic, economic and institutional variables included in 
our model 
Variable  Definitions and Sources 
Projected 
Value in 
2004 
Projected 
Value in 
2050 
Average 
Annual 
Growth 
Rate, 
2004-2050 
AGE65-
74 
Population aged 65-74 as a share of the total 
population. Source: Eurostat.  8.61 12.27  0.79 
AGE75+  Population aged 75+ as a share of the total 
population. Source: Eurostat.  7.20 15.77  1.73 
AVELE6
5  Life expectancy at aged 65 Source:  WHO.  18.22 23.48 0.57 
MORTAL
ITY 
Mortality from any cause of death. Calculated 
as the simple ratio of number of registered 
deaths/mid-year population (per 100,000) (in 
logs). Source: WHO. 
0.93 1.41 0.91 
FLFPR 
Female labour force participation rate (% ratio 
to active population aged 15-65). Source: 
OECD and AWG. 
47.50    
UNEMP  Unemployed individuals as a share of the total 
labour force. Source: OECD and AWG.  8.83 6  -0.8 
ALCCON 
Alcohol consumption, litres per capita (15+) 
(in logs). Source: OECD and Annual Growth 
Trend. 
8.28    
PUHES 
Public health expenditure in US$ PPP per 
capita as a share of the total health 
expenditure in US$ PPP per capita. Source: 
OECD and AWG. 
73.8    
SALARY
GP 
Dummy variable taking the value of one for 
countries with salaried GPs; zero otherwise. 
Source: Christiansen et. al (2006) 
0.00 0.00 Na 
CAPGP 
Dummy variable taking the value of one for 
countries with capitation payment GPs; zero 
otherwise. Source: Christiansen et. al (2006) . 
0.00 0.00 Na 
CASEHO 
Dummy variable taking the value of one for 
countries with case-based reimbursement of 
hospitals; zero otherwise. Source: 
Christiansen et. al (2006) . 
0.00 0.00 Na 
COPAYG
P 
Dummy variable taking the value of one for 
countries with significant co-payment for 
GPs; zero otherwise. Source: Christiansen et. 
al (2006). 
1.00 1.00 Na 
COPAYH
O 
Dummy variable taking the value of one for 
countries with significant co-payment for 
inpatient hospital treatment; zero otherwise. 
Source: Christiansen et. al (2006) . 
1.00 1.00 Na 
FREEGP 
Dummy variable taking the value of one for 
countries with free choice of GP or primary 
care physician; zero otherwise. Source: 
Christiansen et. al (2006) . 
1.00 1.00 Na 
FREEHO 
Dummy variable taking the value of one for 
countries with overall ceiling of hospitals; 
zero otherwise. Source: Christiansen et. al 
(2006) . 
1.00 1.00 Na 
BEDS  Acute care beds per 1,000 inhabitants (in 
logs). Source: Christiansen et. al (2006)  2.24 1.41 -1.0  B23
 
It is important to note that many of the variables, such as those representing the public 
share in health spending may seem arbitrary, and we subsequently explore the 
importance of our assumptions. In addition, the differences between institutional 
arrangements of different countries are not usually as simple and clear-cut as implied 
by the use of dummy variables which take on values of zero or one. Finland does not 
fit perfectly into this framework. 
Simulation models of health care expenditure in Finland, 2004-2050: 
Influences of Driving Variables 
Table B4-3 shows the base-line expenditure on health as a proportion of GDP, with 
expenditure on health care expected to increase to 9.20% of GDP in 2050 from 7.3% 
in 2003. Table, however, shows the degree of uncertainty surrounding our estimates. 
It is also seen in our last table that imposing demographic effects based on observed 
current age-specific expenditure shares would considerably raise the estimates. 
 
The projected changes in the share of health spending match well most people’s 
intuition and it is important to understand the factors driving it. It is obviously the 
outcome of both the model parameters and the paths assumed for the exogenous 
variables. We explore the key aspects of both of these. 
 
In Table B4-3 we show, along with the base value, the results of simulations in which 
each socio-economic variable is set to the value that it held in 2003. Comparison of 
the results of these simulations with the base therefore indicates the importance of the 
projected path of the variable as an influence on the base projection.  
 
 
 
Table B4-3  The Influence of Socio-Economic Variables on Projected Health 
Spending (Model 0) 
 Value  in  2003  Value in 2050 in 
Base Run 
Projected Share of 
Health Spending 
in 2050 (% GDP) 
Difference from 
Base 
Base    9.20%  0.00% 
GDP 25936 59568 9.44% 0.24% 
GDP (1.5% p.a. 
growth)  25936 52216 9.45  %  0.25% 
AGE65-74 8.53  12.27  9.22  %  0.02% 
AGE75+ 7.03  15.77  9.22%  0.02% 
AVELE65  18.22 23.48 7.34  %  -1.86% 
FLFPR  47.50 47.50 9.20%  0.00% 
MORTALITY  0.93 1.41 9.27%  0.07% 
UNEMP  9.01 6.00 9.03%  -0.17% 
ALCCON  8.28 8.28 9.20%  0.00% 
PUHES  73.78 73.78 9.20%  0.00% 
Note: Except in the case above where the GDP growth rate is set to 1.5% p.a., the table shows the 
share of health spending in GDP resulting if each variable in turn is held to its 2003 value instead of 
moving to the 2050 value during the simulation. The GDP elasticity is unrestricted. 
 
Table B4-3 shows that some of our projections have a powerful influence on the share 
of spending. With GDP constant the projected value is 0.24 percentage points higher  B24
than the base on account of the dynamic effects in the model. The share of the 
population in each age group is not very important given the restrictions in the model 
for the share of people aged 65-74 and 75+ . The mortality rate is expected to rise. 
This has the influence of raising projected expenditures very little. The share of the 
public sector in health spending is of minor importance, with a projected decline in 
the share not reducing the expenditure total. However the increase in life expectancy 
has a powerful effect. 
 
We next use a similar approach to look at the effects of the variables, which can be 
regarded as health policy variables. The only continuous variable of this type is the 
number of beds. The other variables are dummy variables and we explore these 
differently. We do this exercise first with no restrictions imposed on GDP elasticity as 
the model appeared to yield more realistic projections. We carry out a set of 
simulations in which the value of each in turn is switched between the base run and 
the alternatives. Thus if a dummy took the value of 1 in the base it is switched to 0 in 
the alternative projections and vice versa. Finland has significant co-payment for GPs 
(COPAYGP=1), also in inpatient hospital treatment (COPAYHO=1). Finland is also 
characterized by free choice of GP or primary care physician (FREEGP=1) and 
overall ceiling of hospitals (FREEHO=1). Thus the idea is to see what would be the 
expenditures in the converse case (taking the model used in Table B4-3). These 
results are shown in Table B4-4 
 
 
Table B4-4  The Influence of Policy Variables on Projected Health Spending  
(Model 0) 
 Value  in  2003  Value in 2050 in 
Base Run 
Projected Share of 
Health Spending 
in 2050 (% GDP) 
Difference from 
Base 
Beds  2.26 1.41 9.46%  0.26% 
  Value in Base 
Run 
Value in 
Alternative    
SalaryGP  0 1 9.20%  0.00% 
CapGP  0 1 10.58%  1.38% 
CaseHO  0 1 9.05%  -0.15% 
CoPAyGP  1 0 7.63%  -1.57% 
CoPayHO  1 0 9.83%  0.63% 
FreeGP  1 0 7.97%  -1.23% 
FreeHO  1 0 8.57%  -0.63% 
Note: The entry for beds has the same interpretation as in Table B6.2. The other entries show the 
impact of each dummy in turn changing from 0 to 1 or vice versa. 
 
Table B4-4 shows that maintaining the hospital beds at current higher level would 
have increased expenditure projects by around 0.26 percentage points. Thus 
decreasing number of hospital bed in the future as such has only a minor impact. It is 
also seen that it is the management of GPs such as co-payment for GP rather than the 
management of hospitals which has an important effect on health spending. Salaried 
GPs and Capitation-paid GPs both add to costs as does failing to charge the public for 
visiting their doctors. However, as we have noted there are questions about the precise 
interpretation of these dummy variables. 
  B25
Influences of Expenditure Elasticities 
Table B4-5 provides further information on the effect of the income elasticity. As we 
have already observed when decreasing it from the unrestricted value to 1, there is a 
mild positive overall change. 
 
Table B4-5. Scenarios of different restrictions on long run income elasticity on 
health care expenditure in Finland 
Restriction on 
long run income 
elasticity 
+1% s.d. of 
Health Care 
Expenditure in 
2050 
Health Care 
Expenditure in 
2050 
(% GDP) 
-1% s.d. of Health Care Expenditure 
in 2050 
Unrestricted  9.59 %  9.20 %  8.83 % 
1  9.60 %  9.21 %  8.84 % 
1.1  9.33 %  8.94 %  8.57 % 
1.2  8.98 %  8.58 %  8.20 % 
 
Table B4-5 shows that increases in the elasticity of health spending with respect to 
GDP results in a moderate fall in total expenditure as a proportion of GDP. As we 
nave noted, this arises because of the impact of the restriction on the coefficient on 
life expectancy. 
Influences of Restrictions on Demographic Parameters 
Finally, in Table B4-6 we explore the effects of restrictions on the demographic 
parameters, both with the long run elasticity with respect to GDP left unrestricted and 
with it set equal to 1. In the table the boldface entries indicate that a demographic 
restriction has been imposed. For the age variables it is that the coefficient on them is 
what would be observed if health expenditure were driven by the age structure of the 
population using the prevailing age-specific expenditure share observed. For mortality 
it is the coefficient which would be expected if the demographic influence were 
death-related costs. In each case where demographic-related restrictions are imposed 
on parameters we are interested in two sub-cases. In the first the other parameters on 
the other demographic variables related to old people are left unrestricted and in the 
second they are restricted to zero. Thus the second sub case of each type tells us what 
would happen if expenditure were age or mortality related and if that were the only 
demographic influence. 
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Table B4-6  The Impact of Restrictions on the Demographic Parameters on 
the Projected Share of Health Expenditure in 2050 
Model  GDP 
Elasticity 
AGE65-
74  AGE75+ AVELE65 MORT +1  S.D 
Health 
Expenditure 
in 2050 (% 
GDP) 
-1 S.D 
0 1.0071  0 0  0.0419  0  9.59 %  9.20 %  8.82 % 
1 1.0151  0 0  0.0538  0.313  11.71% 11.24%  10.79% 
2 1.1738  0 0  0  0.313  9.92% 9.50%  9.11% 
3 0.9653  0.006 0.03  0.0227  0  11.16% 10.71%  10.27% 
4 1.0403  0.006 0.03  0  0  10.48% 10.06%  9.65% 
5  1 0  0 0.0431  0  9.60% 9.21%  8.84% 
6  1 0  0 0.0564  0.313  11.72% 11.26%  10.82% 
7  1 0  0 0  0.313  9.04% 8.65%  8.27% 
8  1 0.006  0.03  0.0163  0  11.05% 10.60%  10.17% 
9  1 0.006  0.03  0  0  10.24% 9.82%  9.42% 
Note: Boldface entries indicate numerical values of restrictions. Other entries are the long-run 
coefficients implied by the restrictions. In mortality coefficients are -0.1 for lag zero, and 0.41 for 
lag one. 
 
The importance of the interactions between the coefficients can be deduced from this 
table. The coefficient of GPP elasticity is in general lower when demographic 
restrictions are imposed. When the mortality restriction is imposed, it can be seen that 
the additional imposition of a zero restriction on the long-run effect of life expectancy 
has a very marked influence on the out-turn. Without restriction to life expectancy if 
spending is driven by mortality costs, health expenditure share would rise to 11.71% 
of GDP.  When the effect of life expectancy is restricted to zero, the increase, to 
9.92% of GDP, is much smaller. We observe the restrictions to exert much the same 
effect with assuming unit GDP elasticity. Thus, the projections are now very similar 
with or without the unit elasticity assumption. It is seen that the coefficient for life 
expectancy is higher with unit income elasticity. 
 
It is finally seen that health care expenditure share would rise to around 11.16% of 
GDP when imposing  a coefficient 0.006 for age 65-74 share and coefficient 0.03 for 
age 75+ share, depending on whether or not the GDP elasticity is left unrestricted. In 
both cases the effect is considerably smaller if life expectancy effects are suppressed. 
 
We can thus expect up to 2% higher share of health care expenditures when the 
demographic effects are included in the model, when not based on historical trends 
but on the recent estimates of distribution of costs over ages. Note also that the true 
expenditure share in recent estimates for Finland was 0.01591 for age 65-74 share 
(instead of 0.006 used in Table B4-6 ) and 0.0461 for age 75+ share (instead of 0.03 
in Table B4-6)..  
Conclusions 
Our final Table B4-6 indicates large sensitivity to assumptions regarding Age 65-74, 
Age 75+ and mortality effects. Mechanical calculations based on earlier expenditure 
shares would give much steeper rise in expenditures. In Table B4-6 the rise would be 
around 2%-point higher using the standard assumption that reflect the age-specific 
expenditure shares at European level or slightly greater assuming the Finnish age-
specific health expenditure distribution. Thus, the expected substantial increase in  B27
costs should be given due attention. It is also noteworthy that the expected increase in 
expenditures would be higher assuming unit elasticity of GDP. Some of the modest 
rise in expenditures is explained by health expenditures being an inferior good. Less is 
spent on health as wealth goes up. Estimates of the influence of demographic effects 
are still fairly robust in the interaction between these and the estimated GDP elasticity 
of health spending. With the figures for the Finnish projections, raising the GDP 
elasticity from its unrestricted value of 1.007 to 1.2 decreases expenditures only by 
0.8 percentage points. Generally, imposing restriction in GDP elasticity also matters 
less when not restricting coefficients for demographic effects such as life expectancy. 
 
It is clear that cost management in health sector to lower the sensitivity to GDP 
growth is very important. Of the other variables the share of public expenditure in the 
total volume of expenditure is not very important; a projected decrease in this takes 
negligible effect on total expenditure by 2050. The decrease in the number of hospital 
beds turns out to be only somewhat important explanatory factor for the moderate cost 
increase in the past. The projected halving of hospital beds by 2050 saves costs only 
by 0.26%-points. This is a bit surprising given that large cost savings are to expected 
by more productive use of the facilities. 
 
In Finland about 27% of health care expenditures accrue to the last four years before 
death. Moderating these costs are also important, although our model by and large 
fails to extrapolate the costs from rising share of 75+. The structure of GP 
remuneration and the basis on which GDP services are provided have also important 
influences. In countries with significant co-payment for inpatient hospital treatment 
health expenditure costs are generally higher. 
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B5    France 
Health care expenditure, 1980-2003 
Health care expenditure in France grew by an estimated 2.5 percentage points from 
7.1 per cent to 9.6 per cent of GDP between 1980 and 2003. According to the OECD 
Health Data 2006 (OECD, 2006) this is precisely the growth for the EU15 member 
states over the same period with health care expenditure in 2003 reaching 9.0 per cent 
of GDP. 
 
French health care expenditure can be broadly divided into public and private 
spending. Estimated of public health expenditure as a share of the total fell by an 
estimated 4 percentage points between 1980 and 2003: 80% in 1980 to 76% in 2003. 
Health care expenditure projections, 2004-2050 
The dependent variable used in this paper is total health care expenditure per capita 
(THEPC) measured in US dollars in nominal prices, adjusted for purchasing power 
parities (PPP) and for inflation, although this is converted to a percentage of GDP in 
presenting the results.  
 
The variables are listed in Table B5-1  have been collected from Eurostat, INSEE, 
INED, the OECD Health Data 2006 and the AWG. The projected data are either 
derived from the OECD, AWG, INSEE, INED or evaluated by extrapolating the trend 
over the period 1980-2003. 
 
The projected data for France assume that female labour force participation (FLFPR) 
will continue to grow slightly until 2015 and will go down until 2050 (see annex at 
the end of the document). The unemployment rate (UNEMP) is expected to fall 
slightly. The amount of alcohol consumption per capita (ALCCON) and the number of 
acute care beds (BEDS) will also fall until 2050. Private health care expenditure is 
(PUHES) is kept constant by the end year of the projections. The shares of elderly 
age-groups and life expectancies are growing over the projection period. Mortality, 
measured by crude death rate, will grow from 0.84% in 2004 to 1.11% in 2050. 
 
Dummy variables are assumed unchanged. The source or method of derivation is 
indicated in the table. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table B5-1  Demographic, economic and institutional variables included in our  B29
model 
Variable Definitions  and  Sources 
Projected 
Value in 
2004 
Projected 
Value in 
2050 
Average 
Annual 
Growth 
Rate, 
2004-
2050 
AGE65-74  Population aged 65-74 as a share of the total 
population. Source: Eurostat and INSEE and INED.  8.46 12.21  0.82 
AGE75+  Population aged 75+ as a share of the total population. 
Source: Eurostat and INSEE and INED.  7.87 17.97  1.82 
AVELE65  The average life expectancy at aged 65 for males and 
females. Source: WHO and INSEE and INED.  19.42 23.81  0.44 
MORTALI
TY 
Mortality from any cause of death. Calculated as the 
simple ratio of number of registered deaths/mid-year 
population (per 100,000) (in logs). Source: WHO and 
INSEE and INED. 
0.84 1.11  0.61 
GDP 
Gross domestic product per capita. US$ in nominal 
prices and adjusted for PPP. This variable is taken in 
log in the model. Source: OECD and AWG 
26770.49 54744.41  1.57 
FLFPR  Female labour force participation rate (% ratio to active 
population aged 15-65). Source: OECD and INSEE.  46.18 45.85  -0.02 
UNEMP  Unemployed individuals as a share of the total labour 
force. Source: OECD and INSEE and OFCE.  9.97 9.42  -0.12 
ALCCON  Alcohol consumption. litres per capita (15+) (in logs). 
Source: OECD and non linear model.  10.57 8.31  -0.52 
PUHES 
Public health expenditure in US$ PPP per capita as a 
share of the total health expenditure in US$ PPP per 
capita. Source: OECD. 
76.12 76.12  0.00 
SALARYG
P 
Dummy variable taking the value of one for countries 
with salaried GPs; zero otherwise. Source: Christiansen 
et. al (2006) 
0.00 0.00  na 
CAPGP 
Dummy variable taking the value of one for countries 
with capitation payment GPs; zero otherwise. Source: 
Christiansen et. al (2006) . 
0.00 0.00  na 
CASEHO 
Dummy variable taking the value of one for countries 
with case-based reimbursement of hospitals; zero 
otherwise. Source: Christiansen et. al (2006) . 
0.00 0.00  na 
COPAYGP 
Dummy variable taking the value of one for countries 
with significant co-payment for GPs; zero otherwise. 
Source: Christiansen et. al (2006) . 
1.00 0.00  na 
COPAYH
O 
Dummy variable taking the value of one for countries 
with significant co-payment for inpatient hospital 
treatment; zero otherwise. Source: Christiansen et. al 
(2006) . 
1.00 0.00  na 
FREEGP 
Dummy variable taking the value of one for countries 
with free choice of GP or primary care physician; zero 
otherwise. Source: Christiansen et. al (2006) . 
1.00 1.00  na 
FREEHO 
Dummy variable taking the value of one for countries 
with overall ceiling of hospitals; zero otherwise. 
Source: Christiansen et. al (2006) . 
1.00 0.00  na 
BEDS  Acute care beds per 1 000 inhabitants (in logs). Source: 
Christiansen et. al (2006) and non linear model.  4.03 3.39  -0.38 
 
It is important to note that many of the variables, such as those representing the public 
share in health spending may seem arbitrary, and we subsequently explore the 
importance of our assumptions. In addition, the differences between institutional 
arrangements of different countries are not usually as simple and clear-cut as implied 
by the use of dummy variables which take on values of zero or one. France does not 
fit perfectly into this framework.  B30
Simulation models of health care expenditure in France, 2004-2050: 
Influences of Driving Variables 
Table B5-2 shows the base-line expenditure on health as a proportion of GDP, with 
expenditure on health care expected to rise to 11.3% of GDP in 2050 from 9.6% in 
2003. In Table B5-2 we show, along with the base value, the results of simulations in 
which each socio-economic variable is set to the value that it held in 2003. 
Comparison of the results of these simulations with the base therefore indicates the 
importance of the projected path of the variable as an influence on the base projection.  
 
Table B5-2   The Influence of Socio-Economic Variables on Projected Health 
Spending 
 Value  in  2003  Value in 2050 in 
Base Run 
Projected Share of 
Health Spending 
in 2050 (% GDP) 
Difference from 
Base 
Base     11,30%   
GDP 26770.49  54744.41  11,68%  0,39% 
GDP (1.5% p.a. 
growth)  26770.49 54641.20  11,33%  0,04% 
AGE65-74 8.57  17.97  11,34% 0,05% 
AGE75+ 7.74  25.74  11,12%  -0,17% 
FLFPR 46.28  45.85  11.43%  0,138 
AVELE65 19.32    9,51% -1,79% 
MORTALITY 0.92  1.11  11,32%  0,03% 
UNEMP 9.22  9.42  11,31%  0,01% 
ALCCON 10.70  8.31  11,27% -0,02% 
PUHES 76.12  76.12  11,30%  0,00% (same 
scenario as base) 
Note: Except in the case above where the GDP growth rate is set to 1.5% p.a., the table shows the 
share of health spending in GDP resulting if each variable in turn is held to its 2003 value instead of 
moving to the 2050 value during the simulation. The GDP elasticity is unrestricted. Demographic 
parameters are restricted as in the model 0 (see Table B5-5 below). 
 
Because the health spending elasticity with respect to GDP is very close to one, rising 
GDP has slight effect on share of health spending. With GDP constant the projected 
value is over 0.39 percentage points higher than the base.  
 
Despite the large rising of the share of old age groups over the period, the effect of the 
demographic structure on health expenditure is very weak. With constant 
demographic structure the health spending is 0.12 percentage points lower than the 
base. The mortality rate has also very slight effect. Quite evidently, the average life 
expectancy at aged 65 (AVELE65) captures entirely the demographic influence on 
health spending: with constant life expectancy at 65 the health expenditure is 1.79 
lower than the base. The other socio-economic variables, including the share of public 
sector, have no impact on projected heath spending because they are held constant in 
the forecast period. 
 
Finally we use a similar approach to look at the effects of the variables which can be 
regarded as health policy variables in Table B5-3. The only continuous variable of 
this type is the number of beds; we treat this as in the earlier simulations, showing 
what would have happened if it had been held at its 2003 value. The other variables 
are dummy variables and we explore these differently. We carry out a set of 
simulations in which the value of each in turn is switched between the base run and  B31
the alternatives. Thus if a dummy took the value of 1 in the base it is switched to 0 in 
the alternative and vice versa.  
 
Table B5-3 The Influence of Policy Variables on  Projected Health Spending 
 Value  in  2003  Value in 2050 in 
Base Run 
Projected Share of 
Health Spending 
in 2050 (% GDP) 
Difference from 
Base 
Beds 3.75  3.39  11,37%  0,07% 
  Value in Base 
Run 
Value in 
Alternative    
SalaryGP 0  1  11,30%  0,00% 
CapGP 0  1 13,00%  1,70% 
CaseHO 0  1  11,11%  -0,18% 
CoPAyGP 1  0  9,38%  -1,92% 
CoPAyHO 1  0  12,07%  0,77% 
FreeGP 1  0  9,79%  -1,50% 
FreeHO 1  0  10,52%  -0,77% 
Note: The entry for beds has the same interpretation as in Table B5-1. The other entries show the 
impact of each dummy in turn changing from 0 to 1 or vice versa. The GDP elasticity is 
unrestricted. Demographic parameters are restricted as in the model 0 (see Table B5-5 below). 
 
Management of GPs seems to have an important effect on French health spending. 
Capitation-paid GPs in particular have a large effect; this is rather a surprising result 
knowing that this type of GPs payment can be considered as a regulation device. 
More naturally Removal of free choice of GP or primary care physician (FreeGP 
becomes 0) reduces the health spending. Otherwise, co-payment for GPs increases the 
health spending which is again quite surprising except if co-payment for GPs is in fact 
a response to an inefficient regulation of out-patient spending. Thus, although the 
dummy variables are important it is questionable whether they represent the effects 
attributed to them. 
Influences of Expenditure Elasticities 
Table B5-4 shows small effects on French health spending of income elasticity 
increasing. The mechanical effect of rising GDP is compensated by the change of the 
other coefficients of the regression (implied by the restriction of GDP coefficients). 
The projections are not much affected by income-elasticity restrictions. 
 
Table B5-4  Scenarios of different restrictions on long run income elasticity on 
health care expenditure in France 
Restriction on long run income 
elasticity 
+1% s.d. of 
Health Care 
Expenditure in 
2050 
Health Care 
Expenditure in 
2050 
(% GDP) 
-1% s.d. of Health 
Care Expenditure 
in 2050 
Unrestricted 11.57%  11.30%  11.03% 
1 11.57%  11.30%  11.03% 
1.1 11.44%  11.16%  10.89% 
1.2 11.22%  10.92%  10.64% 
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Influences of Restrictions on Demographic Parameters 
Finally, in Table B5-5 we explore the effects of restrictions on the demographic 
parameters, both with the long run elasticity with respect to GDP left unrestricted and 
with it set equal to 1. In the table the boldface entries indicate that restrictions have 
been imposed. For the age variables it is that the coefficient on them is what would be 
observed if health expenditure were driven by the age structure of the population. For 
mortality it is the coefficient which would be expected if the only demographic 
influence were death-related costs.  In each case where demographic-related 
restrictions are imposed on parameters we are interested in two sub-cases. In the first 
the other parameters on the other demographic variables related to old people are left 
unrestricted and in the second they are restricted to zero. Thus the second sub case of 
each type tells us what would happen if expenditure were age or mortality related and 
if that were the only demographic influence.  
 
Table B5-5 shows that, compared to the base model, imposing restrictions on 
demographic variables so that health spending is directly linked to age structure 
increases noticeably forecast health spending (even if coefficient on the life 
expectancy at 65 is restricted to zero). The same effect, though weaker, is observed 
when the same type of restriction is imposed on mortality coefficient. This reflects the 
fact that the coefficients on the age and mortality terms are not strongly correlated 
with other parameters, so that an increase in these terms is not offset by other 
coefficients evolutions. 
 
Unit income-elasticity restriction does not noticeably modify the results even though 
it depresses the health spending when the coefficient on life expectancy at 65 is 
restricted to zero. This emphasizes a correlation between GDP and life expectancy at 
65. 
 
 
Table B5-5  The Impact of Restrictions on the Demographic Parameters on the 
Projected Share of Health Expenditure in 2050 
Model  GDP 
Elasticity 
AGE65-
74  AGE75+ AVELE65 MORT +1  S.D 
Health 
Expenditure 
in 2050 (% 
GDP) 
-1 S.D 
0 1.0071  0 0  0.0419  0  11.57% 11.30% 11.03% 
1 1.0151  0 0  0.0538  0.313  13.04% 12.72% 12.42% 
2 1.1738  0 0  0  0.313  11.52% 11.26% 11.01% 
3 0.9653  0.006 0.03 0.0227  0  14.36% 14.02% 13.69% 
4 1.0403  0.006 0.03  0  0  13.71% 13.38% 13.06% 
5  1 0 0  0.0431  0  11.57% 11.30% 11.03% 
6  1 0 0  0.0564  0.313  13.05% 12.74% 12.43% 
7  1 0 0  0  0.313  10.26% 10.06%  9.87% 
8  1 0.006  0.03  0.0163  0  14.30% 13.96% 13.63% 
9  1 0.006  0.03  0  0  13.34% 13.03% 12.71% 
Note: Boldface entries indicate numerical values of restrictions. Other entries are the long-run 
coefficients implied by the restrictions.  B33
Conclusions 
The projections for France lead to a rather slight increase of the health spending. The 
effect of demographic terms is real but moderate (less than 2 points, Table B5-2). 
Certain policy variables (Table B5-3) have a comparable influence. The projections 
appear not to be very sensitive to income elasticity restriction. More generally, the 
projections are rather robust to the restrictions imposed and react in suitable way.  
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B6    Germany 
Erika Schulz, DIW 
Health care expenditure, 1980-2003 
The total health care expenditures (public and private) in Germany grew by an 
estimated 2.7 percentage points from 8.7 per cent to 11.4 per cent of GDP  between 
1980 and 2003. According to the OECD Health Data 2006 (OECD, 2006) this 
compares with a growth of 2.5 percentage points for the EU15 member states over the 
same period with health care expenditure  in 2003 reaching 9.0 per cent of GDP. 
 
The health care expenditures in Germany can be broadly divided into public spending, 
which is mainly spent on the statutory Health Care Insurance System, and private 
spending, which is defined as expenditure of households and corporate sector on 
health care. The public health expenditure as a share of the total grew by an estimated 
0.7 percentage points to 79.4 per cent between 1980 and 2003. The public health care 
expenditure as a percentage of GDP grew from 6.6 percent in 1980 to 8.5 per cent in 
2003. 
Health care expenditure projections, 2004-2050 
The projected data for Germany assume that the unemployment rate (UNEMP) is 
expected to fall slightly. In the past the alcohol consumption as well as the number of 
beds decreased markedly by 1.7 per cent (ALCCON) respectively 2.1 per cent 
(BEDS). It is assumed that the further decline is restricted to 0.5 per cent per year. In 
view of the demographic development with a decline in the number of inhabitants and 
an increase in the share of the older people the crude mortality rate will increase 
markedly. 
 
The dependent variable used in this paper is total health care expenditure per capita 
(THEPC) measured in US dollars in nominal prices, adjusted for purchasing power 
parities (PPP) and inflation, in addition this is converted to a percentage of GDP in 
presenting the results. The variables included in our model are listed in Table B6-1. 
They have been collected from both the OECD Health Data 2006 and the AWG. The 
projected data are either derived from the OECD, AWG or evaluated by extrapolating 
the trend over the period 1980-2003. Dummy variables are assumed to be unchanged. 
The source or method of derivation is indicated in the table. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  B35
Table B6-1 Demographic, economic and institutional variables included in our model 
Variable  Definitions and Sources 
Projected 
Value in 
2004 
Projected 
Value in 
2050 
Average 
Annual 
Growth 
Rate, 
2004-
2050 
FLFPR  Proportion of females in total labour force. 
Source: OECD, AWG  44.2 45.74  0.06 
AGE65-
74 
Population aged 65-74 as a share of the total 
population. Source: EUROSTAT, AWG.  10.27 11.98 0.36 
AGE75+  Population aged 75+ as a share of the total 
population. Source: EUROSTAT, AWG.  7.74 18.50  1.92 
AVELE6
5 
Life expectancy at aged 65 for females and 
males. Source: WHO, AWG.  17.80 21.80 0.44 
MORTA
LITY 
Mortality from any cause of death. Calculated 
as the simple ratio of number of registered 
deaths/mid-year population (per 100,000) (in 
logs). Source: WHO, AWG. 
1.08 1.62  0.89 
GDP  Gross domestic product per capita in US$ PPP 
Source: OECD and AWG.  24368,15 47328,85  1.45 
UNEMP  Unemployed individuals as a share of the total 
labour force. Source: OECD and AWG.  9.54 7.00  -0.66 
ALCCON 
Alcohol consumption, litres per capita (15+) 
(in logs). Source: OECD and Annual Growth 
Trend. 
10.59 8.41 -0.5 
PUHES 
Public health expenditure in US$ PPP per 
capita as a share of the total health expenditure 
in US$ PPP per capita. Source: OECD and 
AWG. 
79.40 80.97 0.04 
SALARY
GP 
Dummy variable taking the value of one for 
countries with salaried GPs; zero otherwise. 
Source: Christiansen et. al (2006) 
0.00 0.00 na 
CAPGP 
Dummy variable taking the value of one for 
countries with capitation payment GPs; zero 
otherwise. Source: Christiansen et. al (2006) . 
0.00 0.00 na 
CASEHO 
Dummy variable taking the value of one for 
countries with case-based reimbursement of 
hospitals; zero otherwise. Source: Christiansen 
et. al (2006) . 
0.00 0.00 na 
COPAYG
P 
Dummy variable taking the value of one for 
countries with significant co-payment for GPs; 
zero otherwise. Source: Christiansen et. al 
(2006) . 
0.00 0.00 na 
COPAYH
O 
Dummy variable taking the value of one for 
countries with significant co-payment for 
inpatient hospital treatment; zero otherwise. 
Source: Christiansen et. al (2006) . 
1.00 1.00 na 
FREEGP 
Dummy variable taking the value of one for 
countries with free choice of GP or primary 
care physician; zero otherwise. Source: 
Christiansen et. al (2006) . 
1.00 1.00 na 
FREEHO 
Dummy variable taking the value of one for 
countries with overall ceiling of hospitals; zero 
otherwise. Source: Christiansen et. al (2006) . 
1.00 1.00 na 
BEDS  Acute care beds per 1,000 inhabitants (in 
logs). Source: Christiansen et. al (2006)  6.14 4.88 -0.5 
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Note: It is important to note that many of the variables, such as those representing the 
public share in health spending may seem arbitrary, and we subsequently explore the 
importance of our assumptions. In addition, the differences between institutional 
arrangements of different countries are not usually as simple and clear-cut as implied 
by the use of dummy variables which take on values of zero or one.  
Simulation models of health care expenditures in Germany, 2004-2050: 
Influences of driving variables 
Table B6-2 shows the base-line expenditure on health as a proportion of GDP, with 
expenditure on health care expected rise to 12.9 per cent of GDP in 2050 from 11.4 
per cent in 2003. In Table B6-2 we also show, along with the base value, the results of 
simulations in which each socio-economic variable is set to the value that it held in 
2003. A comparison of the results of these simulations with the base therefore 
indicates the importance of the projected path of the variable as an influence on the 
base projection. These are calculated using model 0 of Table B3. 
 
Table B6-2 The Influence of Socio-Economic Variables on Projected Health Spending 
(Model 0) 
 Value  in  2003  Value in 2050 in 
Base Run 
Projected Share of 
Health Spending 
in 2050 (% GDP) 
Difference from 
Base (% pts) 
Base     12.93%   
GDP 24103 47329  13.35%  0.42 
GDP (1.5% p.a. 
growth)     12.96%  0.03 
AGE65-74 9.96  11.98  12.86% -0.07 
AGE75+ 7.54  18.50  12.93% 0.00 
AVELE65 18.55  21.80  11.40%  -1.53 
FLFRP 44.20  45.75  12.36%  -0.57 
MORTALITY 1.03  1.62  13.10%  0.17 
UNEMP 9.00  7.00  12.77%  -0.16 
ALCCON 10.64  8.41  12.90%  -0.03 
PUHES 79.36  80.97  12.74%  -0.19 
Note: Except in the case above where the GDP growth rate is set to 1.5% p.a., the table shows the 
share of health spending in GDP resulting if each variable in turn is held to its 2003 value instead of 
moving to the 2050 value during the simulation. The GDP elasticity is unrestricted. 
 
This table shows that some of our projections have a powerful influence on the share 
of spending. Because the health spending elasticity with respect to GDP is 1.0071, a 
reduction in the growth rate of GDP increases the share of health spending in GDP. 
With constant GDP the projected value is 0.42 percentage points higher than the base. 
While a constant value in the proportion of the elderly in total population (AGE65-74 
and AGE75+) has no significant effect on the health care spending, the increase in life 
expectancy has a markedly impact. If the life expectancy of people aged 65 will be 
held constant, the health care expenditure will decline by 1.5 percentage points 
. 
The sharp increase in the crude death rate shows an adverse effect. A constant death 
rate lead to an increase in health care expenditures by 0.17 percentage points. A net 
demographic effect can be calculated by adding together the deviations of all the 
demographic terms. If all of these stayed at their 2003 values, spending would decline 
by 1.43 percentage points. The share of the public sector in health spending is also  B37
important. The projected expansion in the share increases the total expenditures by 
0.19 percentage points.  
 
To look at the effects of the variables which can be regarded as health policy 
variables, we use a similar approach. The only continuous variable of this type is the 
number of beds; we treat this as in the earlier simulations, showing what would have 
happened if it had been held at its 2003 value. The other variables are dummy 
variables and we explore these differently. We carry out a set of simulations in which 
the value of each in turn is switched between the base run and the alternatives. Thus, 
if a dummy take the value of 1 in the base it is switched to 0 in the alternative and 
vice versa. These results are shown in Table B6-3 using our model 0.  
 
Table B6-3 The Influence of Policy Variables on Projected Health Spending (Model 0) 
 Value  in  2003  Value in 2050 in 
Base Run 
Projected Share of 
Health Spending 
in 2050 (% GDP) 
Difference from 
Base (% pts) 
Base     12.93%   
Beds 6.17  4.88  13.11%  0.18 
  Value in Base 
Run 
Value in 
Alternative    
SalaryGP 0  1  12.93%  0.00 
CapGP 0  1 14.88%  1.95 
CaseHO 0  1  12.72%  -0.21 
CoPAyGP 0  1  15.57% 2.64 
CoPayHO 1  0  13.81% 0.88 
FreeGP 1  0  11.20%  -1.73 
FreeHO 1  0  12.04%  -0.89 
Note: The entry for beds has the same interpretation as in Table B1. The other entries show the 
impact of each dummy in turn changing from 0 to 1 or vice versa. 
 
The table shows that it is the management of GPs rather than the management of 
hospitals which has an important effect on health spending. Capitation-paid GPs add 
to costs as does failing to charge the public for visiting their doctors. Copayment for 
visiting a GP increases the total health care expenditures due to a rise in private 
spending. Limiting the access to GP’s would lead to a decline in health spending. 
There is, however, a question particularly whether the copayment dummy in fact 
represents the effect attributed to it since copayments might be expected to depress 
spending.   
Influences of Expenditure Elasticities 
Table B6-4 shows that reduction in the elasticity of health spending with respect to 
GDP to 1 result in a rise and an increase up to 1.1 and 1.2 results in a decline in total 
expenditures as a proportion of GDP. Allowing for the fact that the AWG figure 
covers only public health spending and grossing up on the basis of the 2003 share, the 
comparable AWG figure, with a unit elasticity of 1 is 13.1 per cent of GDP which lies 
0.6 percentage points above our figure.  
 
Table B6-4 provides further information on the effect of the income elasticity. As we 
have already observed when reducing it from the unrestricted value to 1, there is little 
overall change because of offsetting changes in the other parameters of the model. It  B38
can be seen that the impact of the elasticity is particularly weak for values just above 
1.  
 
Table B6-4 Scenarios of different restrictions on long run income elasticity on health 
care expenditure in Germany 
Restriction on 
long run income 
elasticity 
+1% s.d. of 
Health Care 
Expenditure in 
2050 
Health Care 
Expenditure in 
2050 
(% GDP) 
-1% s.d. of Health Care Expenditure 
in 2050 
Unrestricted 13.41%  12.93%  12.46% 
1 13.42%  12.94%  12.48% 
1.1 13.08%  12.60%  12.13% 
1.2 12.60%  12.10%  11.62% 
Influences of Restrictions on Demographic Parameters 
Finally, in Table B6-5 we explore the effects of restrictions on the demographic 
parameters, both with the long run elasticity with respect to GDP left unrestricted and 
with it set equal to 1. In the table boldface entries indicate that a demographic 
restriction has been imposed. For the age variables the coefficient shows what would 
be observed if health expenditure were driven by the age structure of the population. 
For mortality it is the coefficient which would be expected if the only demographic 
influence were death-related costs. In each case where demographic-related 
restrictions are imposed on parameters we are interested in two sub-cases. In the first 
the other parameters on the other demographic variables related to old people are left 
unrestricted and in the second they are restricted to zero. Thus the second sub case of 
each type tells us what would happen if expenditure were age or mortality related and 
if that were the only demographic influences.  
 
Table B6-5 The impact of restrictions on the demographic parameters on the 
projected share of health expenditure in 2050 
Model  GDP 
Elasticity 
AGE65-
74  AGE75+ AVELE65 MORT +1  S.D 
Health 
Expenditure 
in 2050 (% 
GDP) 
-1 S.D 
0 1.0071  0 0  0.0419  0  13.41% 12.93% 12.46% 
1 1.0151  0 0  0.0538  0.313  17.12% 16.49% 15.90% 
2 1.1738  0 0  0  0.313  14.79% 14.24% 13.72% 
3 0.9653  0.006 0.03 0.0227  0  17.65% 16.99% 16.36% 
4 1.0403  0.006 0.03  0  0  16.55% 15.96% 15.39% 
5  1 0 0  0.0431  0  13.42% 12.94% 12.48% 
6  1 0 0  0.0564  0.313  17.17% 16.56% 15.97% 
7  1 0 0  0  0.313  13.59% 13.08% 12.59% 
8  1 0.006  0.03  0.0163  0  17.47% 16.82% 16.20% 
9  1 0.006  0.03  0  0  16.24% 15.67% 15.12% 
Note: Boldface entries indicate numerical values of restrictions. Other entries are the long-run 
coefficients implied by the restrictions. 
 
The importance of the interactions between the coefficients can be deduced from this 
table. When the GDP elasticity is not restricted, the restriction that spending is driven 
by death-related costs in the manner set out in section 3-2 has the effect of raising 
projected expenditure. However, if the life expectancy effects are restricted to zero so 
that death-related costs are the only demographic influence, then projected  B39
expenditure increases by 1.31 percentage points. When expenditure is assumed to be 
age related expenditure is raised by 4.03 percentage points, falling to 3.03 percentage 
points when life expectancy effects are also suppressed.  
 
If GDP elasticity is also restricted these effects are altered. In particular, when 
demographic effects are assumed to come only through mortality effects, a unit 
elasticity has the effect of reducing age projected expenditure fairly sharply by more 
than one percentage point.  
Conclusions 
The exercise has indicated a number of key influences on health spending in 
Germany. Estimates of the influence of demographic effects are crucially dependent 
on the interaction between these effects and the estimated GDP elasticity of health 
spending. With the figures for the German projections, raising the GDP elasticity 
from its unrestricted value of 1.0071 to 1.2 has the effect of reducing projected 
expenditures by 0.8 percentage points because of offsetting movements in the effects 
of the demographic variables. Out of the other variables the life expectancy of people 
aged 65 is important; a constant life expectancy would lead to a reduction by almost 
1.5 percentage points of total expenditures by 2050.  The structure of GP 
remuneration and the basis on which GDP services are provided are also important 
influences. B40
 
B7    Ireland 
Ehsan Khoman, Rebecca Riley and Martin Weale, National Institute of Economic and 
Social Research (NIESR) 
Health care expenditure, 1980-2003 
Health care expenditure in Ireland grew by an estimated 3.4 percentage points from 
4.1 per cent to 7.5 per cent of GDP between 1980 and 2003. According to the OECD 
Health Data 2006 (OECD, 2006) the only EU15 member states that experienced a 
larger increase in health care expenditure over this period were Greece and Portugal. 
The relatively strong expansion of health spending in Ireland may in part be explained 
by the low level from which it has risen. 
 
The majority of health care expenditure in Ireland is accounted for by public 
spending. Over the period 1980-2003 public spending has accounted for 71 to 82 per 
cent of total health care expenditure. Taken over this period as a whole, public health 
expenditure as a share of the total fell by an estimated 4.1 percentage points to 77.5 
per cent between 1980 and 2003. 
Health care expenditure projections, 2004-2050 
The projected data for Ireland assume that the unemployment rate (UNEMP) falls 
slightly. Female labour force participation is expected to continue to grow more 
quickly than male labour force participation, resulting in a rise in the share of women 
in the labour force (FLFPR) until 2050. Both, the amount of alcohol consumption per 
capita (ALCCON) and the number of acute care beds (BEDS) rise over the projection 
period. Finally, private health care expenditure is expected to rise considerably, with 
the share of public health care expenditure (PUHES) falling further than observed at 
any time since 1980. 
 
The dependent variable used in this paper is total health care expenditure per capita 
(THEPC) measured in US dollars in nominal prices, adjusted for purchasing power 
parities (PPP) and for inflation, although this is converted to a percentage of GDP in 
presenting the results. The variables are listed in Table B7-1. Demographic, economic 
and institutional variables included in our model have been collected from both the 
OECD Health Data 2006 and the AWG. The projected data are either derived from 
the OECD or AWG, unless otherwise stated. Dummy variables are assumed 
unchanged. The source or method of derivation is indicated in the table. 
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Table B7-1 Demographic, economic and institutional variables included in our model 
Variable Definitions  and  Sources 
Projected 
Value in 
2004 
Projected 
Value in 
2050 
Averag
e 
Annual 
Growth 
Rate, 
2004-
2050 
AGE65-
74 
Population aged 65-74 as a share of the total population. 
Source: Eurostat.  6.26 12.94  1.59 
AGE75+  Population aged 75+ as a share of the total population. 
Source: Eurostat.  4.89 13.21  2.19 
AVELE6
5 
The average life expectancy at age 65 for males and 
females. Source: WHO. 
 
16.97 21.93  0.56 
MORTA
LITY 
Mortality from any cause of death. Calculated as the 
simple ratio of number of registered deaths/mid-year 
population (per 100,000) (in logs). Source: WHO. 
0.76 1.11  0.82 
FLFPR  Female share of labour force (female share of active 
population aged 15-64). Source: OECD and AWG.  42.45 45.63  0.16 
UNEMP  Unemployed individuals as a share of the total labour 
force. Source: OECD and AWG.  4.30 3.40  -0.49 
ALCCON 
Alcohol consumption, litres per capita (15+) (in logs). 
Source: OECD and Annual Growth Trend until 2008, level 
maintained thereafter. 
12.65 14.05  0.23 
PUHES 
Public health expenditure in US$ PPP per capita as a share 
of the total health expenditure in US$ PPP per capita. 
Source: OECD and Annual Growth Trend. 
77.36 69.91  -0.22 
SALARY
GP 
Dummy variable taking the value of one for countries with 
salaried GPs; zero otherwise. Source: Christiansen et. al 
(2006). 
0.00 0.00  na 
CAPGP 
Dummy variable taking the value of one for countries with 
capitation payment GPs; zero otherwise. Source: 
Christiansen et. al (2006). 
1.00 1.00  na 
CASEHO 
Dummy variable taking the value of one for countries with 
case-based reimbursement of hospitals; zero otherwise. 
Source: Christiansen et. al (2006). 
0.00 0.00  na 
COPAYG
P 
Dummy variable taking the value of one for countries with 
significant co-payment for GPs; zero otherwise. Source: 
Christiansen et. al (2006). 
1.00 1.00  na 
COPAYH
O 
Dummy variable taking the value of one for countries with 
significant co-payment for inpatient hospital treatment; 
zero otherwise. Source: Christiansen et. al (2006). 
1.00 1.00  na 
FREEGP 
Dummy variable taking the value of one for countries with 
free choice of GP or primary care physician; zero 
otherwise. Source: Christiansen et. al (2006). 
1.00 1.00  na 
FREEHO 
Dummy variable taking the value of one for countries with 
overall ceiling of hospitals; zero otherwise. Source: 
Christiansen et. al (2006). 
1.00 1.00  na 
BEDS 
Acute care beds per 1,000 inhabitants (in logs). Source: 
Christiansen et al (2006); 20% growth between 2003 and 
2015, level maintained thereafter. 
3.07 3.63  0.37 
 
 
It is important to note that many of the variables, such as those representing the public 
share in health spending, may seem arbitrary, and we subsequently explore the 
importance of our assumptions. In addition, the differences between institutional 
arrangements of different countries are not usually as simple and clear-cut as implied  B42
by the use of dummy variables which take on values of zero or one. Ireland does not 
fit perfectly into this framework. 
Simulation models of health care expenditure in Ireland, 2004-2050: 
Influences of Driving Variables 
Table B7-2 shows the base-line expenditure on health as a proportion of GDP, with 
expenditure on health care expected to rise to 12.1% of GDP in 2050 from 7.5% in 
2003. The projected rise in the share of health spending is substantial and it is 
important to understand the factors driving it. It is obviously the outcome of both the 
model parameters and the paths assumed for the exogenous variables. We explore key 
aspects of both of these. 
 
In Table B7-2 we show, along with the base value, the results of simulations in which 
each socio-economic variable is set to the value that it held in 2003. Comparison of 
the results of these simulations with the base therefore indicates the importance of the 
projected path of the variable as an influence on the base projection.  
 
This table shows that some of our projections have a powerful influence on the share 
of spending. The single most important factor driving the rise in health spending over 
the projection period is the expected increase in the average life expectancy for men 
and women at age 65, which rises from 16.9 years in 2003 to 21.9 years in 2050, 
adding 2.2 percentage points to the share of health spending in GDP. In comparison, 
the share of the population in each age group is less important. Given the coefficients 
in the estimated model, the rapid increase in the share of people aged 65-74 over the 
projection period raises health spending by just 0.1 per cent of GDP; the rise in the 
share of people aged 75+ raises the expenditure share by 0.3 percentage points. Given 
the necessary correlations between developments in the share of older age people in 
the population, life expectancy, and mortality, the influence of these demographic 
changes on health spending are perhaps best viewed in conjunction with each other. A 
net demographic effect can be calculated by adding together the deviations of all the 
demographic terms. If all of these stayed at their 2003 values spending would be 
reduced by 2.5 percentage points. 
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Table B7-2. The Influence of Socio-Economic Variables on Projected Health 
Spending (Model 0) 
 Value  in  2003  Value in 2050 in 
Base Run 
Projected Share of 
Health Spending 
in 2050 (% GDP) 
Difference from 
Base 
Base     12.07%  0.00% 
GDP 32869 92134  12.32%  0.25% 
GDP (1.5% p.a. 
growth)  32869 92134  11.96%  -0.11% 
AGE65-74 6.26  12.94  11.97% -0.10% 
AGE75+ 4.87  13.21  11.73%  -0.34% 
AVELE65 16.87  21.93  9.92%  -2.15% 
MORTALITY 0.70  1.11  12.20%  0.13% 
FLFPR 42.50  45.63  11.05%  -1.02% 
UNEMP 4.30  3.40  12.01%  -0.06% 
ALCCON 12.32  14.05  12.09%  0.02% 
PUHES 77.53  69.91  12.93% 0.86% 
Note: Except in the case above where the GDP growth rate is set to 1.5% p.a., the table shows the 
share of health spending in GDP resulting if each variable in turn is held to its 2003 value instead of 
moving to the 2050 value during the simulation. The GDP elasticity is unrestricted. 
 
Another significant influence on the share of spending is the relatively sharp increase 
in the female labour force participation rate. As a result, the share of women in the 
labour force is projected to rise by 3.1 percentage points over the projection period. If 
instead the gender distribution of the labour force were held constant at 2003 levels 
health spending would be 1 percentage point less than given by the base projection. 
The share of the public sector in health spending also influences total health spending, 
with a projected decline in the share reducing the expenditure total by 0.9 percentage 
points. 
  
Table B7-3. The Influence of Policy Variables on  Projected Health Spending  
(Model 0) 
 Value  in  2003  Value in 2050 in 
Base Run 
Projected Share of 
Health Spending 
in 2050 (% GDP) 
Difference from 
Base 
Beds 3.02  3.63  11.94%  -0.13% 
  Value in Base 
Run 
Value in 
Alternative    
SalaryGP 0  1  12.07%  0.00% 
CapGP 1  0 10.49%  -1.58% 
CaseHO 0  1  11.88%  -0.19% 
CoPayGP 1  0  10.02%  -2.05% 
CoPayHO 1  0  12.90%  0.83% 
FreeGP 1  0  10.47%  -1.60% 
FreeHO 1  0  11.25%  -0.82% 
Note: The entry for beds has the same interpretation as in Table B1. The other entries show the 
impact of each dummy in turn changing from 0 to 1 or vice versa. 
 
Finally we use a similar approach to look at the effects of the variables which can be 
regarded as health policy variables. The only continuous variable of this type is the 
number of beds; we treat this as in the earlier simulations, showing what would have 
happened if it had been held at its 2003 value. The other variables are dummy 
variables and we explore these differently. We carry out a set of simulations in which 
the value of each in turn is switched between the base run and the alternatives. Thus if  B44
a dummy took the value of 1 in the base it is switched to 0 in the alternative and vice 
versa. These results are shown in Table B7-3  for model 0.  
 
These tables show that it is primarily the management of GPs rather than the 
management of hospitals which has an important effect on health spending. 
Capitation-paid GPs add to costs as does failing to charge the public for visiting their 
doctors. 
Influences of Expenditure Elasticities 
Table B7-4 shows that increases in the elasticity of health spending with respect to 
GDP result in a rise in total expenditure as a proportion of GDP.  
 
Table B7-4. Scenarios of different restrictions on long run income elasticity on health 
care expenditure in Ireland 
Restriction on 
long run income 
elasticity 
+1% s.d. of Health 
Care Expenditure 
in 2050 
Health Care Expenditure 
in 2050 
(% GDP) 
-1% s.d. of Health Care 
Expenditure in 2050 
Unrestricted 12.63%  12.07%  11.54% 
1 12.54%  12.02%  11.51% 
1.1 13.58%  12.96%  12.37% 
1.2 14.94%  14.19%  13.48% 
 
Influences of Restrictions on Demographic Parameters 
Finally, in Table B7-5 we explore the effects of restrictions on the demographic 
parameters, both with the long run elasticity with respect to GDP left unrestricted and 
with it set equal to 1. In the table boldface entries indicate that a demographic 
restriction has been imposed. For the age variables, where the restrictions are not set 
to zero, it is that the coefficient on them is what would be observed if health 
expenditure were driven by the age structure of the population. For mortality it is the 
coefficient which would be expected if the only demographic influence were death-
related costs. In each case where demographic-related restrictions are imposed on 
parameters we are interested in two sub-cases. In the first the other parameters on the 
other demographic variables related to old people are left unrestricted and in the 
second they are restricted to zero. Thus the second sub case of each type tells us what 
would happen if expenditure were age or mortality related and if that were the only 
demographic influence.  
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Table B7-5. The Impact of Restrictions on the Demographic Parameters on the 
Projected Share of Health Expenditure in 2050 
Model  GDP 
Elasticity 
AGE65-
74  AGE75+ AVELE65 MORT +1  S.D 
Health 
Expenditure 
in 2050 (% 
GDP) 
-1 S.D 
0 1.0071  0 0  0.0419  0  12.63% 12.07% 11.54% 
1 1.0151  0 0  0.0538  0.313  14.20% 13.58% 12.99% 
2 1.1738  0 0  0  0.313  16.00% 15.13% 14.31% 
3 0.9653  0.006 0.030 0.0227  0  14.34% 13.70% 13.09% 
4 1.0403  0.006 0.030  0  0 15.26% 14.51% 13.79% 
5  1 0 0  0.0431  0  12.54% 12.02% 11.51% 
6  1 0 0  0.0564  0.313  14.03% 13.45% 12.89% 
7  1 0 0  0  0.313  14.39% 13.60% 12.85% 
8  1 0.006  0.030  0.0163  0  14.69% 14.04% 13.43% 
9  1 0.006  0.030  0  0  14.71% 14.01% 13.34% 
Note: Boldface entries indicate numerical values of restrictions. Other entries are the long-run 
coefficients implied by the restrictions. 
 
The restriction that spending is driven by death-related costs in the manner described 
has the effect of increasing projected expenditure (compare models: 1 and 2 to 0; 6 
and 7 to 5). This occurs mainly, given the rising mortality rate, because of the increase 
in the elasticity of health spending with respect to mortality. In the case where the 
GDP elasticity of health spending is unrestricted there is an additional effect that 
comes from the increase in the GDP elasticity when the other demographic terms are 
restricted to zero (from 1.0071 in model 0 to 1.1738 in model 2). Given the rise in 
GDP over the projection period this has the effect of raising projected health 
expenditure as a share of GDP. We also note that when the parameters on the age 
variables are restricted so that health spending is linked to the age structure of the 
population, there are significant increases in forecast spending (compare models: 3 
and 4 to 0; 8 and 9 to 5). Again the estimated elasticity of health spending with 
respect to GDP is sensitive to the restrictions on average life expectancy, so that the 
rise in health spending is greater when the entire demographic effect occurs through 
the age structure.  
Conclusions 
The exercise has indicated a number of key influences on health spending in Ireland. 
The influences on health spending of demographic changes associated with an aging 
population are significant. Taken together, the effect on health spending of rising 
mortality rates, longer life expectancy and a rising population share of people above 
age 65 is to raise health spending by 2.5 per cent of GDP, the most significant factor 
behind this increase being rising life expectancy. Rising female labour force 
participation also contributes to rising health spending, adding 1 percentage point to 
the total over the projection period.  
 
Another influence is the share of public expenditure in the total volume of 
expenditure; a projected decrease in this takes 0.9 percentage point off total 
expenditure by 2050.  The structure of GP remuneration and the basis on which GP 
services are provided are also important influences.  
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We note the sensitivity of our projections to restrictions on the demographic 
parameters of our model, which partly arise through the effect of these restrictions on 
the estimated elasticity of health spending with respect to GDP. B47
 
B8    Italy 
 
Stefania Gabriele and Michele Raitano, Istituto Studi Analisi Economica (ISAE) 
Health Care Expenditure, 1980-2003 
Health care expenditure in Italy grew by an estimated 1.6 percentage point from 6.9 
per cent to 8.5 per cent of GDP between 1980 and 2003. According to the OECD 
Health Data 2006 (OECD, 2006) this compares with a growth of 2.5 percentage 
points for the EU15 member states over the same period with health care expenditure 
in 2003 reaching 9.0 per cent of GDP. Italian health care expenditure can be broadly 
divided into public spending, which is spent on the National Health Service (Servizio 
Sanitario Nazionale, SSN), and private spending, which is defined as expenditure by 
the household and corporate sector on health care. Estimated of public health 
expenditure as a share of the total slightly reduced since 1980 until 75.3 per cent in 
2003. 
Health Care Expenditure Projections, 2004-2050 
The projected data for Italy assume that the unemployment rate (UNEMP) is expected 
to continue to fall until 6.5%, while female labour force participation (FLFPR) will 
continue to grow until 2050. In line with recent trends, both the amount of alcohol 
consumption per capita (ALCCON) and the number of acute care beds (BEDS) will 
decrease until 2050. Finally, private health care expenditure is expected to rise 
slightly, with the level of public health care expenditure (PUHES) reaching seventy 
per cent in 2014 and keeping then constant up to the end year of the projections. 
The dependent variable used in this paper is total health care expenditure per capita 
(THEPC) measured in US dollars in nominal prices, adjusted for purchasing power 
parities (PPP) and for inflation, although this is converted to a percentage of GDP in 
presenting the results. The variables are listed in Table B8-1 have been collected from 
both the OECD Health Data 2006 and the AWG. The projected data are either derived 
from the OECD, AWG or evaluated by extrapolating some trends. In particular, in 
order to take into account recent dynamics, for the alcohol consumption per capita 
(ALCCON) and the number of acute care beds (BEDS) we refer, respectively, to the 
1999-2003 and the 2000-2003 trends; for the level of public health care expenditure 
(PUHES) we assume a 0.5 percentage points decrease until 2014; then, reached the 
70% level, this variable is kept constant until 2050. Dummy variables are assumed 
unchanged. The source or method of derivation is indicated in the table.  
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Table B8-1  Demographic, economic and institutional variables included in our model 
Variable Definitions  and  Sources 
Projected 
Value in 
2004 
Projected 
Value in 
2050 
Average 
Annual 
Growth 
Rate, 2004-
2050 
AGE65-74  Population aged 65-74 as a share of the total 
population. Source: Eurostat.  10.4 13.4 0.55 
AGE75+  Population aged 75+ as a share of the total 
population. Source: Eurostat.  8.8 20.6  1.86 
AVELE65  The average life expectancy at aged 65 for males. 
Source: WHO.  18.7 24.1 0.56 
FLFPR 
Share of females in total labour force (% ratio to 
active population aged 15-65). Source: OECD and 
AWG. 
38.8 40.6 0.10 
MORTALITY 
Mortality from any cause of death. Calculated as 
the simple ratio of number of registered 
deaths/mid-year population (per 100,000) (in 
logs). Source: WHO. 
1.0 1.6  0.94 
GDP  Gross domestic product in US $ PPP. Source: 
OECD.  24886.04 47873.25  1.43 
FLFPR 
Share of females in total labour force (% ratio to 
active population aged 15-65). Source: OECD and 
AWG. 
38.8 40.6 0.10 
UNEMP  Unemployed individuals as a share of the total 
labour force. Source: Eurostat and AWG.  8.4 6.5  -0.55 
ALCCON 
Pure alcohol consumption, litres per capita (15+) 
(in logs). Source: WHO and Annual Growth 
Trend. 
7.9 6.4  -0.45 
PUHES 
Public health expenditure in US$ PPP per capita 
as a share of the total health expenditure in US$ 
PPP per capita. Source: OECD and AWG and 
Annual Growth Trend.. 
75.0 70.0 -0.15 
SALARYGP 
Dummy variable taking the value of one for 
countries with salaried GPs; zero otherwise. 
Source: Christiansen et. al (2006) 
0.0 0.0 Na 
CAPGP 
Dummy variable taking the value of one for 
countries with capitation payment GPs; zero 
otherwise. Source: Christiansen et. al (2006) . 
1.0 1.0 Na 
CASEHO 
Dummy variable taking the value of one for 
countries with case-based reimbursement of 
hospitals; zero otherwise. Source: Christiansen et. 
al (2006) . 
1.0 1.0 Na 
COPAYGP 
Dummy variable taking the value of one for 
countries with significant co-payment for GPs; 
zero otherwise. Source: Christiansen et. al (2006) . 
0.0 0.0 Na 
COPAYHO 
Dummy variable taking the value of one for 
countries with significant co-payment for inpatient 
hospital treatment; zero otherwise. Source: 
Christiansen et. al (2006) . 
0.0 0.0 Na 
FREEGP 
Dummy variable taking the value of one for 
countries with free choice of GP or primary care 
physician; zero otherwise. Source: Christiansen et. 
al (2006) . 
1.0 1.0 Na 
FREEHO 
Dummy variable taking the value of one for 
countries with overall ceiling of hospitals; zero 
otherwise. Source: Christiansen et. al (2006) . 
1.0 1.0 Na 
BEDS 
Acute care beds per 1,000 inhabitants (in logs). 
Source: Christiansen et. al (2006) and Annual 
Growth Trend. 
4.2 2.9  -0.77 
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It is important to note that many of the variables, such as those representing the public 
share in health spending may seem arbitrary, and we subsequently explore the 
importance of our assumptions. In addition, the differences between institutional 
arrangements of different countries are not usually as simple and clear-cut as implied 
by the use of dummy variables which take on values of zero or one. Italy does not fit 
perfectly into this framework. 
Simulation models of health care expenditure in Italy, 2004-2050: 
Influences of Driving Variables 
Table B8-2 shows the base-line expenditure on health as a proportion of GDP, with 
expenditure on health care expected to rise to 10.0% of GDP in 2050 from 8.5% in 
2003. The Ageing Working Group (AWG) projections value for 2050 in the baseline 
scenario (pure ageing scenario, with an unitary income elasticity) is 7.2%. But AWG 
projects only public expenditure, that, as  shows, currently is about 75% of the total 
and is projected to fall to 70% of the total in 2050. Correcting AWG value according 
to the 2050 share, the AWG value in 2050 for total (i.e. public and private spending) 
becomes 10.3%, approximately the same value predicted by our model.  The trend in 
the share of health spending is the outcome of both the model parameters and the 
paths assumed for the exogenous variables. We explore key aspects of both of these. 
 
In Table B8-2 we show, along with the base value, the results of simulations in which 
each socio-economic variable is set to the value that it held in 2003. Comparison of 
the results of these simulations with the base therefore indicates the importance of the 
projected path of the variable as an influence on the base projection. These are 
calculated using model 0 of tables 3, 4 and 7. 
 
Table B8-2 The Influence of Socio-Economic Variables on Projected Health Spending 
(Model 0) 
 Value  in  2003  Value in 2050 in 
Base Run 
Projected Share of 
Health Spending 
in 2050 (% GDP) 
Difference from 
Base (% pts) 
Base    9.96%   
GDP 24886.04  47873.25  10.29%  0.33% 
GDP (1.5% p.a. 
growth)  24886.04 47873.25  9.98%  0.02% 
AGE65-74 10.4  13.4  10.27% 0.31% 
AGE75+ 8.8  20.6  9.61%  -0.35% 
AVELE65 18.7  24.1  8.34% -1.62% 
FLFRP 38.8  40.6  9.40%  -0.56% 
MORTALITY 1.0  1.6  10.12%  0.16% 
UNEMP 8.4  6.5  9.84%  -0.12% 
ALCCON 7.9  6.4  9.94%  -0.02% 
PUHES 75.0  70.0  10.47%  0.51% 
Note: Except in the case above where the GDP growth rate is set to 1.5% p.a., the table shows the 
share of health spending in GDP resulting if each variable in turn is held to its 2003 value instead of 
moving to the 2050 value during the simulation. The GDP elasticity is unrestricted. 
 
This table shows that some of our independent variables projections have a powerful 
influence on the share of spending. Although the steady state elasticity with respect to 
GDP is very close to 1, a reduction in the growth rate affects the dynamics of the 
process and thus the projected value for 2050. The share of the population in each age 
group is slightly important, causing, respectively for AGE65-74 and AGE75+, an  B50
increase and a decrease in spending around 0.3 percentage points. Mortality has a 
lower influence. The bigger effect on spending is induced by life expectancy; rising 
average life expectancy of men and of women each adds 1.6 percentage points to the 
expenditure share. 
 
The share of the public sector in health spending is also important, with a projected 
decline in the share (around 5 percentage points up to 2014 and then constant) 
increasing the total expenditure by 0.5 percentage points, while the increase in the 
share of female on total labour force raises spending by 0.6 percentage points. 
 
We use a similar approach to look at the effects of the variables which can be 
regarded as health policy variables. The only continuous variable of this type is the 
number of beds; we treat this as in the earlier simulations, showing what would have 
happened if it had been held at its 2003 value. The other variables are dummy 
variables and we explore these differently. We carry out a set of simulations in which 
the value of each in turn is switched between the base run and the alternatives. Thus if 
a dummy took the value of 1 in the base it is switched to 0 in the alternative and vice 
versa. These results are shown in Table B8-3. 
 
Table B8-3  The Influence of Policy Variables on Projected Health Spending (Model 0) 
 Value  in  2003  Value in 2050 in 
Base Run 
Projected Share of 
Health Spending 
in 2050 (% GDP) 
Difference from 
Base 
Beds 4.2  2.9  10.18%  0.22% 
  Value in Base 
Run 
Value in 
Alternative    
SalaryGP 0  1  9.96%  0.00% 
CapGP 1  0  8.66%  -1.30% 
CaseHO 1  0  10.14%  0.18% 
CoPAyGP 0  1  12.00%  2.04% 
CoPayHO 0  1  9.32%  -0.64% 
FreeGP 1  0  8.64%  -1.32% 
FreeHO 1  0  9.28%  -0.68% 
Note: The entry for beds has the same interpretation as in Table B1. The other entries show the impact 
of each dummy in turn changing from 0 to 1 or vice versa. 
 
The table shows that it is the management of GPs rather than the management of 
hospitals which has much more important effect on health spending (SalaryGP value 
is restricted to zero in model 0, so that changing its value does not change spending) .  
Influences of Expenditure Elasticities 
Table B8-4 shows the effect of long run income elasticity on total health spending. 
Allowing for the fact that the AWG figure covers only public health spending and 
grossing up on the basis of the 2003 share, the comparable AWG figure, with a unit 
elasticity is 10.3% of GDP.  
 
Since in model 0 the GDP elasticity is very close to one, it is no surprise that the 
result is scarcely changed by imposing an elasticity of 1. A higher elasticity results in 
lower expenditure shares. This is because of the interaction between the elasticity and 
the coefficient on life expectancy as discussed in the main body of the paper.  
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Table B8-4 Scenarios of different restrictions on long run income elasticity on health 
care expenditure in Italy 
Restriction on 
long run income 
elasticity 
+1% s.d. of 
Health Care 
Expenditure in 
2050 
Health Care 
Expenditure in 
2050 
(% GDP) 
-1% s.d. of Health Care Expenditure 
in 2050 
Unrestricted 10.45%  9.96%  9.50% 
1 10.46%  9.99%  9.55% 
1.1 9.96%  9.52%  9.11% 
1.2 9.45%  9.02%  8.62% 
Influences of Restrictions on Demographic Parameters 
Finally, in Table B8-5 we explore the effects of restrictions on the demographic 
parameters, both with the long run elasticity with respect to GDP left unrestricted and 
with it set equal to 1. In the table the boldface entries indicate that a demographic 
restriction has been imposed. For the age variables it is that the coefficient on them is 
what would be observed if health expenditure were driven by the age structure of the 
population. For mortality it is the coefficient which would be expected if the only 
demographic influence were death-related costs. In each case where demographic-
related restrictions are imposed on parameters we are interested in two sub-cases. In 
the first the other parameters on the other demographic variables related to old people 
are left unrestricted and in the second they are restricted to zero. Thus the second sub 
case of each type tells us what would happen if expenditure were age or mortality 
related and if that were the only demographic influence. 
 
Table B8-5 The Impact of Restrictions on the Demographic Parameters on the 
Projected Share of Health Expenditure in 2050 
Model  GDP 
Elasticity 
AGE65-
74  AGE75+ AVELE65 MORT +1  S.D 
Health 
Expenditure 
in 2050 (% 
GDP) 
-1 S.D 
0 1.0071  0 0  0.0419  0  10.45% 9.96%  9.50% 
1 1.0151  0 0  0.0538  0.313  12.76% 12.16% 11.59% 
2 1.1738  0 0  0  0.313  10.60% 10.16%  9.75% 
3 0.9893  0.009 0.020 0.0271  0  12.35% 11.73% 11.14% 
4 1.0776  0.009 0.020  0  0 11.16% 10.68% 10.23% 
5  1 0  0  0.0431  0  10.46% 9.99%  9.55% 
6  1  0 0  0.0564  0.313  12.83% 12.25% 11.69% 
7  1 0 0  0  0.313  10.10% 9.68%  9.27% 
8  1 0.009  0.020  0.0252  0  12.26% 11.67% 11.11% 
9  1 0.009  0.020  0  0  10.88% 10.42%  9.99% 
Note: Boldface entries indicate numerical values of restrictions. Other entries are the long-run 
coefficients implied by the restrictions. 
 
The importance of the interactions between the coefficients can be deduced from this 
table. The restriction that spending is driven by death-related costs in the manner set 
out in section 3.2 has the effect of raising projected expenditure by more than 2 
percentage points. However, if the life expectancy effects are restricted to zero so that 
death-related costs are the only demographic influence, then projected expenditure 
increase is slight (+0.2%). By contrast when expenditure is assumed to be age related 
expenditure is raised by nearly 1.8 percentage points, falling to 0.72 percentage points 
when life expectancy effects are also suppressed. If the GDP elasticity is also  B52
restricted to one these effects are not altered very significantly; however a strong 
reduction is observed in models 2 and 4 compared, respectively, with models 7 and 9.  B53
B9    Netherlands 
Health care expenditure, 1980-2003 
Health care expenditure in the Netherlands grew by an estimated 1.2 percentage 
points from 7.5 per cent to 8.7 per cent of GDP  between 1980 and 2003. According 
to the OECD Health Data 2006 (OECD, 2006) this compares with a growth of 2.5 
percentage points for the EU15 member states over the same period with health care 
expenditure in 2003 reaching 9.0 per cent of GDP. 
  
Health care expenditure projections, 2004-2050 
The dependent variable used in this paper is total health care expenditure per capita 
(THEPC) measured in US dollars in nominal prices, adjusted for purchasing power 
parities (PPP) and for inflation, although this is converted to a percentage of GDP in 
presenting the results. The variables listed in Table B9-1 have been collected from 
both the OECD Health Data 2006 and the AWG. The projected data are either derived 
from the OECD, AWG or evaluated by extrapolating the trend over the period 1980-
2003. Dummy variables are assumed unchanged. The source or method of derivation 
is indicated in the table.  
 
The projected data for the Netherlands assume that female labour force participation 
(FLFPR) will continue to grow until 2050, whilst the unemployment rate (UNEMP) is 
expected to fall slightly. The amount of alcohol consumption per capita (ALCCON) is 
assumed to be constant over time and the number of acute care beds (BEDS) will fall 
until 2050. Finally, a change in the health care system caused the public health care 
expenditures to rise to around 75 per cent in 2006. After that, public health care 
expenditures are assumed to be unchanged.   B54
 
Table B9-1 Demographic, economic and institutional variables included in our model 
Variable  Definitions and Sources 
Projected 
Value in 
2004 
Projected 
Value in 
2050 
Average 
Annual 
Growth 
Rate, 2004-
2050 
AGE65-74  Population aged 65-74 as a share of the total 
population. Source: AWG.  7.61 10.09  0.64 
AGE75+  Population aged 75+ as a share of the total 
population. Source: AWG.  6.24 14.29  1.82 
AVELE65  The average life expectancy at aged 65 for males 
and females. Source: WHO.  17.18 19.31  0.25 
MORTALITY 
Mortality from any cause of death. Calculated as 
the simple ratio of number of registered 
deaths/mid-year population (per 100) (in logs). 
Source: AWG. 
0.93 1.35  0.80 
FLFPR  Female labour force participation rate (% ratio to 
active population aged 15-65). Source: AWG.  44.65 47.30  0.13 
UNEMP  Unemployed individuals as a share of the total 
labour force. Source: AWG.  3.66 3.23 -0.27 
ALCCON  Alcohol consumption, litres per capita (15+) (in 
logs). Source: OECD.  8.24 8.24  0.00 
PUHES 
Public health expenditure in US$ PPP per capita as 
a share of the total health expenditure in US$ PPP 
per capita. Source: AWG. 
62.00 75.00  0.46 
SALARYGP 
Dummy variable taking the value of one for 
countries with salaried GPs; zero otherwise. 
Source: Christiansen et. al (2006) 
0.00 0.00  na 
CAPGP 
Dummy variable taking the value of one for 
countries with capitation payment GPs; zero 
otherwise. Source: Christiansen et. al (2006) . 
0.00 0.00  na 
GLOBALHO 
Dummy variable taking the value of one for 
countries with global budget reimbursement of 
hospitals; zero otherwise. Source: Christiansen et. 
al (2006) . 
0.00 0.00  na 
CASEHO 
Dummy variable taking the value of one for 
countries with case-based reimbursement of 
hospitals; zero otherwise. Source: Christiansen et. 
al (2006) . 
0.00 0.00  na 
COPAYGP 
Dummy variable taking the value of one for 
countries with significant co-payment for GPs; 
zero otherwise. Source: Christiansen et. al (2006) . 
0.00 0.00  na 
COPAYHO 
Dummy variable taking the value of one for 
countries with significant co-payment for inpatient 
hospital treatment; zero otherwise. Source: 
Christiansen et. al (2006) . 
0.00 0.00  na 
FREEGP 
Dummy variable taking the value of one for 
countries with free choice of GP or primary care 
physician; zero otherwise. Source: Christiansen et. 
al (2006) . 
1.00 1.00  na 
FREEHO 
Dummy variable taking the value of one for 
countries with overall ceiling of hospitals; zero 
otherwise. Source: Christiansen et. al (2006) . 
1.00 1.00  na 
BEDS  Acute care beds per 1,000 inhabitants (in logs). 
Source: Christiansen et. al (2006)  3.13 1.90 -1.08 
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It is important to note that many of the variables, such as those representing the 
number of beds may seem arbitrary, and we subsequently explore the importance of 
our assumptions. In addition, the differences between institutional arrangements of 
different countries are not usually as simple and clear-cut as implied by the use of 
dummy variables which take on values of zero or one. The Netherlands do not fit 
perfectly into this framework. For example, while the dummy for capitation of GP’s 
takes on the value zero, for all publicly insured patients (about two thirds  of all 
patients) GP’s were paid by capitation until 2006. For privately insured patients there 
was a fee-for-service system. With the health care reform of 2006, a mixed system 
was introduced for all patients. 
Simulation models of health care expenditure in the Netherlands, 2004-
2050: Influences of Driving Variables 
Table B9-2 shows the base-line expenditure on health as a proportion of GDP, with 
expenditure on health care expected to rise from 8.7% of GDP in 2003 to 9.94% in 
2050. In Table B9-2 we show, along with the base value, the results of simulations in 
which each socio-economic variable is set to the value that it held in 2003. 
Comparison of the results of these simulations with the base therefore indicates the 
importance of the projected path of the variable as an influence on the base projection.  
 
Given the restrictions on some of the demographic variables the most powerful 
influences on the projection are the average life expectancy and the share of public 
expenditure. A higher life expectancy at 65 and a higher share of public financing are 
associated with higher health care spending. The effect of the increase in GDP is not 
very large, since the estimated income elasticity is close to unity. 
 
For the Netherlands there is no a priori reason to expect that the rise in the share of 
public financing that took place, will lead to higher health care expenditure. The share 
of public financing increased in 2006 because the health care reform introduced 
public health insurance for everybody including the higher incomes. Since before 
2006 practically all the higher incomes were voluntarily insured anyway with about 
the same basic package as the publicly insured lower incomes, there is no reason this 
reform should increase health care expenditure. On the contrary, the reform was 
meant to make the health care market more efficient. 
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Table B9-2 The Influence of Socio-Economic Variables on Projected Health 
Spending (Model 0) 
 Value  in  2003  Value in 2050 in 
Base Run 
Projected Share of 
Health Spending 
in 2050 (% GDP) 
Difference from 
Base 
Base    9.94%  0.00% 
GDP 28414 57725  10.34%  0.40% 
GDP (1.5% p.a. 
growth)  28414 57725  10.04%  0.10% 
AGE65-74 7.54  10.09  10.09% 0.15% 
AGE75+ 6.17  14.29  9.89%  -0.05% 
FLLPR 43.35  47.30  10.19%  0.25% 
AVELE65 17.55  19.31  9.28% -0.66% 
MORTALITY 0.88  1.35  9.97%  0.03% 
FLFPR  43.35 47.30 10.19  0.25% 
UNEMP 3.7  3.23  10.08%  0.14% 
ALCCON 8.24  8.24  9.94% 0.00% 
PUHES 63.00  75.00  8.88%  -1.06% 
Note: Except in the case above where the GDP growth rate is set to 1.5% p.a., the table shows the 
share of health spending in GDP resulting if each variable in turn is held to its 2003 value instead of 
moving to the 2050 value during the simulation. The GDP elasticity is unrestricted. 
 
We use a similar approach to look at the effects of the variables which can be 
regarded as health policy variables. The only continuous variable of this type is the 
number of beds; we treat this as in the earlier simulations, showing what would have 
happened if it had been held at its 2003 value. The other variables are dummy 
variables and we explore these differently. We carry out a set of simulations in which 
the value of each in turn is switched between the base run and the alternatives (from 
2004 on). Thus if a dummy took the value of 1 in the base it is switched to 0 in the 
alternative and vice versa. These results are shown in Table B9-3.  
 
 
Table B9-3 The Influence of Policy Variables on  Projected Health Spending 
(Model 0) 
 Value  in  2003  Value in 2050 in 
Base Run 
Projected Share of 
Health Spending 
in 2050 (% GDP) 
Difference from 
Base 
Base    9.94%   
Beds 3.13  1.90  10.26%  0.32% 
  Value in Base 
Run 
Value in 
Alternative    
SalaryGP 0  1  9.94% 0% 
CapGP 0  1 11.44%  1.50% 
CaseHO 0  1  9.78%  -0.16% 
CoPAyGP 0  1  11.98%  2.04% 
CoPayHO 0  1  9.30%  -0.64% 
FreeGP 1  0  8.62%  -1.32% 
FreeHO 1  0  9.26%  -0.68% 
Note: The entry for beds has the same interpretation as in Table B1. The other entries show the 
impact of each dummy in turn changing from 0 to 1 or vice versa. 
 
The table shows that it is the management of GPs rather than the management of 
hospitals which has an important effect on health spending. Capitation-paid GPs and 
significant co-payments for GP services both add considerably to costs, though these 
effects seem not very plausible for the Netherlands. An increase in costs because of  B57
co-payments for the GP instead of a decrease could possibly be explained by patients 
going directly to the hospital or waiting to ask for medical care until their condition is 
more serious. As in the Netherlands GPs act as gatekeepers and the fee for a 
consultation is only €9, it is not  very likely that health care costs would increase 
considerably. The magnitude of the change suggests that the variable may in fact be 
representing some other institutional difference between countries.  
 
Influences of Expenditure Elasticities 
Table B9-4 shows that increases in the elasticity of health spending with respect to 
GDP result in a relatively modest rise in total expenditure as a proportion of GDP.  
 
Table B9-4  Scenarios of different restrictions on long run income elasticity on 
health care expenditure in the Netherlands 
Restriction on 
long run income 
elasticity 
+1% s.d. of 
Health Care 
Expenditure in 
2050 
Health Care 
Expenditure in 
2050 
(% GDP) 
-1% s.d. of Health Care Expenditure 
in 2050 
Unrestricted 10.73%  9.94%  9.21% 
1 10.79%  10.00%  9.28% 
1.1 11.23%  10.45%  9.72% 
1.2 11.63%  10.83%  10.09% 
 
 
Influences of Restrictions on Demographic Parameters 
Finally, in Table B9-5 we explore the effects of restrictions on the demographic 
parameters, both with the long run elasticity with respect to GDP left unrestricted and 
with it set equal to 1. In the table boldly printed coefficients are restricted. In the base 
run the only non-restricted demographic variable is the average life expectancy at age 
65. The other demographic variables are restricted to zero, a restriction that is not 
rejected by the data. Under these circumstances an increase in the average life 
expectancy is associated with a higher share of health care expenditures in GDP, as 
we have seen. We also explore what would happen if  the age variables would have 
the coefficient that would be observed if health expenditure were driven by the age 
structure of the population. For mortality it is the coefficient which would be expected 
if the only demographic influence were death-related costs. 
 
If we add the influence of death related costs to the model, health expenditure in 2050 
is considerably higher; this result is hardly influenced by the inclusion or exclusion of 
life expectancy as an independent influence. In the cases were the coefficients for the 
older age groups are fixed and death-related costs are excluded (a pure ageing 
scenario) health expenditure is higher than in the base run but lower than in the death 
cost scenario.  
 
A restriction of the long term income elasticity to unity does not have a large 
influence for most demographic scenarios. The pure death related cost scenario is an 
exception: in that case a decrease of the income elasticity from 1.17 to 1 leads to 2 
percentage point lower expenditure.  B58
 
 
Table B9-5  The Impact of Restrictions on the Demographic Parameters on 
the Projected Share of Health Expenditure in 2050 
Model  GDP 
Elasticity 
AGE65-
74  AGE75+ AVELE65 MORT +1  S.D 
Health 
Expenditure 
in 2050 (% 
GDP) 
-1 S.D 
0 1.0071  0 0  0.0419  0  10.73% 9.94%  9.21% 
1 1.0151  0 0  0.0538  0.313  13.46% 12.46% 11.53% 
2 1.1738  0 0  0  0.313  13.49% 12.50% 11.59% 
3 0.9653  0.006 0.03 0.0227  0  13.14% 12.16% 11.25% 
4 1.0403  0.006 0.03  0  0  13.19% 12.23% 11.34% 
5  1 0 0  0.0431  0  10.79% 10.00%  9.28% 
6  1 0 0  0.0564  0.313  13.46% 12.46% 11.54% 
7  1 0 0  0  0.313  11.32% 10.42%  9.59% 
8  1 0.006  0.03  0.0163  0  13.32% 12.35% 11.46% 
9  1 0.006  0.03  0  0  12.70% 11.77% 10.91% 
Note: Boldface entries indicate numerical values of restrictions. Other entries are the long-run 
coefficients implied by the restrictions. 
 
Compared to CPB projections and scenarios the base line projection of about 10% in 
2050 is low. In a recent study of the effect of ageing, the share of public health care 
expenditure was projected to rise from 8.8% of GDP in 2006 to 13.1% in 2040 and 
12.5% in 2060.
2 Earlier a number of long term economic scenarios were developed 
and detailed for the health care sector. Total health care expenditure increased from 
8.7% in 2001 to between 13.3% and 14.6% in 2040 depending on the scenario.
3 
However, in the CPB scenarios the effect of the changing age structure of the 
population was taken into account. In that sense they are more comparable to model 9 
that yields a projection of 11.8%. The resulting projection of model 9, though 
considerably higher than the base line projection, is still substantially lower than the 
results of the comparable CPB scenarios. The base run model for the EU-15 that is 
used in Table B9-2, where the effect of several demographic variables is restricted to 
zero, may give rise to an underestimation of the effect of ageing for the Netherlands.  
 
Conclusions 
In the next 40 years health care expenditure in the Netherlands will increase because 
of ageing, in the model represented by increasing life expectancy of the elderly. The 
increase of 1.2 percentage point of GDP found in this analysis is low compared to 
other projections for the Netherlands. As the estimated income elasticity is close to 
unity, the effect of increasing GDP on the share of health expenditure is small. 
 
A number of policy variables appear to be important, like the organisation and 
payment of primary care and the share of public financing of health care. However, 
                                                 
2 Van Ewijk et al. (2006), Ageing and the sustainability of Dutch public finances, Den Haag, Centraal 
Planbureau 
3 The definition of health care in this case excluded pharmaceuticals and included some parts of long 
term care that fall outside the OECD definition. See Bos, F., R. Douven and E. Mot, Four Long-term 
scenarios for the Dutch government and the health care sector, Proceedings of the Banca d'Italia 
workshop, Perugia, 2005   B59
the effects of these policy variables that resulted from the analysis do not seem to fit 
the situation in the Netherlands. Dummies cannot completely describe the complex 
workings of a health care system and furthermore the restriction is used that the 
effects of the policy variables are homogeneous across countries. This may be the 
reason why some of the results found for the influence of these variables in the 
Netherlands are difficult to accept.  B60
B10    Portugal 
Namkee Ahn and Juan Ramon García (FEDEA, Madrid) 
 
Health care expenditure, 1980-2003 
During the period, 1980-2003, per-capita health care expenditure (as a share of per-
capita GDP) in Portugal has increased by 75% from 5.56% to 9.60%. It appears that 
population ageing may have been a factor contributing to this increase. Elderly 
population share has increased substantially during this period, from 7.45% to 9.63% 
for those aged 65 to 74 and from 3.73% to 7.05% for those aged 75 and more. Other 
variables have not changed much. However, given that the share of elderly population 
is still relatively small in 2003, the main driver of the increase in health care 
expenditure may be the increasing coverage of public health care system during this 
period in Portugal. 
 
Health care expenditure projections, 2004-2050 
Some important features of the final data we used for the projections are shown in 
Table B10-1. Due to persistently low fertility rate and continuous increase in 
longevity, the share of elderly (65 and older) population is projected to double during 
the period from 16.8% to 32.1%, posing as a potential driver of increased health care 
demand. 
 
On the other hand, the number of death per 100,000 habitants is projected to stay 
more less the same during the same period. Other variables, such as female labour 
share, unemployment rate, alcohol consumption and the share of public health 
expenditure, are predicted to be more or less stable during the projection period. 
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Table B10-1 Demographic, economic and institutional variables included in the 
model 
Variable Definitions  and  Sources  Projected 
Value in 
2004 
Projected 
Value in 
2050 
Average 
Annual 
Growth 
Rate, 
2004-
2050 
(%) 
AGE65-74  Population aged 65-74 as a share of the total 
population. Source: Eurostat. 
9.65 14.59 0.90 
AGE75+  Population aged 75+ as a share of the total population. 
Source: Eurostat. 
7.17 17.52 1.96 
AVELE65  The average life expectancy at aged 65 for males and 
females. Source: WHO. 
17.33 23.05  0.62 
MORTALITY  Mortality from any cause of death. Calculated as the 
simple ratio of number of registered deaths/mid-year 
population (per 100,000) (in logs). Source: WHO. 
1.03 1.01  -0.04 
GDP  Gross domestic product in US $ PPP. Source: OECD.  18587.36  35178.98  1.40 
FLFPR  Female labour force participation rate (% ratio to active 
population aged 15-65). Source: OECD and AWG. 
46.35 47.20  0.04 
UNEMP  Unemployed individuals as a share of the total labour 
force. Source: OECD and AWG. 
6.19 5.55  -0.24 
ALCCON Alcohol  consumption,  litres per capita (15+) (in logs). 
Source: OECD and Annual Growth Trend. 
11.28 11.50  0.04 
PUHES  Public health expenditure in US$ PPP per capita as a 
share of the total health expenditure in US$ PPP per 
capita. Source: OECD. 
69.88 69.88  0.00 
SALARYGP  Dummy variable taking the value of one for countries 
with salaried GPs; zero otherwise. Source: Christiansen 
et. al (2006) 
1.00 1.00  n.a. 
CAPGP  Dummy variable taking the value of one for countries 
with capitation payment GPs; zero otherwise. Source: 
Christiansen et. al (2006) . 
0.00 0.00  n.a. 
CASEHO  Dummy variable taking the value of one for countries 
with case-based reimbursement of hospitals; zero 
otherwise. Source: Christiansen et. al (2006) . 
0.00 0.00  n.a. 
COPAYGP  Dummy variable taking the value of one for countries 
with significant co-payment for GPs; zero otherwise. 
Source: Christiansen et. al (2006). 
1.00 1.00  n.a. 
COPAYHO  Dummy variable taking the value of one for countries 
with significant co-payment for inpatient hospital 
treatment; zero otherwise. Source: Christiansen et. al 
(2006) . 
0.00 0.00  n.a. 
FREEGP  Dummy variable taking the value of one for countries 
with free choice of GP or primary care physician; zero 
otherwise. Source: Christiansen et. al (2006) . 
1.00 1.00  n.a. 
FREEHO  Dummy variable taking the value of one for countries 
with overall ceiling of hospitals; zero otherwise. 
Source: Christiansen et. al (2006) . 
1.00 1.00  n.a. 
BEDS  Acute care beds per 1,000 inhabitants (in logs). Source: 
Christiansen et. al (2006) 
3.10 2.33  -0.62  B62
Simulation models of health care expenditure in Portugal, 2004-2050: 
Influences of Driving Variables 
We carried out projections under different assumptions of different variables. Base-
line model predicts the increase of HCE from 9.60% in 2003 to 13.8% in 2050. 
 
Table B10-2 shows the projection results when the specified variable in each row is 
held at 2003 level during the entire projection period while other variables follow the 
base-line scenario shown in Table B10-1. Hence, we can compare the relative 
contribution of each factor in health expenditure during the projected period. 
 
Obviously, constant GDP increases the share of HCE in GDP, while 1.5% annual 
growth in GDP leads to a very similar HCE to the base-line result. Higher life 
expectancy increases HCE by 2.77 percentage points, while other demographic 
variables have small effects. The overall effect of population ageing (higher life 
expectancy, greater share of elderly and smaller number of deaths) amounts to an 
increase of 3.13 percentage points in health care expenditure as a share of GDP. Other 
variables are not important. 
 
Table B10-2 Influence of Socio-Economic Variables on Projected Health Spending 
  Value in 2003  Value in 2050 in 
Base Run 
Projected Share of 
Health Spending 
in 2050 (% GDP) 
Difference from 
Base (% pts) 
Base  - - 13.79%  0.00% 
GDP  18587.36 35178.98 14.18%  0.38% 
GDP (1.5% p.a. 
growth) 
18587.36 35178.98 13.76%  -0.04% 
AGE65-74 9.65  14.59  13.88%  0.08% 
AGE75+ 7.17  17.52  13.36%  -0.44% 
AVELE65  17.33 23.05 11.02%  -2.77% 
FLFRP  46.35 47.20 13.32%  -0.47% 
MORTALITY  1.03 1.01 13.79%  0.00% 
UNEMP  6.19 5.55 13.74%  -0.06% 
ALCCON  11.28 11.50 13.79%  0.00% 
PUHES  69.88 69.88 13.77%  -0.02% 
Note: Except in the case above where the GDP growth rate is set to 1.5% p.a., the table shows the 
share of health spending in GDP resulting if each variable in turn is held to its 2003 value instead of 
moving to the 2050 value during the simulation. The GDP elasticity is unrestricted. 
  
Table B10-3 shows the projection results where we can examine the effect of policy 
variables on health expenditure. It shows that changing the pay system from salary to 
capitation would increase HCE by more than 2 percentage points. Two changes which 
will result in an important saving of HCE are the elimination of free choice of GP and 
the elimination of co-pay for GP. On the other hand, adoption of co-pay for hospital 
treatment or elimination of overall ceiling of hospitals will result in a decrease in HCE 
by about 0.9 percentage points each. 
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Table B10-3  Influence of Policy Variables on Projected Health Spending. Unit GDP 
Elasticity 
  Value in 2003  Value in 2050 in 
Base Run 
Projected Share of 
Health Spending 
in 2050 (% GDP) 
Difference from 
Base (% pts) 
Beds  3.10 2.33 14.04%  0.25% 
  Value in Base 
Run 
Value in 
Alternative 
  
SalaryGP  1.00 0.00 13.79%  0.00% 
CapGP  0.00 1.00 15.87%  2.08% 
CaseHO  0.00 1.00 13.57%  -0.22% 
CoPAyGP  1.00 0.00 11.45%  -2.34% 
CoPayHO  0.00 1.00 12.91%  -0.88% 
FreeGP  1.00 0.00 11.96%  -1.84% 
FreeHO  1.00 0.00 12.85%  -0.94% 
Note: The entry for beds has the same interpretation as in Table B1. The other entries show the 
impact of each dummy in turn changing from 0 to 1 or vice versa. 
Influences of Expenditure Elasticity 
It is often said that one of the most important factors which will determine future 
health care expenditure is income elasticity of health care expenditure. Table B10-4 
shows the projection results under different income elasticity for Portugal. Contrary to 
the previous findings, higher income elasticity results in lower health expenditure in 
Portugal. 
  
Table B10-4 Scenarios of different restrictions on long run income elasticity on 
health care expenditure in Portugal 
Restriction on 
long run income 
elasticity 
+1% s.d. of 
Health Care 
Expenditure in 
2050 
Health Care 
Expenditure in 
2050 
(% GDP) 
-1% s.d. of Health Care Expenditure 
in 2050 
Unrestricted  14.75% 13.79% 12.90% 
1  14.76% 13.81% 12.92% 
1.1  14.58% 13.58% 12.65% 
1.2  14.42% 13.32% 12.31% 
Influences of Restrictions on Demographic Parameters 
Finally, we explore the effects of restrictions on the demographic parameters, both 
with the long run elasticity with respect to GDP left unrestricted and with it set equal 
to 1. In the table R indicates that a demographic restriction has been imposed. For the 
age variables it is that the coefficient on them is what would be observed if health 
expenditure were driven by the age structure of the population. For mortality it is the 
coefficient which would be expected if the only demographic influence were death-
related costs.  In each case where demographic-related restrictions are imposed on 
parameters we are interested in two sub-cases. In the first the other parameters on the  B64
other demographic variables related to old people are left unrestricted and in the 
second they are restricted to zero. Thus the second sub case of each type tells us what 
would happen if expenditure were age or mortality related and if that were the only 
demographic influence.  
 
We can see that the restriction on the parameters of age structure variables increases 
substantially health care expenditure while imposing no effect of life expectancy 
variables mitigates this effect. 
 
Table B10-5  Impact of Restrictions on the Demographic Parameters on the 
Projected Share of Health Expenditure in 2050 
Model GDP 
Elasticity 
AGE65-
74 
AGE75+ AVELE65 MORT +1  S.D  Health 
Expenditure 
in 2050 (% 
GDP) 
-1 S.D 
0 1.0071  0 0  0.0419  0  14.75% 13.79%  12.90% 
1 1.0151  0 0  0.0538  0.313  15.60% 14.56%  13.59% 
2 1.1738  0 0  0  0.313  14.11% 12.97%  11.93% 
3 0.9653  0.006 0.03  0.0227  0  17.84% 16.69%  15.61% 
4 1.0403  0.006 0.03  0  0  16.95% 15.86%  14.83% 
5  1 0  0 0.0431  0  14.76% 13.81%  12.92% 
6  1 0  0 0.0564  0.313  15.62% 14.59%  13.64% 
7  1 0  0 0  0.313  12.96% 11.93%  10.98% 
8  1 0.006  0.03  0.0163  0  17.72% 16.58%  15.51% 
9  1 0.006  0.03  0  0  16.54% 15.47%  14.47% 
Note: Boldface entries indicate numerical values of restrictions. Other entries are the long-run 
coefficients implied by the restrictions. 
Conclusions 
According to our projection for Portugal, population ageing (higher life expectancy, 
greater share of elderly and smaller number of deaths) could increase substantially 
national health care expenditure, by 3.24 percentage points as a share of GDP. 
 
Some institutional variables could also affect health expenditure in the future. For 
example, a switch of paying system of GPs from salary to capitation will increase 
HCE by about 3 percentage points while the elimination of free choice of GP will 
save by a similar magnitude. 
 
Another important factor seems to be income elasticity health care expenditure. Even 
a small increase in the elasticity could result in a substantial rise in health expenditure 
in the future. B65
 
B11    Spain 
Namkee Ahn and Juan Ramon García (FEDEA, Madrid) 
Health care expenditure, 1980-2003 
During the period, 1980-2003, per-capita health care expenditure (as a share of per-
capita GDP) in Spain has increased by 42% from 5.41% to 7.68%. It appears that 
population ageing may have been a factor contributing to this increase. Elderly 
population share has increased substantially during this period, from 6.91% to 9.32% 
for those aged 65 to 74 and from 3.91% to 7.58% for those aged 75 and more. Other 
variables have not changed much. However, given that the share of elderly population 
is still relatively small in 2003, the main driver of the increase in health care 
expenditure may be the increasing coverage of public health care system during this 
period in Spain. 
Health care expenditure projections, 2004-2050 
Some important features of the final data we used for the projections are shown in 
Table B11-1. Due to persistently low fertility rate and continuous increase in 
longevity, the share of elderly (65 and older) population is projected to more than 
double during the period from 16.7% to 35%, posing as a potential driver of increased 
health care demand. 
 
Similarly, the number of death increases over time as the number of the elderly 
population increases.  The number of death per 100,000 habitants is projected to 
increase from 0.93 to 1.23 (in logarithm) during the same period, which can be 
another potential driver of health expenditures due to death related costs. 
 
Other variables are also expected to change although not so dramatically as 
demographic variables. Female labour share is projected to increase from 41% to 
45%, and unemployment rate to decrease from 11% to 7%. Alcohol consumption is 
also projected to decrease substantially. 
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Table B11-1 Demographic, economic and institutional variables included in the model  
Variable  Definitions and Sources  Projected 
Value in 
2004 
Projected 
Value in 
2050 
Average 
Annual 
Growth 
Rate, 2004-
2050 
AGE65-74  Population aged 65-74 as a share of the total 
population. Source: Eurostat. 
9.14 15.36  1.14 
AGE75+  Population aged 75+ as a share of the total 
population. Source: Eurostat. 
7.73 19.64  2.05 
AVELE65  The average life expectancy at aged 65 for 
males and females. Source: WHO. 
18.69 22.13  0.37 
MORTALITY  Mortality from any cause of death. Calculated as 
the simple ratio of number of registered 
deaths/mid-year population (per 100,000) (in 
logs). Source: WHO. 
0.93 1.23  0.62 
GDP  Gross domestic product in US $ PPP. Source: 
OECD. 
24177.72 47620.68  1.48 
FLFPR  Female labour force participation rate (% ratio 
to active population aged 15-65). Source: OECD 
and AWG. 
41.10 44.90  0.19 
UNEMP  Unemployed individuals as a share of the total 
labour force. Source: OECD and AWG. 
10.83 7.00  -0.94 
ALCCON Alcohol  consumption,  litres per capita (15+) (in 
logs). Source: OECD and Annual Growth 
Trend. 
10.59 5.95  -1.25 
PUHES  Public health expenditure in US$ PPP per capita 
as a share of the total health expenditure in US$ 
PPP per capita. Source: OECD. 
70.80 63.94  -0.22 
SALARYGP  Dummy variable taking the value of one for 
countries with salaried GPs; zero otherwise. 
Source: Christiansen et. al (2006) 
1.00 1.00  n.a. 
CAPGP  Dummy variable taking the value of one for 
countries with capitation payment GPs; zero 
otherwise. Source: Christiansen et. al (2006) . 
0.00 0.00  n.a. 
CASEHO  Dummy variable taking the value of one for 
countries with case-based reimbursement of 
hospitals; zero otherwise. Source: Christiansen 
et. al (2006) . 
0.00 0.00  n.a. 
COPAYGP  Dummy variable taking the value of one for 
countries with significant co-payment for GPs; 
zero otherwise. Source: Christiansen et. al 
(2006). 
0.00 0.00  n.a. 
COPAYHO  Dummy variable taking the value of one for 
countries with significant co-payment for 
inpatient hospital treatment; zero otherwise. 
Source: Christiansen et. al (2006) . 
0.00 0.00  n.a. 
FREEGP  Dummy variable taking the value of one for 
countries with free choice of GP or primary care 
physician; zero otherwise. Source: Christiansen 
et. al (2006) . 
1.00 1.00  n.a. 
FREEHO  Dummy variable taking the value of one for 
countries with overall ceiling of hospitals; zero 
otherwise. Source: Christiansen et. al (2006) . 
0.00 0.00  n.a. 
BEDS  Acute care beds per 1,000 inhabitants (in logs). 
Source: Christiansen et. al (2006) 
3.09 2.68 -0.31 
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Simulation models of health care expenditure in Spain, 2004-2050: 
Influences of Driving Variables 
We carried out projections under different assumptions of different variables. Base-
line model predicts the increase of HCE from 7.68% in 2003 to 11.10% in 2050. 
 
Table B11-2 shows the projection results when the specified variable in each row is 
held at 2003 level during the entire projection period while other variables follow the 
base-line scenario shown in Table B11-1. Hence, we can compare the relative 
contribution of each factor in health expenditure during the projected period. 
 
Obviously, constant GDP increases the share of HCE in GDP, while 1.5% annual 
growth in GDP leads to a very similar HCE to the base-line scenario. Higher life 
expectancy increases HCE by 1.4 percentage points, while the number of deaths 
(MORT) has a very small effect. The overall effect of population ageing (higher life 
expectancy, greater share of elderly and more deaths) amounts to an increase of 1.69 
percentage points in health care expenditure as a share of GDP. Increasing female 
labour force participation is expected to increase health expenditure by 1.16 
percentage points.  
 
Table B11-2 Influence of Socio-Economic Variables on Projected Health Spending 
  Value in 2003  Value in 2050 in 
Base Run 
Projected Share of 
Health Spending 
in 2050 (% GDP) 
Difference from 
Base (% pts) 
Base -  - 11.10%  0.00% 
GDP 24177.72  47620.68  11.39% 0.29% 
GDP (1.5% p.a. 
growth) 
24177.72 47620.68  11.05%  -0.05% 
AGE65-74 9.14  15.36 11.28%  0.18% 
AGE75+ 7.73 19.64  10.61%  -0.50% 
AVELE65 18.69  22.13  9.69%  -1.42% 
FLFRP 41.10 44.90  9.94% -1.16% 
MORTALITY 0.93  1.23  11.16%  0.05% 
UNEMP 10.83  7.00 10.81% -0.29% 
ALCCON 10.59  5.95  11.04% -0.07% 
PUHES 70.80 63.94  11.89% 0.78% 
Note: Except in the case above where the GDP growth rate is set to 1.5% p.a., the table shows the share 
of health spending in GDP resulting if each variable in turn is held to its 2003 value instead of moving 
to the 2050 value during the simulation. The GDP elasticity is unrestricted. 
 
 
 
 
Table B11-3 shows the projection results where we can examine the effect of policy 
variables on health expenditure. It shows that changing the pay system from salary to 
capitation would increase HCE by about 1.7 percentage points. A change that is 
projected to result in an important saving of HCE is the elimination of free choice of 
GP, whose effect is projected to be about 1.5 percentage points of HCE. On the other 
hand, contrary to our intuition, adoption of co-pay system is predicted to increase 
HCE by 2.3 percentage points. Adoption of case-based reimbursement of hospital is  B68
predicted to decrease HCE by 0.2 percentage points while adoption of overall ceiling 
of hospitals will result in a increase of HCE by about 0.8 percentage points. 
 
 
 
 
Table B11-3 Influence of Policy Variables on Projected Health Spending (Model 0) 
  Value in 2003  Value in 2050 in 
Base Run 
Projected Share of 
Health Spending 
in 2050 (% GDP) 
Difference from 
Base 
Beds 3.09 2.68  11.21%  0.10% 
  Value in Base 
Run 
Value in 
Alternative 
  
SalaryGP 1.00  0.00  11.10%  0.00% 
CapGP 0.00  1.00  12.78%  1.67% 
CaseHO 0.00  1.00  10.93%  -0.18% 
CoPAyGP 0.00  1.00 13.38% 2.27% 
CoPayHO 0.00  1.00  10.39%  -0.71% 
FreeGP 1.00  0.00  9.63%  -1.48% 
FreeHO 0.00  1.00  11.92%  0.81% 
Note: The entry for beds has the same interpretation as in Table B2-1. The other entries show the 
impact of each dummy in turn changing from 0 to 1 or vice versa. 
Influences of Expenditure Elasticity 
It is often claimed that one of the most important factors which will determine future 
health care expenditure is income elasticity of health care expenditure. Table B11-4 
shows the projection results under different income elasticity. An increase of income 
elasticity from 1 to 1.2 raises the HCE in 2050 by almost full one percentage point.  
 
Table B11-4 Scenarios of different restrictions on long run income elasticity on health 
care expenditure in Spain  
Restriction on long run income 
elasticity 
+1% s.d. of 
Health Care 
Expenditure in 
2050 
Health Care 
Expenditure in 
2050 
(% GDP) 
-1% s.d. of Health 
Care Expenditure 
in 2050 
Unrestricted 11.49%  11.10%  10.73% 
1 11.46%  11.09%  10.72% 
1.1 11.89%  11.46%  11.04% 
1.2 12.54%  12.02%  11.53% 
Influences of Restrictions on Demographic Parameters 
Finally, we explore the effects of restrictions on the demographic parameters, both 
with the long run elasticity with respect to GDP left unrestricted and with it set equal 
to 1. In the table we indicate demographic restrictions that have been imposed. For the 
age variables it is that the coefficient on them is what would be observed if health 
expenditure were driven by the age structure of the population. For mortality it is the 
coefficient which would be expected if the only demographic influence were death-
related costs. In each case where demographic-related restrictions are imposed on 
parameters we are interested in two sub-cases. In the first the other parameters on the 
other demographic variables related to old people are left unrestricted and in the  B69
second they are restricted to zero. Thus the second sub case of each type tells us what 
would happen if expenditure were age or mortality related and if that were the only 
demographic influence.  
 
We can see that the restriction on the parameters of age structure variables increases 
substantially health care expenditure while imposing no effect of life expectancy 
variables decreases it substantially. 
 
Table B11-5 Impact of Restrictions on the Demographic Parameters on the Projected 
Share of Health Expenditure in 2050 
Model GDP 
Elasticity 
AGE65-
74 
AGE75+ AVELE65 MORT +1  S.D  Health 
Expenditure 
in 2050 (% 
GDP) 
-1 S.D 
0 1.0071 0 0  0.0419  0  11.49% 11.10% 10.73% 
1 1.0151 0 0  0.0538  0.313  12.62% 12.16% 11.72% 
2 1.1738 0 0  0  0.313  13.50% 12.91% 12.34% 
3 0.9653  0.006 0.03 0.0227  0  15.04% 14.54% 14.05% 
4 1.0403  0.006 0.03  0  0  15.29% 14.77% 14.27% 
5  1 0 0  0.0431  0  11.46% 11.09% 10.72% 
6  1 0 0  0.0564  0.313  12.56% 12.11% 11.68% 
7  1 0 0  0  0.313  13.16% 12.60% 12.06% 
8  1 0.006  0.03  0.0163  0  15.18% 14.67% 14.18% 
9  1 0.006  0.03  0  0  15.05% 14.54% 14.05% 
Note: Boldface entries indicate numerical values of restrictions. Other entries are the long-run 
coefficients implied by the restrictions. 
 
Conclusions 
According to our projection for Spain, population ageing (higher life expectancy, 
greater share of elderly and more deaths) could increase substantially national health 
care expenditure, by 1.7 percentage points as a share of GDP. 
 
Some institutional variables could also affect health expenditure in the future. For 
example, a switch of paying system of GPs from salary to capitation or adoption of 
co-pay will increase substantially the health spending while the elimination of free 
choice of GP will save it substantially. 
 
Contrary to the cases of other countries, income elasticity seems to play a relatively 
minor role in Spain in determining future health care expenditure.  B70
B12    Sweden 
Report produced by Johan Jarl and Ulf-G Gerdtham, Health Economics Program 
(HEP), Lund University. 
Health Care Expenditure, 1980-2003 
The health care expenditures in Sweden increased from 9.0 per cent of GDP in 1980 
to 9.3 per cent in 2003, i.e. a marginal increase of 0.3 percentage points (OECD, 
2006b). This compares to a much higher growth in the EU15 countries of 2.5 
percentage points (OECD, 2006). However, the gap between health care expenditures 
in Sweden and the rest of EU15 have decreased as the health care expenditure for 
EU15 was 9.0 per cent of GDP in 2003, i.e. only 0.3 percentage points lower than 
Sweden. 
 
The share of public spending on total health care expenditure decreased in Sweden 
during 1980-2003, from 93 to 84 percent, i.e. 9 percentage point decrease. The public 
spending is mainly focused on the county councils while households and the corporate 
sector mainly make up the private expenditures. 
Health Care Expenditure Projections, 2004-2050 
The projected data for Sweden and the years 2004-2050 assumes a continuous growth 
in the alcohol consumption variable (ALCCON) while female labour force 
participation rate (FLFPR) are assumed to remain more or less constant around 48 
percent of the active population aged 15-65. The unemployment rate (UNEMP) are 
assumed to decrease by one percentage point over the projected period while a larger 
decrease is expected in the share of public health expenditures (PUHES). The later is 
assumed to decrease to just below 70 percent in 2050 following the trend of increased 
private expenditure. 
 
The number of acute care beds (BEDS) declined rather steeply in Sweden during the 
period 1980-2003. It can not, however, be assumed to continue in the future as it 
would rapidly converge toward zero. Lacking any relevant projections for the future, 
this variable have been set to zero growth rate during the projected period. 
 
The dependent variable is total health care expenditures per capita (THEPC), 
measured in US dollars (PPP) adjusted for inflation. This variable is for the sake of 
simplicity presented in the results as percentage of GDP. In Table B12-1 are the 
independent variables listed. The data are mainly collected from both the OECD 
Health Data 2006 and the AWG, with partial exception to ALCCON and UNEMP 
where additional sources have been used as supplements. Regarding ALCCON have 
unrecorded consumption, e.g. private import and bootlegging, been added to the 
recorded consumption. The reason for this is that an unrecorded consumption stand 
for a large fraction of total consumption in Sweden and, looking at recent years, the 
total consumption has increased while the recorded consumption has actually 
decreased. It would therefore result in a serious bias if unrecorded consumption was 
left outside the ALCCON variable for the case of Sweden. The source or method of 
derivation is indicated in the table below. It should be noted that the use of dummy  B71
variables as controls for institutional setting results in a somewhat oversimplified 
model, thus not fitting the Swedish system completely. 
 
Table B12-1. Demographic, economic and institutional variables included in our 
model 
Variable  Definitions and Sources  Projecte
d Value 
in 2004 
Projected 
Value in 
2050 
Average 
Annual 
Growth 
Rate, 2004-
2050 
AGE65-74  Population aged 65-74 as a share of the total 
population. Source: Eurostat. 
8.3 10.2  0.47 
AGE75+  Population aged 75+ as a share of the total 
population. Source: Eurostat. 
8.9 14.1  1.02 
AVELE65  The average life expectancy at aged 65 for 
males and females. Source: WHO. 
18.25 21.39  0.35 
MORTALIT
Y 
Mortality from any cause of death. Calculated as 
the simple ratio of number of registered 
deaths/mid-year population (per 100,000) (in 
logs). Source: WHO. 
1.10 1.22  0.22 
GDP  Gross domestic product in US $ PPP. Source: 
OECD. 
26440.4
7 
64119.00  1.95 
FLFPR  Female labour force participation rate (% ratio to 
active population aged 15-65). Source: OECD 
and AWG. 
48.03 47.86  -0.008 
UNEMP  Unemployed individuals as a share of the total 
labour force. Source: Eurostat and SCB. 
5.3 4.3  -0.42 
ALCCON  Alcohol consumption, litres per capita (15+) (in 
logs). Source: Gustafsson & Trolldal (2004), 
WHO and Annual Growth Trend. 
8.57 15.30  1.26 
PUHES  Public health expenditure in US$ PPP per capita 
as a share of the total health expenditure in US$ 
PPP per capita. Source: OECD, AWG and 
Annual Growth Trend. 
83.98 69.79  -0.40 
SALARYGP  Dummy variable taking the value of one for 
countries with salaried GPs; zero otherwise. 
Source: Christiansen et. al (2006) 
0 0  Na 
CAPGP  Dummy variable taking the value of one for 
countries with capitation payment GPs; zero 
otherwise. Source: Christiansen et. al (2006) . 
1 1  Na 
CASEHO  Dummy variable taking the value of one for 
countries with case-based reimbursement of 
hospitals; zero otherwise. Source: Christiansen 
et. al (2006) . 
0 0  Na 
COPAYGP  Dummy variable taking the value of one for 
countries with significant co-payment for GPs; 
zero otherwise. Source: Christiansen et. al 
(2006) . 
1 1  Na 
COPAYHO  Dummy variable taking the value of one for 
countries with significant co-payment for 
inpatient hospital treatment; zero otherwise. 
Source: Christiansen et. al (2006) . 
1 1  Na 
FREEGP  Dummy variable taking the value of one for 
countries with free choice of GP or primary care 
physician; zero otherwise. Source: Christiansen 
et. al (2006) . 
1 1  Na 
FREEHO  Dummy variable taking the value of one for 
countries with overall ceiling of hospitals; zero 
otherwise. Source: Christiansen et. al (2006) . 
1 1  Na 
BEDS  Acute care beds per 1,000 inhabitants (in logs). 
Source: Christiansen et. al (2006) 
0.63 0.63  0  B72
Simulation models of health care expenditure in Sweden, 2004-2050: 
Influences of Driving Variables 
The baseline estimation of health care expenditure as proportion of GDP in 2050 is 
shown in Table B12-2. It is expected to fall to 8.7 percent of GDP by the year 2050.  
Table B12-2 also shows the results of simulations in which each socio-economic 
variable is held constant at its value in 2003, one variable at a time. This is done in 
order to investigate the importance of the projected path of the exogenous variables 
on the baseline estimation.  
 
Table B12-2  The Influence of Socio-Economic Variables on Projected Health 
Spending (Model 0) 
  Value in 2003  Value in 2050 in 
Base Run 
Projected Share of 
Health Spending 
in 2050 (% GDP) 
Difference from 
Base 
Base    8.73%  0.00 
GDP 25987 64119 9.03% 0.30 
GDP (1.5% p.a. 
growth) 
25987 52594 8.76% 0.03 
AGE65-74 8.3  10.2  8.83%  0.10 
AGE75+ 8.9  14.1  8.67% -0.06 
FLFPR  47.43 47.86  8.62 -0.09 
AVELE65 18.88  21.39  7.92%  -0.81 
MORTALITY 1.10  1.22  8.74%  0.01 
UNEMP 5.3  4.3  8.66% -0.07 
ALCCON 8.57  15.30  8.78%  0.05 
PUHES 83.98  69.79  9.95%  1.22 
Note: Except in the case above where the GDP growth rate is set to 1.5% p.a., the table shows the 
share of health spending in GDP resulting if each variable in turn is held to its 2003 value instead of 
moving to the 2050 value during the simulation. The GDP elasticity is unrestricted. 
 
Some of our projections have a rather large influence on the share of health spending. 
Especially the expected decrease in the public share of health expenditures (PUHES) 
leads to a decrease of the estimation by 1.2 percentage points. This is important when 
comparing with the AWG figure above as one of the differences between the 
estimates is removed when not projecting a decrease in PUHES. The variable for 
average life expectancy at aged 65 (AVELE65) have also a non-negligible impact, in 
this case by increasing the estimate by 0.8 percentage points. Setting the GDP growth 
rate to zero increases the share of health spending in 2050 by 0.3 percentage points 
and with a growth rate of 1.5 (below baseline) is the projected share of health 
spending in 2050 8.8 percent of GDP. 
 
No other variables have any larger impact on the estimation although taking all 
demographic variables together, their projections increase the estimation by 0.77 
percentage points, mainly due to AVELE65. All sensitivity analyses in Table B12-2 
fall within one standard deviation of the baseline estimation (9.10 – 8.38%) except 
PUHES and AVELE65. 
 
We will now use a similar approach as above to investigate the effects of the health 
policy variables. The health policy variables are the dummy variables and BEDS, the 
only continuous health policy variable. For reasons stated above, the BEDS-variable 
have been assumed to have a zero growth rate in the baseline model and will thus not 
be included in this analysis. In the previous analysis are the variables kept at the 2003  B73
value for the whole projected period while the opposite is true for the current analysis. 
All dummy variables will be switched one at a time, from zero to one or one to zero, 
for the projected period. The results are shown in Table B12-3. 
 
Table B12-3  The Influence of Policy Variables on  Projected Health Spending 
(Model 0) 
  Value in Base 
Run 
Value in 
Alternative 
Projected Share of 
Health Spending 
in 2050 (% GDP) 
Difference from 
Base 
Base    8.73%  0.00 
SalaryGP 0  1  8.73%  0.00 
CapGP 1  0  7.59%  -1.14 
CaseHO 0  1  8.59% -0.14 
CoPayGP 1  0  7.25%  -1.48 
CoPayHO 1  0  9.33%  0.60 
FreeGP 1  0  7.57% -1.16 
FreeHO 1  0  8.14% -0.59 
Note: The entries show the impact of each dummy in turn changing from 0 to 1 or vice versa. 
 
Table B12-3 shows that the largest effect of health policies on the estimate are those 
targeting GPs rather than hospitals. Capitation payments GPs (CapGP), significant co-
payment GPs (CoPayGP) and free choice of GPs (FreeGP) all add to the cost rather 
substantially (increase by more than one percentage point each). For policies targeting 
hospitals do case-based reimbursement of hospitals (CaseHO) and significant co-
payment inpatient hospital treatment (CoPayHO) give a lower cost while overall 
ceiling of hospitals (FreeHO) gives a higher cost. 
Influences of Expenditure Elasticities 
In Table B12-4 are the effects of increases in health spending elasticity with respect to 
GDP shown. For the case of the Swedish estimate, the health care expenditures 
increase with increased elasticity. The model does not, however, seem to be overly 
sensitive to restrictions on the long run income elasticity as the change is rather 
moderate. Further is an increase in health care expenditure expected with increasing 
elasticity, holding all else equal, given a positive GDP growth rate. 
 
Table B12-4  Scenarios of different restrictions on long run income elasticity on 
health care expenditure in Sweden 
Restriction on long run income 
elasticity 
+1% s.d. of 
Health Care 
Expenditure in 
2050 
Health Care 
Expenditure in 
2050 
(% GDP) 
-1% s.d. of Health Care 
Expenditure in 2050 
Unrestricted 9.10%  8.73%  8.38% 
1 9.08%  8.71%  8.36% 
1.1 9.36%  9.00%  8.65% 
1.2 9.67%  9.30%  8.94% 
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Influences of Restrictions on Demographic Parameters 
Table B12-5 below shows the effects of restrictions (boldface) on the demographic 
variables. In each case when a demographic restriction is imposed, two alternative 
models are estimated (with and without unit elasticity).  For the age variables the 
coefficient is what would be observed if health expenditure were driven by the age 
structure of the population, while for mortality the coefficient is what would be 
expected if the only demographic influence were death-related costs.  
 
 
Table B12-5  The Impact of Restrictions on the Demographic Parameters on 
the Projected Share of Health Expenditure in 2050 
Model GDP 
Elasticity 
AGE65-
74 
AGE75+ AVELE65 MORT +1  S.D  Health 
Expenditure 
in 2050 (% 
GDP) 
-1 S.D 
0 1.0071  0 0  0.0419  0  9.10% 8.73%  8.38% 
1 1.0151  0 0  0.0538  0.313  9.21% 8.82%  8.45% 
2 1.1738  0 0  0  0.313  9.36% 8.99%  8.63% 
3 0.9653  0.006 0.03 0.0227  0  9.61% 9.19%  8.79% 
4 1.0403  0.006 0.03  0  0 9.71% 9.31%  8.94% 
5  1 0 0  0.0431  0  9.08% 8.71%  8.36% 
6  1 0 0  0.0564  0.313  9.17% 8.78%  8.40% 
7  1 0 0  0  0.313  8.62% 8.27%  7.93% 
8  1 0.006  0.03  0.0163  0  9.70% 9.29%  8.89% 
9  1 0.006  0.03  0  0  9.47% 9.10%  8.74% 
Note: Boldface entries indicate numerical values of restrictions. Other entries are the long-run 
coefficients implied by the restrictions. 
 
 
Assuming that only death-related costs have an demographic influence (model 2) 
increases the health care expenditure compared to the baseline (model 0) when using 
an unrestricted income elasticity. However, unit elasticity (model 7) reduces the costs 
compared to the baseline (model 5). Weakening the restriction and allowing average 
life expectancy at age 65 to also have an influence takes an intermediate position for 
unrestricted income elasticity (model 1) and increases the costs compared to baseline 
when restricted to unit income elasticity (model 6). When restricting so that only age 
structures have an influence on health expenditures, the costs increases (model 4 & 9). 
Relaxing the restriction on average life expectancy at 65 further increases the costs 
when the GDP elasticity is restricted to unity (model 8) and takes an intermediate 
position otherwise (model 3). It is noteworthy that no large differences exist between 
models, irrespective of the restrictions imposed.  
Conclusions  
The health care expenditure for Sweden in 2050 as share of GDP is estimated to 8.7 
percent, i.e. a decrease by 0.6 percentage points compared to 2003. The results for 
Sweden are rather stable and it is mainly the variable for public health expenditures as 
share of the total health expenditure (PUHES) and health policy variables regarding 
GPs that have a larger effect on the results.   B75
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B13    United Kingdom 
Ehsan Khoman and Martin Weale, National Institute of Economic and Social 
Research (NIESR) 
Health Care Expenditure, 1980-2003 
Health care expenditure in the United Kingdom grew by an estimated 2.1 percentage 
points from 5.7 per cent to 7.8 per cent of GDP between 1980 and 2003. According to 
the OECD Health Data 2006 (OECD, 2006) this compares with a growth of 2.5 
percentage points for the EU15 member states over the same period with health care 
expenditure  in 2003 reaching 9.0 per cent of GDP. 
 
The United Kingdom health care expenditure can be broadly divided into public 
spending, which is mainly spent on the National Health Service, and private spending, 
which is defined as expenditure by the household and corporate sector on health care. 
Estimated of public health expenditure as a share of the total fell by an estimated 7.2 
percentage points to 82.2 per cent between 1980 and 2003. 
Health Care Expenditure Projections, 2004-2050 
The projected data for the United Kingdom assume that the unemployment rate 
(UNEMP) is expected to fall slightly whilst both, the amount of alcohol consumption 
per capita (ALCCON) and the number of acute care beds (BEDS) will rise until 2050. 
Finally, private health care expenditure is expected to rise considerably, with the level 
of public health care expenditure (PUHES) falling to under seventy per cent by the 
end year of the projections. 
 
The dependent variable used in this paper is total health care expenditure per capita 
(THEPC) measured in US dollars in nominal prices, adjusted for purchasing power 
parities (PPP) and for inflation, although this is converted to a percentage of GDP in 
presenting the results. The variables are listed in Table B13-1 in our model have been 
collected from both the OECD Health Data 2006 and the AWG. The projected data 
are in all cases except one, either derived from the OECD, AWG or evaluated by 
extrapolating the trend over the period 1980-2003. However, the BEDS variable 
shows erratic movement suggesting that its definition may have changed, and we 
therefore use the 2003 value in the projection. Dummy variables are assumed 
unchanged. The source or method of derivation is indicated in the table. 
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Table B13-1  Demographic, economic and institutional variables included in our 
model 
Variable  Definitions and Sources 
Projected 
Value in 
2004 
Projected 
Value in 
2050 
Average 
Annual 
Growth 
Rate, 
2004-
2050 
AGE65-
74 
Population aged 65-74 as a share of the total 
population. Source: Eurostat.  8.41 11.12 0.62 
AGE75+  Population aged 75+ as a share of the total 
population. Source: Eurostat.  7.58 15.36 1.55 
AVELE6
5 
The average life expectancy at aged 65 for males 
and females. Source: WHO.  17.61 22.83 0.57 
MORTA
LITY 
Mortality from any cause of death. Calculated as 
the simple ratio of number of registered 
deaths/mid-year population (per 100,000) (in 
logs). Source: WHO. 
0.99 1.12 0.28 
GDP  Gross domestic product in US $ PPP. Source: OECD.  27319.01  61822.06  1.79 
FLFPR 
Female labour force participation rate (% ratio to 
active population aged 15-65). Source: OECD and 
AWG. 
45.43 46.07 0.03 
UNEMP  Unemployed individuals as a share of the total 
labour force. Source: OECD and AWG.  4.90 4.59  -0.14 
ALCCO
N 
Alcohol consumption, litres per capita (15+) (in 
logs). Source: OECD and Annual Growth Trend.  11.34 19.93 1.23 
PUHES 
Public health expenditure in US$ PPP per capita as 
a share of the total health expenditure in US$ PPP 
per capita. Source: OECD. 
81.90 69.43 -0.36 
SALAR
YGP 
Dummy variable taking the value of one for 
countries with salaried GPs; zero otherwise. 
Source: Christiansen et. al (2006) 
0.00 0.00  na 
CAPGP 
Dummy variable taking the value of one for 
countries with capitation payment GPs; zero 
otherwise. Source: Christiansen et. al (2006) . 
0.00 0.00  na 
CASEH
O 
Dummy variable taking the value of one for 
countries with case-based reimbursement of 
hospitals; zero otherwise. Source: Christiansen et. 
al (2006) . 
0.00 0.00  na 
COPAY
GP 
Dummy variable taking the value of one for 
countries with significant co-payment for GPs; 
zero otherwise. Source: Christiansen et. al (2006). 
0.00 0.00  na 
COPAY
HO 
Dummy variable taking the value of one for 
countries with significant co-payment for inpatient 
hospital treatment; zero otherwise. Source: 
Christiansen et. al (2006) . 
0.00 0.00  na 
FREEGP 
Dummy variable taking the value of one for 
countries with free choice of GP or primary care 
physician; zero otherwise. Source: Christiansen et. 
al (2006) . 
1.00 1.00  na 
FREEHO 
Dummy variable taking the value of one for 
countries with overall ceiling of hospitals; zero 
otherwise. Source: Christiansen et. al (2006) . 
0.00 0.00  na 
BEDS  Acute care beds per 1,000 inhabitants (in logs). 
Source: Christiansen et. al (2006)  4.61 4.61  0 
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It is important to note that many of the variables, such as those representing the public 
share in health spending may seem arbitrary, and we subsequently explore the 
importance of our assumptions. In addition, the differences between institutional 
arrangements of different countries are not usually as simple and clear-cut as implied 
by the use of dummy variables which take on values of zero or one. The United 
Kingdom does not fit perfectly into this framework. 
Simulation models of health care expenditure in the United Kingdom, 
2004-2050: Influences of Driving Variables 
Table B13-2 shows the base-line expenditure on health as a proportion of GDP, with 
expenditure on health care expected to rise to 9.5% of GDP in 2050 from 7.8% in 
2003.  In Table B13-2 we show, along with the base value, the results of simulations 
in which each socio-economic variable is set to the value that it held in 2003. 
Comparison of the results of these simulations with the base therefore indicates the 
importance of the projected path of the variable as an influence on the base projection. 
These are calculated using model 0 of tables 3, 4 and 7.  
 
Table B13-2 The Influence of Socio-Economic Variables on Projected Health 
Spending (Model 0) 
 Value  in  2003  Value in 2050 in 
Base Run 
Projected Share of 
Health Spending 
in 2050 (% GDP) 
Difference from 
Base (% pts) 
Base    9.41%  0.00% 
GDP 26719 61822 9.70%  0.29% 
GDP (1.5% p.a. 
growth)  26719 61822 9.41%  0.00% 
AGE65-74 8.21  11.12  9.42% 0.01% 
AGE75+ 7.29  15.36  9.32%  -0.09% 
AVELE65 17.61  22.83  7.75% -1.66% 
FLFRP 44.46  46.07  8.99%  -0.42% 
MORTALITY 0.99  1.12  9.44%  0.03% 
UNEMP 4.80  4.59  9.40%  -0.01% 
ALCCON 11.20  19.93  9.46%  0.05% 
PUHES 82.20  69.43  10.56%  1.21% 
Note: Except in the case above where the GDP growth rate is set to 1.5% p.a., the table shows the 
share of health spending in GDP resulting if each variable in turn is held to its 2003 value instead of 
moving to the 2050 value during the simulation. The GDP elasticity is unrestricted. 
 
This table shows that some of our projections have a powerful influence on the share 
of spending. Although the steady state elasticity with respect to GDP is very close to 
1, a reduction in the growth rate affects the dynamics of the process and thus the 
projected value for 2050. The share of the population in each age group is not very 
important, which is not very surprising since the variables are specified to have no 
long-run effect. Mortality likewise has little influence. However rising average life 
expectancy adds 1.7 percentage points to the expenditure share. The share of the 
public sector in health spending is also important, with a projected decline in the share 
decreasing the expenditure total by 1.2 percentage points.  
 
We use a similar approach to look at the effects of the variables which can be 
regarded as health policy variables. The only continuous variable of this type is the 
number of beds; we treat this as in the earlier simulations, showing what would have 
happened if it had been held at its 2003 value. The other variables are dummy  B79
variables and we explore these differently. We carry out a set of simulations in which 
the value of each in turn is switched between the base run and the alternatives. Thus if 
a dummy took the value of 1 in the base it is switched to 0 in the alternative and vice 
versa. These results are shown in Table B13-3. 
 
 
Table B13-3. The Influence of Policy Variables on Projected Health Spending 
(Model 0) 
 Value  in  2003  Value in 2050 in 
Base Run 
Projected Share of 
Health Spending 
in 2050 (% GDP) 
Difference from 
Base 
Beds 4.61  4.61 9.41%  0.00% 
  Value in Base 
Run 
Value in 
Alternative    
SalaryGP 0  1  9.41%  0.00% 
CapGP 0  1 10.83%  1.42% 
CaseHO 0  1  9.26%  -0.15% 
CoPAyGP 0  1  11.34%  1.93% 
CoPayHO 0  1  8.81%  -0.60% 
FreeGP 1  0  8.16%  -1.25% 
FreeHO 0  1  10.10%  -0.69% 
Note: The entry for beds has the same interpretation as in Table B1. The other entries show the impact 
of each dummy in turn changing from 0 to 1 or vice versa. 
 
 
 
The table shows that it is the management of GPs rather than the management of 
hospitals which has an important effect on health spending. However, while the 
effects are large, there are questions how far the circumstances of any one country is 
adequately represented by dummy variables since any classification of this type 
inevitably has an arbitrary element to it.  
Influences of Expenditure Elasticities 
Table B13-4 shows the effects of different  elasticities of health spending with respect 
to GDP on total expenditure as a proportion of GDP.  Since in model 0 the GDP 
elasticity is very close to one, it is no surprise that the result is scarcely changed by 
imposing an elasticity of 1. Higher elasticities result in lower expenditure shares. This 
is because of the interaction between the elasticity and the coefficient on life 
expectancy as discussed in the main body of the paper.  
 
Table B13-4  Scenarios of different restrictions on long run income elasticity on 
health care expenditure in the United Kingdom 
Restriction on 
long run income 
elasticity 
+1% s.d. of 
Health Care 
Expenditure in 
2050 
Health Care 
Expenditure in 
2050 
(% GDP) 
-1% s.d. of Health 
Care Expenditure 
in 2050 
AWG Scenarios 
Unrestricted 9.78%  9.41%  9.06%  9.3% 
1 9.78%  9.42%  9.07%  9.7% 
1.1 9.76%  9.37%  9.00% n.a. 
1.2 9.74%  9.31%  8.91% n.a. 
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Influences of Restrictions on Demographic Parameters 
Finally, in Table B13-5 we explore the effects of restrictions on the demographic 
parameters, both with the long run elasticity with respect to GDP left unrestricted and 
with it set equal to 1. In the table the boldface entries indicate that a demographic 
restriction has been imposed. For the age variables it is that the coefficient on them is 
what would be observed if health expenditure were driven by the age structure of the 
population. For mortality it is the coefficient which would be expected if the only 
demographic influence were death-related costs. In each case where demographic-
related restrictions are imposed on parameters we are interested in two sub-cases. In 
the first the other parameters on the other demographic variables related to old people 
are left unrestricted and in the second they are restricted to zero. Thus the second sub 
case of each type tells us what would happen if expenditure were age or mortality 
related and if that were the only demographic influence. 
 
 
Table B13-5  The Impact of Restrictions on the Demographic Parameters on 
the Projected Share of Health Expenditure in 2050 
Model  GDP 
Elasticity 
AGE65-
74  AGE75+ AVELE65 MORT +1  S.D 
Health 
Expenditure 
in 2050 (% 
GDP) 
-1 S.D 
0 1.0071  0 0  0.0419  0  9.78% 9.41% 9.06% 
1 1.0151  0 0  0.0538  0.313  10.08% 9.71%  9.35% 
2 1.1738  0 0  0  0.313  9.32% 8.90% 8.50% 
3 0.9653  0.006 0.030 0.0227  0  10.90% 10.49% 10.09% 
4 1.0403  0.006 0.030  0  0 10.57% 10.14%  9.74% 
5  1 0  0  0.0431  0  9.78% 9.41% 9.07% 
6  1  0 0  0.0564  0.313  10.09% 9.72%  9.36% 
7  1 0 0  0  0.313  8.61% 8.22% 7.84% 
8  1 0.006  0.030  0.0163  0  10.89% 10.47% 10.06% 
9  1 0.006  0.030  0  0  10.31% 9.91%  9.52% 
Note: Boldface entries indicate numerical values of restrictions. Other entries are the long-run 
coefficients implied by the restrictions. 
 
 
The importance of the interactions between the coefficients can be deduced from this 
table. The restriction that spending is driven by death-related costs in the manner set 
out in section 3.2 has the effect of raising projected expenditure by 0.3 percentage 
points. However, if the life expectancy effects are restricted to zero so that death-
related costs are the only demographic influence, then projected expenditure is 
reduced by 0.5 percentage points. By contrast when expenditure is assumed to be age 
related expenditure is raised by nearly one percentage point, falling to 0.7 percentage 
points when life expectancy effects are also suppressed. If the GDP elasticity is also 
restricted to one these effects are altered. In particular, when demographic effects are 
assumed to come only through mortality effects, a unit elasticity has the effect of 
reducing age projected expenditure fairly sharply.   B81
Conclusions 
The exercise has indicated a number of key influences on health spending in the 
United Kingdom. Estimates of the influence of demographic effects are crucially 
dependent on the interaction between these and the estimated GDP elasticity of health 
spending. The extent to which the public sector provides health care is an important 
influence on total spending and there is evidence that other institutional arrangements 
are also important, although the crude nature of the measures used makes it difficult 
to come up with any firm conclusions about these. 
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Appendix C    The Effects of Copayments to GPs in 
Austria
1 
Martin Weale NIESR 
 
We noted in section 7  the substantial effect that the change in 2005 to copayments to 
GPs has  on the projections for Austria. Because of the concerns that the dummy 
variable reflects only this and not also a range of other institutional factors, we 
reproduce Table B1-5 but on the assumption that there is no institutional change in the 
forecast period. This is shown in Table C1  below. 
 
Table C1  The Impact of Restrictions on the Demographic Parameters on the Projected 
Share of Health Expenditure in 2050. No changes to Copayments to GPs 
Model  GDP 
Elasticity  AGE65-74 AGE75+ AVELE65 MORT +1  S.D
Health 
Expenditure 
in 2050  
(% GDP) 
-1 S.D 
Results from 
report on 
Austria Table 
B1-5 
0 1.0071  0 0  0.0419  0  11.41% 10.81% 10.24%  8.98% 
1 1.0151  0 0  0.0538  0.313  14.28% 13.49% 12.74%  10.43% 
2 1.1738  0 0 0  0.313  13.19% 12.34% 11.55%  9.11% 
3 0.9653 0.006 0.03 0.0227  0  14.62% 13.78% 12.99%  10.61% 
4 1.0403 0.006 0.03  0  0  14.22% 13.34% 12.52%  9.92% 
5  1 0  0  0.0431  0  11.40% 10.81% 10.24%  9.06% 
6  1 0  0  0.0564  0.313  14.27% 13.48% 12.74%  10.44% 
7  1 0  0 0  0.313  11.81% 10.99% 10.21%  7.84% 
8  1 0.006  0.03  0.0163  0  14.62% 13.78% 12.98%  10.59% 
9  1 0.006  0.03 0  0  13.87% 13.00% 12.18%  9.53% 
Note: Boldface entries indicate numerical values of restrictions. Other entries are the 
long-run coefficients implied by the restrictions. 
 
It is clear that the impact of the institutional change on the projection is of the order of 
2-3 percentage points. However, if the remainder of the health system in Austria 
remains unchanged, there is a risk that the predicted benefits of this may not be 
realised. Table C1 points to a risk that Austria may face greater upward pressure on its 
health expenditure than the results in Appendix B suggest. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 This Appendix was prepared by Martin Weale of NIESR  
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